Intergroup reconciliation: Instrumental and socio-emotional processes and the needs-based model

We discuss the complexity of the concept of intergroup reconciliation, offer our definition of it, and identify instrumental and socio-emotional processes as distinct processes that facilitate reconciliation. We then present the needs-based model, according to which conflicts threaten victims’ sense of agency and perpetrators’ moral image, and social exchange interactions that restore victims’ and perpetrators’ impaired identities promote reconciliation. We review empirical evidence supporting the model and present extensions of it to (a) contexts of structural inequality, (b) “dual” conflicts, in which both parties transgress against each other, and (c) contexts in which the restoration of positive identities is external to the victim–perpetrator dyad (e.g., third-parties’ interventions). Theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and future research directions are discussed.     

The Impact of Failing to Give an Apology and the Need-for-Cognition on Anger

This study examined how failing to give an apology would affect the anger of persons high and low in the need-for-cognition. We hypothesized that failing to apologize when there was an opportunity would lead to more anger than a no communication control condition, and that apologizing would lead to less anger than the control condition. Further, we hypothesized that these effects would be particularly strong in participants with a low need-for-cognition. To test these hypotheses 60 participants were put in an anger inducing situation and randomly assigned to one of three conditions: apology, no apology (fail to apologize), and control condition where there was no opportunity for an apology. As predicted, failure to apologize was associated with more anger than the control condition. With participants low in the need-for-cognition, the failure to apologize resulted in more anger than either the no communication control or the apology condition.     

The disposition to apologize

Relative to forgiveness, individual differences in apology willingness have received limited empirical attention. We correlated responses of >900 undergraduate students to a newly devised Proclivity to Apologize Measure (PAM) with responses to related and dissimilar constructs. In Study 1a, PAM scores correlated positively with well-being, acceptance, and viewing oneself as amenable to change, and negatively with self-monitoring. In Study 1b, PAM scores correlated positively with seeking forgiveness, self-esteem, neuroticism, and agreeableness, and negatively with narcissism and entitlement. In Study 2a, PAM scores correlated positively with care as a moral foundation, and with compassion and other positive emotions. In Study 2b, PAM scores correlated positively with autonomy and competence. We discuss a framework of research concerning apology which mirrors the more established domain of forgiveness.     

Shame expressions reduce the recipient’s insult from outgroup reparations

Despite a growing literature on the consequences of group-based guilt and shame, little work has examined how expressions of self-conscious emotions are received by targets of collective wrongdoing. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that when an outgroup member offers apologies accompanied by reparations, the recipients are likely to take insult unless the outgroup member expresses the self-abasing emotion of shame rather than guilt. Experiment 1 showed that when reparations were offered, participants were less insulted by shame than guilt expressed by an outgroup member, rather than an ingroup member. Experiment 2 improved Experiment 1 by manipulating the culprit’s action (reparation vs. withdrawal), and this experiment replicated Experiment 1’s interaction on a measure of insult, but only when reparations were offered. These interactions on insult were not explained by the emotion’s perceived intensity or surprisingness. Our results indicate a possible functional aspect of expressions of shame in an intergroup context. Self-abasement, as opposed to a mere admission of culpability and regret, can reduce the insult taken from an outgroup’s reparations.     

Corrective Justice and the Possibility of Rectification

In this paper, I ask how – and whether – the rectification of injury at which corrective justice aims is possible, and by whom it must be performed. I split the injury up into components of harm and wrong, and consider their rectification separately. First, I show that pecuniary compensation for the harm is practically plausible, because money acts as a mediator between the damaged interest and other interests. I then argue that this is also a morally plausible approach, because it does not claim too much for compensation: neither can all harms be compensated, nor can it be said when compensation is paid that the status quo ante has been restored. I argue that there is no conceptual reason for any particular agent paying this compensation. I then turn to the wrong, and reject three proposed methods of rectification. The first aims to rectify the wrong by rectifying the harm; the second deploys punitive damages; the third, punishment. After undermining each proposal, I argue that the wrong can only be rectified by a full apology, which I disaggregate into the admission of causal and moral responsibility, repudiation of the act, reform, and, in some cases, disgorgement and reparations, which I define as a good faith effort to share the burden of the victim’s harm. I argue, further, that only the injurer herself can make a full apology, and it is not something that can be coerced by other members of society. As such, whether rectification of the wrong can be a matter of corrective justice is left an open question.

Beyond "Practical" Reconciliation: Intergroup Inequality and the Meaning of Non-Indigenous Identity

The long-standing policy of "practical reconciliation" between Australian Indigenous and Non-Indigenous people has actively disregarded the need to redress past injustice as the basis of current intergroup inequality. While this approach has received extensive critique from reconciliation scholars, its implications for Non-Indigenous involvement in reconciliation have been neglected. When Indigenous disadvantage is divorced from its social and historical context it is also more likely to be seen as having little to do with "us" as Non-Indigenous Australians. In contrast, when inequality is seen as stemming from the past and present reality of intergroup relations, and as such shapes the meaning of Non-Indigenous identity, it will be seen as more illegitimate, in need of change, and is more likely to motivate political engagement in the reconciliation process. The current study tests and finds support for this idea. Importantly, controlling for the contributions of perceived legitimacy of inequality and need for social change, Non-Indigenous identity meaning continued to significantly predict intentions to vote and engage in political action in support of reconciliation.     

Please accept my sincere and humble apologies: The HEXACO model of personality and the proclivity to apologize

We investigated the links of the HEXACO personality factors and facets with the proclivity to apologize for transgressions, using self- and observer-reports of personality in two adult samples. The proclivity to apologize showed its strongest correlations with the honesty–humility factor, whether evaluated by the self or a knowledgeable observer. Agreeableness was a positive correlate of the proclivity to apologize in one sample only. In both samples, self-reported conscientiousness was positively associated with a proclivity to apologize. We also obtained self-reports on the guilt and shame proneness scales, given the strong conceptual link between guilt and apology. The proclivity to apologize was associated positively with facets of guilt (especially Negative Behavior Evaluation) but negatively with one facet of Shame (Withdrawal).     

Lingering guilt and shame: Emotional burdens upon those who intended but failed to apologize

ABSTRACT

Prior research has shown that greater willingness to apologize for an offense is prompted by greater guilt but lesser shame. Yet little work examined whether apologies indeed resolve moral emotions. This study investigated how the absence of apology psychologically affects harm-doers when they recall a past offense. Undergraduates (N = 284) were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions wherein they recalled a past incident in which they hurt, offended, angered, or had some other negative effect on another person. Harm-doers who intended but failed to apologize reported greater PFQ-2 state guilt and shame, compared to others who refused to apologize or whose apologies were rejected. However, similar results were not found for ESS state shame. Results suggest that failing to apologize may impede transgressors from relieving moral emotional burdens, but only for those who intended to apologize.