A Bayesian formulation of behavioral control

Helplessness, a belief that the world is not subject to behavioral control, has long been central to our understanding of depression, and has influenced cognitive theories, animal models and behavioral treatments. However, despite its importance, there is no fully accepted definition of helplessness or behavioral control in psychology or psychiatry, and the formal treatments in engineering appear to capture only limited aspects of the intuitive concepts. Here, we formalize controllability in terms of characteristics of prior distributions over affectively charged environments. We explore the relevance of this notion of control to reinforcement learning methods of optimising behavior in such environments and consider how apparently maladaptive beliefs can result from normative inference processes. These results are discussed with reference to depression and animal models thereof.     

Sosa in perspective

Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology. This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.

Theories of Attachment: The Long and Winding Road to an Integrative Developmental Science

Although traditional accounts of attachment theory attempted to partition the organism’s attachment and separation responses into those that were instinctive and those that were the result of the developmental environment, recent findings from epigenetics are indicating that no such partitioning is possible, even in principle. Rather than assuming the expression of a given behavioral trait is based on some set of instincts (as Bowlby and many of his colleagues did for attachment and separation responses), behavioral development is now seen as a self-organizing, probabilistic process in which pattern and order emerge and change as a result of ongoing co-actions among developmentally relevant components both internal (e.g., genes, hormones, neural networks) and external (e.g., temperature, diet, social interaction) to the organism. Exploring the specific prenatal and postnatal features of the mother–infant interaction system is providing a new appreciation of the complexity of the origins and maintenance of early attachment and its long-term consequences.

Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.     

Looking both ways through time: the Janus model of lateralized cognition

Existing models of laterality, while often successful at describing circumscribed domains, have not been successful as explanations of the overall patterns of hemispheric asymmetries. It is therefore suggested that a new approach is needed based on shared contributions to adaptive hemispheric roles rather than functional and structural intrahemispheric similarities. This paper proposes a model of laterality, the Janus model, based on evolutionary considerations of complementary hemispheric roles. It is proposed that the left hemisphere has the role of anticipating future scenarios and choosing between them while the right hemisphere has the role of integrating ongoing information into a unitary view of the past in order to immediately detect and respond to novel and unexpected events. Evidence for these complementary roles is provided in research on motor control and semantic priming. Finally, the Janus model is contrasted with efforts to cast the frequency model as a general model of laterality.     

The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.

Better safe than sorry: Simplistic fear-relevant stimuli capture attention

It has been consistently demonstrated that fear-relevant images capture attention preferentially over fear-irrelevant images. Current theory suggests that this faster processing could be mediated by an evolved module that allows certain stimulus features to attract attention automatically, prior to the detailed processing of the image. The present research investigated whether simplified images of fear-relevant stimuli would produce interference with target detection in a visual search task. In Experiment 1, silhouettes and degraded silhouettes of fear-relevant animals produced more interference than did the fear-irrelevant images. Experiment 2, compared the effects of fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant distracters and confirmed that the interference produced by fear-relevant distracters was not an effect of novelty. Experiment 3 suggested that fear-relevant stimuli produced interference regardless of whether participants were instructed as to the content of the images. The three experiments indicate that even very simplistic images of fear-relevant animals can divert attention.     

Rendering unto Science and God: Is NOMA Enough?

The proverbial “war between science and religion” has in many quarters reached the status of truism. Francisco J. Ayala seeks to negotiate a truce between the opposing sides through implementing the concept of the Non-overlapping Magisteria (NOMA) of science and theology. The NOMA understanding of the interaction between science and religion maintains that science and religion cannot contradict each other because each discipline has its own proper range of inquiry, namely questions of fact versus questions of value. This article explores the boundaries of these two different domains of knowledge and finds that in both theory and practice, the territorial claims overlap significantly. Furthermore, the author argues that such “territorial trespassing” is not owing to misunderstandings concerning the essence of science and of religion as such. Instead, the overlap of boundary lines—when viewed in light of the history and philosophy of science—is understood as integral to how progressive research normally advances in both science and theology.     

Disjunctivism and the urgency of scepticism

This paper argues that McDowell is right to claim that disjunctivism has anti-sceptical implications. While the disjunctive conception of experience leaves unaffected the Cartesian sceptical challenge, it undermines another type of sceptical challenge. Moreover, the sceptical challenge against which disjunctivism militates has some philosophical urgency in that it threatens the very notion that perceptual experience can acquaint us with the world around us.