Actions speak louder than words: An elaborated theoretical model of the social functions of self-injury and other harmful behaviors

The question of why some people do things that are intentionally harmful to themselves continues to puzzle scientists, clinicians, and the public. Prior studies have demonstrated that one fairly extreme, direct form of self-harm, non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI), is maintained by both automatic (i.e., intrapersonal) as well as social (i.e., interpersonal) reinforcement. However, the majority of theoretical and empirical papers on this topic focus almost exclusively on the automatic functions. The purpose of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the social functions of NSSI. Evidence is presented supporting the notion that NSSI is maintained by social reinforcement in at least a substantial minority of instances. Moreover, an elaborated theoretical model of the social functions of NSSI is outlined that proposes that this behavior represents a high intensity social signal used when less intense communication strategies fail (e.g., speaking, yelling, crying). The model further proposes that NSSI can serve not only as a signal of distress that is reinforced primarily by the caregiving behavior it elicits from others, but that it can also serve as a signal of strength and fitness that is reinforced by warding off potential threats (e.g., peer victimization), and in some cases can strengthen affiliation with others. Support for this theoretical model is drawn from diverse literatures including psychology, evolutionary biology, and cultural anthropology. The paper concludes with specific recommendations for empirical tests of the proposed model of the social functions of NSSI, as well as other harmful behaviors such as alcohol and drug use.     

It’s in your nature: a pluralistic folk psychology

I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and explain behavior through appeal to personality traits that the target wouldn’t endorse, and so could not serve as the target’s reasons. I conclude by suggesting that our folk psychology includes the notion that some behavior is explained by personality traits—who the person is—rather than by beliefs and desires—what the person thinks. Consequences of this view for the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, as well as the debate on chimpanzee theory of mind are discussed.     

Core,animal reminder,and contamination disgust: Three kinds of disgust with distinct personality,behavioral, physiological,and clinical correlates

We examined the relationships between sensitivity to three kinds of disgust (core, animal-reminder, and contamination) and personality traits, behavioral avoidance, physiological responding, and anxiety disorder symptoms. Study 1 revealed that these disgusts are particularly associated with neuroticism and behavioral inhibition. Moreover, the three disgusts showed a theoretically consistent pattern of relations on four disgust-relevant behavioral avoidance tasks in Study 2. Similar results were found in Study 3 such that core disgust was significantly related to increased physiological responding during exposure to vomit, while animal-reminder disgust was specifically related to physiological responding during exposure to blood. Lastly, Study 4 revealed that each of the three disgusts showed a different pattern of relations with fear of contamination, fear of animals, and fear of blood–injury relevant stimuli. These findings provide support for the convergent and divergent validity of core, animal-reminder, and contamination disgust. These findings also highlight the possibility that the three kinds of disgust may manifest as a function of different psychological mechanisms (i.e., oral incorporation, mortality defense, disease avoidance) that may give rise to different clinical conditions. However, empirical examination of the mechanisms that underlie the three disgusts will require further refinement of the psychometric properties of the disgust scale.     

Use of the ABA fear renewal paradigm to assess the effects of extinction with co-present fear inhibitors or excitors: Implications for theories of extinction and for treating human fears and phobias

In four experiments using albino rats in an ABA fear renewal paradigm, we studied conditioned fear in the A test context following extinction in Context B. Conditioned suppression of operant responding was the index of fear. In Experiments 1-3, we found that extinguishing a feared cue in compound with a putative conditioned inhibitor of fear led to more fear in the test context than did a conventional extinction procedure. In Experiments 4a and 4b, we found that extinguishing three feared cues in compound required one third the time and generally led to less fear to the cues in the test context than did the extinction of each cue separately. Thus, fear in the test context seems to vary inversely with the values of co-present cues during extinction in Context B. Results imply that cue value is actually reduced by extinction procedures rather than merely being opposed by a growing inhibitory process. Implications for theories of renewal and for clinical practice are discussed.     

Self in time and language

Time has been considered a crucial factor in distinguishing between two levels of self-awareness: the “core,” or “minimal self,” and the “extended,” or “narrative self.” Herein, I focus on this last concept of the self and, in particular, on the relationship between the narrative self and language. In opposition to the claim that the narrative self is a linguistic construction, my idea is that it is created by the functioning of mental time travel, that is, the faculty of human beings to project themselves mentally backwards in time to relive, or forward to anticipate, events. Moreover, I propose that narrative language itself should be considered a product of a core brain network that includes mechanisms, such as mental time travel, mindreading, and visuo-spatial systems.     

Animal confinement and use

We distinguish two conceptions of confinement – the agential conception and the comparative conception – and show that the former is intimately related to use in a way that the latter is not. Specifically, in certain conditions, agential confinement constitutes use and creates a special relationship that makes neglect or abuse especially egregious. This allows us to develop and defend an account of one important way in which agential confinement can be morally wrong. We then discuss some of the account’s practical implications, including its usefulness for decision-making in real-world contexts in which animals are confined.     

Leading a conspecific away from food in ravens (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Corvus corax</Emphasis>)?

Active misleading of conspecifics has been described as a social strategy mainly for primates. Here we report a raven leading a competitor away from food in a social foraging task. Four individuals had to search and compete for hidden food at color-marked clusters of artificial food caches. At the beginning of the experiment, a subordinate male found and exploited the majority of the food. As a result, the dominant male displaced him from the already opened boxes. The subordinate male then developed a pattern, when the loss of reward to the dominant got high, of moving to unrewarded clusters and opening boxes there. This diversion often led the dominant to approach those unrewarded clusters and the subordinate then had a head start for exploiting the rewarded boxes. Subsequently, however, the dominant male learned not to follow the subordinate to unrewarded clusters and eventually started searching for the reward himself. These interactions between the two males illustrate the ravens' potential for deceptively manipulating conspecifics. We discuss under which circumstances ravens might use this capacity.     

New evidence of animal consciousness

This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.Donald R. Griffin died on 7 November 2003     

Are beliefs signals?

Eric Funkhouser argues that beliefs can function as social signals. I argue that Funkhouser’s argument for this conclusion rests on a problematic definition of “signal,” and that on standard definitions, the imperceptibility of beliefs disqualifies them from counting as signals. However, I also argue that Funkhouser’s insights about the social functions of beliefs can be true even if his claim that beliefs are signals is false.     

Non‐adjacent Dependencies Processing in Human and Non‐human Primates

Human and non‐human primates share the ability to extract adjacent dependencies and, under certain conditions, non‐adjacent dependencies (i.e., predictive relationships between elements that are separated by one or several intervening elements in a sequence). In this study, we explore the online extraction dynamics of non‐adjacent dependencies in humans and baboons using a serial reaction time task. Participants had to produce three‐target sequences containing deterministic relationships between the first and last target locations. In Experiment 1, participants from the two species could extract these non‐adjacent dependencies, but humans required less exposure than baboons. In Experiment 2, the data show for the first time in a non‐human primate species the successful generalization of sequential non‐adjacent dependencies over novel intervening items. These findings provide new evidence to further constrain current theories about the nature and the evolutionary origins of the learning mechanisms allowing the extraction of non‐adjacent dependencies.