Evolutionary Development: Sustainability … and Beyond!

The act of observation can appear to affect the results of certain scientific experiments. Research has shown that the mind is much more than the brain. The perception of an observer may be significantly affected by the local and non-local environment, and is dependant on the time of the day, month, or year on which those measurements are made. This research has led toward a greater understanding of the structure of the universe, including its connection to consciousness and information. For example, it is demonstrated that the mind's ability to communicate information from across the solar system is much faster than the speed of light.     

Enactive or inactive? Cranially envatted dream experience and the extended conscious mind

When we dream, it is often assumed, we are isolated from the external environment. It is also commonly believed that dreams can be, at times, accurate, convincing replicas of waking experience. Here I analyse some of the implications of this view for an enactive theory of conscious experience. If dreams are, as described by the received view, “inactive”, or “cranially envatted” whilst replicating the experience of being awake, this would be problematic for certain extended conscious mind theories. Focusing specifically on Alva Noë’s enactive view, according to which the vehicles of perceptual experience extend beyond the brain, I argue that dreams are a quandary. Noë’s view is that dreaming is consistent with enactivism because even if dreams are inactive and shut off from the external environment, they are not “full-blown” perceptual consciousness, and also, there is some reason to reject the inactive claim. However, this view rests on an unjustified and reductive account of dreams which is not supported by empirical evidence. Dreams can indeed replicate waking phenomenal experience during inactive periods of sleep, and we have no reason to suspect that dreams which are more inactive are less “full-blown”. Taken together, this shows that dreams are indeed relevant to extended conscious mind theories and need to be taken into account by enactivists.     

Making too many enemies: Hutto and Myin’s attack on computationalism†

We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem of Content targets computationalism that relies on semantic notion of computation, claiming that it cannot account for the natural origins of content. The Intentionality Problem is targeted against computationalism using non-semantic accounts of computation, arguing that it fails in explaining intentionality. The Abstraction Problem claims that causal interaction between concrete physical processes and abstract computational properties is problematic. We argue that these arguments are flawed and are not enough to rule out computationalism.     

Positive post‐disaster images: A daydream machine?

This study explores the impact of post‐earthquake images inserted in a vigilance task, in terms of performance, self‐reports of task‐focus, and cerebral activity using functional near‐infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Vigilance tasks present a sequence of stimuli in which only a few are pre‐designated critical or target stimuli requiring an overt response from the participant. Seventy‐one residents participated (51 women, 20 men) by taking part in a vigilance task with task‐irrelevant images inserted in the sequence. There were three conditions consisting positive (emotive inducing), negative (emotive inducing), and control (devoid of meaning) images embedded in the vigilance task to assess possible impacts on vigilance performance. The images were obtained through crowdsourcing and represented parts of the city 3–4 years post‐earthquake. Task performance was assessed with signal detection theory metrics of sensitivity A’ and bias β’’. This enables the separation of an individual's ability to accurately discriminate critical signals from non‐critical stimuli (sensitivity) and shifts in their willingness to respond to any stimuli whether critical or not (bias). Individuals viewing the positive images, relating to progress, rebuild, or aesthetic aspects within the city, had a more conservative response bias (they responded less to both rare critical and distractor stimuli) than those in the other conditions. These individuals also reported lower task‐focus, as would be expected. However, contrary to expectations, indicators of cerebral activity (fNIRS) did not differ significantly between the experimental groups. These results, when combined, suggest that mind wandering events may be being generated when exposed to positive post‐earthquake images.