Pretense,Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters

Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non‐real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn about the world. Both planning with causal models and learning about them require the ability to create false premises and generate conclusions from these premises. We argue that pretending allows children to practice these important cognitive skills. We also consider the prevalence of unrealistic scenarios in children's play and explain how they can be useful in learning, despite appearances to the contrary.     

Beliefs in moral luck: When and why blame hinges on luck

Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.     

Enkratic Agency

An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery how an agent's thinking and acting can be guided by the enkratic requirement, which, as I shall further argue, is something that an adequate conception of enkratic rationality must be able to explain. This, I suggest, motivates exploring a different account of enkratic rationality. On this view, enkratic rationality is primarily a constitutive requirement on agency: it is a standard internal to agency, i.e., a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agential powers well.     

归纳推理的抽样理论

作者提出归纳推理的抽样理论,认为归纳推理实质是根据与归纳特征有关的抽样样本情况来推断结论类别具有归纳特征的可能性,其中的抽样可分为类别抽样和特征抽样两种。以大学生为被试的两个实验结果一致支持抽样理论而不是别的归纳推理理论。对于归纳推理的主要现象,抽样理论比其它的相似性解释具有更大的解释范围,特别是能够解释其它理论严格不能解释的归纳推理非对称性现象     

Minds, persons, and space: an fMRI investigation into the relational complexity of higher-order intentionality

Mental state reasoning or theory-of-mind has been the subject of a rich body of imaging research. Although such investigations routinely tap a common set of regions, the precise function of each area remains a contentious matter. With the help of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we sought to determine which areas are involved when processing mental state or intentional metarepresentations by focusing on the relational aspect of such representations. Using non-intentional relational representations such as spatial relations between persons and between objects as a contrast, the results ascertained the involvement of the precuneus, the temporal poles, and the medial prefrontal cortex in the processing of intentional representations. In contrast, the anterior superior temporal sulcus and the left temporo-parietal junction were implicated when processing representations that refer to the presence of persons in relational contexts in general. The right temporo-parietal junction, however, was specifically activated for persons entering spatial relations. The level of representational complexity, a previously unexplored factor, was also found to modulate the neural response in some brain regions, such as the medial prefrontal cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction. These findings highlight the need to take into account the critical roles played by an extensive network of neural regions during mental state reasoning.     

条件推理和选择任务的关系：选择任务中的条件推理逻辑

要求大学生被试在相同的情境和规则下先后完成选择任务和条件推理任务,从而系统考察两项条件命题任务之间的关系。结果表明,当规则的语义表征意义为条件命题和反条件命题时,两项任务的反应模式具有一致性;当为双向条件和非条件命题时,两项任务的反应模式出现了分歧,而且四种推理形式和四张卡片之间不存在直接的对应关系。两项条件命题任务之间的关系表现在,它们可能享有共同的语义关系表征空间,但推理过程和策略有所不同。     

Rejecting the Urge to Theorise in Fallacy Inquiry

In this paper, I examine the incessant call to theory that is evident in fallacy inquiry. I relate the motivations for this call to a desire to attain for fallacy inquiry certain attributes of the theoretical process in scientific inquiry. I argue that these same attributes, when pursued in the context of philosophical inquiry in general and fallacy inquiry in particular, lead to the assumption of a metaphysical standpoint. This standpoint, I contend, is generative of unintelligibility in philosophical discussions of rationality. I claim that this same unintelligibility can be shown to characterise fallacy inquiry, an example of the study of argumentative rationality. The context for my claim is an examination of the theoretical pronouncements of two prominent fallacy theorists, John Woods and Douglas Walton, in relation to the argument from ignorance fallacy. My conclusion takes the form of guidelines for the post-theoretical pursuit of fallacy inquiry.     

Fallacies in probability judgments for conjunctions and disjunctions of everyday events

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunction B‐and‐A as more probable than a constituent B, contrary to probability theory's ‘conjunction rule’ that a conjunction cannot be more probable than either constituent. Many studies have demonstrated this fallacy in people's reasoning about various experimental materials. Gigerenzer objects that from a ‘frequentist’ standpoint probability theory is not valid for these materials, and so failure to follow the conjunction rule is not a fallacy. This paper describes three experiments showing that the conjunction fallacy occurs as consistently for conjunctions where frequentist probability theory is valid (conjunctions of everyday weather events) as for other conjunctions. These experiments also demonstrate a reliable correlation between the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy and the disjunction fallacy (which arises when a disjunction B‐or‐A is judged less probable than a constituent B). This supports a probability theory + random variation account of probabilistic reasoning. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's temporal judgments for autobiographical past and future events

We compared the performance of twenty 5-7-year-olds on two spatial-temporal judgment tasks. In a semantic task, children located temporal distances from today that were described using conventional, temporal terms on a spatial timeline. In an autobiographical task, children judged temporal distances on the same spatial timeline for events that they had experienced, or were going to experience, presented without explicit temporal references. Six-year-olds were equally accurate in judging temporal distances in the semantic and autobiographical tasks, but 7-year-olds were more accurate in the semantic task. Older children were more accurate than younger children in the semantic task, but no significant age differences were found for autobiographical events. Surprisingly, children were equally accurate in locating past and future events in time. Children at both ages were more accurate judging temporal distances up to one week away (both past and future) as compared to distances of two to four weeks across both tasks. Results suggest that knowledge of recurring time patterns and conventional time measurement systems is necessary, but not sufficient, for locating autobiographical events in time, and temporal distance plays an important role in children's temporal judgments.     

不同回避动机强度的消极情绪对类比推理的影响:来自ERP的证据

研究采用类比推理的四项比例式任务和事件相关电位技术,探究不同回避动机强度的消极情绪(恐惧—高动机强度、悲伤—低动机强度、中性情绪)对类比推理的影响及脑机制。结果发现:(1)行为:不同回避动机强度的消极情绪均会延长类比推理的反应时; 与中性情绪相比,悲伤会提高推理的正确率,而恐惧会降低推理的正确率。(2)脑电:图式提取阶段,N400、P300、LNC被诱发; 类比映射阶段,N400和LNC被诱发,情绪在N400和LNC上的主效应均显著,恐惧情绪下的N400和LNC幅值比悲伤情绪和中性情绪下的更大。研究表明,情绪对类比推理的作用发生在类比映射阶段。恐惧情绪窄化认知,悲伤情绪扩展认知,支持情绪动机维度模型。