Replies to commentators on <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.

Direct Perceptual Access to Other Minds

It is sometimes claimed that we perceive people’s mental states in their expressive features. This paper clarifies the claim by contrasting two possible readings, depending on whether expression is conceived relationally or non-relationally. A crucial difference between both readings is that only a non-relational conception of expression ensures direct access to other minds. The paper offers an argument for a non-relational conception of expression, and therefore for the view that we directly perceive people’s mental states in their expressive features.     

Animal foraging and the evolution of goal-directed cognition

Foraging- and feeding-related behaviors across eumetazoans share similar molecular mechanisms, suggesting the early evolution of an optimal foraging behavior called area-restricted search (ARS), involving mechanisms of dopamine and glutamate in the modulation of behavioral focus. Similar mechanisms in the vertebrate basal ganglia control motor behavior and cognition and reveal an evolutionary progression toward increasing internal connections between prefrontal cortex and striatum in moving from amphibian to primate. The basal ganglia in higher vertebrates show the ability to transfer dopaminergic activity from unconditioned stimuli to conditioned stimuli. The evolutionary role of dopamine in the modulation of goal-directed behavior and cognition is further supported by pathologies of human goal-directed cognition, which have motor and cognitive dysfunction and organize themselves, with respect to dopaminergic activity, along the gradient described by ARS, from perseverative to unfocused. The evidence strongly supports the evolution of goal-directed cognition out of mechanisms initially in control of spatial foraging but, through increasing cortical connections, eventually used to forage for information.     

Ethics and the Science of Animal Minds

Ethicists have commonly appealed to science to bolster their arguments for elevating the moral status of nonhuman animals. I describe a framework within which I take many ethicists to be making such appeals. I focus on an apparent gap in this framework between those properties of animals that are part of the scientific consensus, and those to which ethicists typically appeal in their arguments. I will describe two different ways of diminishing the appearance of the gap, and argue that both of them present challenges to ethicists seeking a firm scientific basis for their claims about the moral status of animals. I argue that more clarity about the role of appeals to science by applied ethicists leads to questions about the effectiveness of such appeals, and that these questions might best be pursued empirically.     

Comparison of behavioral and cognitive-behavioral one-session exposure treatments for small animal phobias

This study evaluated the efficacy of behavioral and cognitive-behavioral one-session exposure treatment procedures with and without programmed generalization for participants with small animal phobias. Forty participants were randomly assigned to the treatment and generalization conditions. Both treatments produced significant improvements from pre-test to post-test and these results were maintained for 1 year. The treatment effect sizes ranged from large to very large across behavioral, self-report, and subjectively rated measures. Participants in the behavioral treatment condition reported that the treatment was significantly more intrusive than participants in the cognitive-behavioral treatment group. The programmed generalization condition did not produce additional measured benefit. The results are discussed in terms of the overall effectiveness of one-session exposure treatment components for small animal phobias.     

Animals' use of landmarks and metric information to reorient: effects of the size of the experimental space

Disoriented children could use geometric information in combination with landmark information to reorient themselves in large but not in small experimental spaces. We tested fish in the same task and found that they were able to conjoin geometric and non-geometric (landmark) information to reorient themselves in both the large and the small space used. Moreover, fish proved able to reorient immediately when dislocated from a large to a small experimental space and vice versa, suggesting that they encoded the relative rather than the absolute metrics of the environment. However, fish tended to make relatively more errors based on geometric information when transfer occurred from a small to a large space, and to make relatively more errors based on landmark information when transfer occurred from a large to a small space. The hypothesis is discussed that organisms are prepared to use only distant featural information as landmarks.     

A Review Of Geraldine Jonçich's The Sane Positivist: A Biography Of Edward L. Thorndike

This book review, unfinished at the author's death, examines in historical context Thorndike's law of effect, his Animal Intelligence monograph of 1898, and related works on learning and behavior.     

Object-goal positioning influences spatial representation in rats

Three tests investigated how the geometric relation between object/landmarks and goals influenced spatial choice behavior in rats. Two groups searched for hidden food in an object-filled circular arena containing 24 small poles. For the “Proximal” group, four distinct objects in a square configuration were placed close to four baited poles. For the “Distal” group, the identical configuration of objects was rotated 45° relative to the poles containing the hidden food. The Proximal group learned to locate the baited poles more quickly than the Distal group. Tests with removed and rearranged landmarks indicated that the two groups learned to use the objects differently. The results suggested that close proximity of objects to goals encouraged their use as beacons, while greater distance of objects from goals resulted in the global encoding of the geometric properties of the arena and the use of the objects as landmarks. Received: 22 June 1998 / Accepted after revision: 23 January 1999     

Other minds,other people,and human opacity

This paper explains the absence of the problem of other minds in ancient philosophy and links its rise in early modern philosophy with the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the consequent veil of ideas. The futile struggles of early modern philosophers with the problems is delineated. So too are the incoherent theories of modern neuroscientists and psychologists. The sources of the manifold confusions are pinned down to use and misuse of the concept of mind, to misunderstandings about the nature of the human ability to say how things are subjectively with oneself, to misconstruals of the nature of introspection and self-knowledge, and to the misguided picture of the “inner” and the “outer”. Philosophical misunderstandings about knowledge of other minds has masked the genuine limitations on our knowledge and understanding of our fellow human beings. Some of these rest on ignorance, others on the constitutional indeterminacy of the mental.     

Evolutionary perspectives on imitation: is a comparative psychology of social learning possible?

Studies of imitation in animals have become numerous in recent times, but do they contribute to a comparative psychology of social learning? We review this burgeoning field to identify the problems and prospects for such a goal. Difficulties of two main kinds are identified. First, researchers have tackled questions about social learning from at least three very different theoretical perspectives, the "phylogenetic", "animal model", and "adaptational". We examine the conflicts between them and consider the scope for integration. A second difficulty arises in the methodological approaches used in the discipline. In relation to one of these - survey reviews of published studies - we tabulate and compare the contrasting conclusions of nine articles that together review 36 studies. The basis for authors' disagreements, including the matters of perceptual opacity, novelty, sequential structure, and goal representation, are examined. In relation to the other key method, comparative experimentation, we identify 12 studies that have explicitly compared species' imitative ability on similar tasks. We examine the principal problems of comparing like with like in these studies and consider solutions, the most powerful of which we propose to be the use of a systematic range of task designs, rather than any single "gold standard" task.