What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

Toward law–gospel harmony in Lutheran theology and ethics

Lutheran antipathy toward the law is harmful to Christian ethics. This antipathy arises from the false notion that law and gospel are opposed. However, the Lutheran Confessions show that law–gospel distinction does not necessarily imply law–gospel opposition. When law and gospel are properly defined, they interrelate harmoniously within a multiperspectival model of Christian ethics. Moreover, the third use of the law then emerges as the basic and primary use.     

Metasemantic ethics

The idea that experts (especially scientific experts) play a privileged role in determining the meanings of our words and the contents of our concepts has become commonplace since the work of Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and others in the 1970s. But if experts have the power to determine what our words mean, they can do so responsibly or irresponsibly, from good motivations or bad, justly or unjustly, with good or bad effects. This paper distinguishes three families of metasemantic views based on their attitudes towards bad behaviour by meaning-fixing experts, and draws a series of distinctions relevant for the normative evaluation of meaning-determining actions.     

COVID-19 and Religious Ethics

The editors of the JRE solicited short essays on the COVID-19 pandemic from a group of scholars of religious ethics that reflected on how the field might help them make sense of the complex religious, cultural, ethical, and political implications of the pandemic, and on how the pandemic might shape the future of religious ethics.     

Toward ethical cognitive architectures for the development of artificial moral agents

New technologies based on artificial agents promise to change the next generation of autonomous systems and therefore our interaction with them. Systems based on artificial agents such as self-driving cars and social robots are examples of this technology that is seeking to improve the quality of people’s life. Cognitive architectures aim to create some of the most challenging artificial agents commonly known as bio-inspired cognitive agents. This type of artificial agent seeks to embody human-like intelligence in order to operate and solve problems in the real world as humans do. Moreover, some cognitive architectures such as Soar, LIDA, ACT-R, and iCub try to be fundamental architectures for the Artificial General Intelligence model of human cognition. Therefore, researchers in the machine ethics field face ethical questions related to what mechanisms an artificial agent must have for making moral decisions in order to ensure that their actions are always ethically right. This paper aims to identify some challenges that researchers need to solve in order to create ethical cognitive architectures. These cognitive architectures are characterized by the capacity to endow artificial agents with appropriate mechanisms to exhibit explicit ethical behavior. Additionally, we offer some reasons to develop ethical cognitive architectures. We hope that this study can be useful to guide future research on ethical cognitive architectures.     

Wall,Gate and Self-Other Dynamics: A Confucian Ethics of Separation and Interconnection

This paper starts with the social and moral implications of wall in history and in the contemporary world, to usher in the early Confucian discourse on wall and gate. The Confucian discourse implies that walls—either actual, virtual or symbolic—are there to defend and/or to separate, while gates enable the managed access to and opening-up the self-imposed insularity or moderate the self-centred exclusiveness that walls imply. By way of reinterpretation and reconstruction, we will extract from a variety of Confucian discussions the ethical awareness that however strongly built, walls must be associated with gates, and that the wall and the gate are therefore locked in mutuality to make possible the reality of interconnectedness between the inside and the outside and between the self and the other. It will be argued that by using ethical virtues as tools to moderate separation and exclusiveness, Confucian discourses highlight the dynamics of the self-other relationship, and establishes an ethics that may well be still applicable to contemporary situations and can be drawn upon to help dissolve the tension between the values of populist self-centrism and those of globalist interconnectedness.     

启新、拓新与创新——论生态伦理学对伦理学的贡献

构建和谐社会,必须弘扬生态伦理,繁荣生态伦理学。生态伦理学对伦理学的贡献功不可没,主要体现为：开辟了伦理学研究的新领域,确立了处理人与自然关系的新原则,培育了人对自然的新态度,对传统思想展开了新的系统批判,明确了人类在自然生活中扮演的新角色,对伦理学基本观念进行了新阐释,制定了人类行为新规范。     

试论罗尔斯顿环境伦理学的理论主旨

罗尔斯顿从整个西方伦理思想发展的角度出发,认为道德是人的存在方式,环境伦理的产生不是要推翻或取代人际伦理,而是要为自然共同体中的人类确立生存方式。人类道德之所以要观照自然生态系统,是因为自然生态系统具有自身的内在价值和存在目的,以文化方式生存于其中的人类须对此给予道德的尊重。环境伦理与人际伦理共同构成了完整的人之伦理,它们都是人的生存之道。     

进化伦理学及其向西方传统伦理学的挑战

在“进化伦理学”这个名称下,容纳了形形色色的具体构想。但是,各种进化伦理学纲领都以进化论来理解和把握人类道德现象。广义进化伦理学就是道德进化论。它侧重于对道德现象进行描述和说明（解释）,但也试图对已有的道德规范体系进行评价,并在评价的基础上对已有的道德规范进行限定或修正,因而并未完全丧失规范伦理学的性质。进化伦理学对西方传统伦理学的基础、学科性质和若干核心伦理观念提出了尖锐的挑战。     

Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory

This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense of “possible”) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other “higher” animals do make such claims on us.