Young children's self‐benefiting lies and their relation to executive functioning and theory of mind

It is well established that children lie in different social contexts for various purposes from the age of 2 years. Surprisingly, little is known about whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain, how self‐benefiting lies emerge, and what cognitive factors affect the emergence of self‐benefiting lies. To bridge this gap in the literature, we situated children between 2 and 4 years of age in a zero‐sum game where children must lie to their opponent if they wanted to win a desirable reward. We found that the majority of young children did not lie even when they experienced personal losses repeatedly. However, some children spontaneously lied during the game; as the game progressed, more children lied. Further, we found that children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning in terms of a combination of inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility had significant positive and unique correlations with how frequently children lied for personal gain. The present results taken together with the existing findings regarding children's lies for self‐protection and politeness purposes suggest that the act of lying begins early in life. Further, its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

Highlights

• The study investigated whether very young children will spontaneously lie for personal gain.
• This study used a zero‐sum game to elicit children's self‐benefiting lies. Results showed the majority of young children did not lie, and it is related to children's theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.
• The act of lying begins early in life, and its emergence and development are influenced by children's specific cognitive abilities in the domains of theory of mind understanding and executive functioning.

     

抑郁对社会决策的影响

从社会决策角度出发,依托博弈论的经典范式是研究抑郁症病人人际与社会功能障碍的一个切入点。Ruff和Fehr （2014）提出在社会决策中存在三类情境,即社会反馈、替代性评价、社会原则。我们从这个理论框架出发,发现抑郁症病人在社会反馈加工中存在社会性快感缺失,对社会拒绝的敏感性增强;在替代性评价过程中,共情和心理理论能力减弱;抑郁症病人对决策中的社会原则（公平、合作）存在适应不良现象,如过度利他性。未来的研究一方面可进一步探索抑郁症病人的社会性快感缺失现象,另一方面可采用经颅电/磁刺激与脑成像技术结合或超扫描技术,提高研究结果的解释力和生态效度。     

人心是何?现代新儒家的心理观

随着文化心理学的兴起,如何深化中国文化与心理学的联系,促进其对心理学的贡献成为了重要问题。在这方面,以梁漱溟、熊十力和冯友兰为代表的现代新儒家进行了开拓性的研究。他们在批判性接纳科学心理观的基础上,主张心理是多层次的存在,强调了心理的自觉性、能动性、生成性、道德性等内涵。新儒家的心理观既能启发本土学者妥善解决中国文化与心理的关系,又能推动建立一种既关注大脑生理机制与心理机制又蕴含本土内涵的综合心理观。     

Theory of mind: The state of the art*

Abstract

In this article, I reflect on theory of mind as a field (ToM), how it has developed over the years, and focally on the state of current research and theory. Having begun with preschoolers’ understanding of beliefs and desires, the field now includes research from infancy through late life, contributions and contributors from around the world, research on behavior, conversation, neural correlates, gene-environment contributions, evolution, and the social-behavioral antecedents and consequences of the unfolding trajectories of ToM understanding. Several topics in particular portray the current state of the art and my sense of where theory-of-mind research is likely to head in the near future: progressions of theory of mind achievement; cultural experiences plus experiential influences that shape developmental trajectories; developmental cognitive neuroscience; infant ToM insights; research on ToM developments beyond preschool, including children’s increasing interest in and wrestling with extraordinary minds, such as those of God and super-heroes.     

Relationship between implicit false belief understanding and role play: Longitudinal study

Pretend play is one of the earliest forms of children’s imagination. While social pretend play (role play) may facilitate the development of theory of mind – including false belief understanding – theoretically, the reverse may be true; theory of mind may facilitate the development of role play. To clarify this relationship, the present longitudinal study examined whether toddler’s implicit understanding of false beliefs predicted their role play during preschool years. We examined 18-month-old toddlers’ looking time in an implicit false-belief task (Time 1). When the children were 4/5 years old (Time 2), children’s parents answered a questionnaire on their child’s engagement in role play, such as playing with an imaginary companion and impersonating an imagined character. Toddlers’ looking time in the false-belief task at Time 1 predicted impersonation scores at Time 2. The results suggest that early theory of mind skills can facilitate children’s role play.     

先“自我中心”再“调整”:成人推理他人心理状态的加工过程

成人在某些情况下推理他人心理状态时也会像较小的儿童一样出现自我中心化。本研究通过控制完成心理理论任务的反应时间,比较成人被试在有/无时间压力情况下推理他人心理状态时行为表现上的差异。其中,实验1选取24名大学生被试进行指示交流任务(考察视觉观点采择),实验2选取76名大学生被试进行成人版意外地点任务(考察错误信念理解)。结果发现,在限制反应时间的条件下,被试会更加自我中心化。两个实验的结果支持了成人推理他人心理状态可能是一个两阶段的加工过程的假设,即先自我中心再调整:首先以自我心理状态进行自我中心锚定,然后(若自我和他人心理状态存在差异)克服自我中心,理解他人的心理状态。     

人类社会认知的神经机制:来自社会脑研究的证据

社会认知是指从环境互动的过程中推测他人意图、情感和思想等内部状态的心理加工过程。社会脑假说认为,包括人类在内的灵长类大脑内肯定存在着一个旨在认识和理解他人表情的神经机制,在社会交往中通过该中枢迅速处理与他人相互作用的各种信息。本文通过回顾社会脑的构成与基本功能,镜像神经元的发现及功能,以及社会脑、镜像神经元对社会认知影响的相关研究,提出了人类社会认知不同于其他物种的三个主要区别。     

Why are there limits on theory of mind use? Evidence from adults' ability to follow instructions from an ignorant speaker

Keysar et al. (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000 Keysar, B., Barr, D. J., Balin, J. A. and Brauner, J. S. 2000. Taking perspective in conversation: The role of mutual knowledge in comprehension. Psychological Sciences, 11: 32–38. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003 Keysar, B., Lin, S. H. and Barr, D. J. 2003. Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 89(1): 25–41. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) report that adults frequently failed to use their conceptual competence for theory of mind (ToM) in an online communication game where they needed to take account of a speaker's perspective. The current research reports 3 experiments investigating the cognitive processes contributing to adults' errors. In Experiments 1 and 2 the frequency of adults' failure to use ToM was unaffected by perspective switching. In Experiment 3 adults made more errors when interpreting instructions according to the speaker's perspective than according to an arbitrary rule. We suggest that adults are efficient at switching perspectives, but that actually using what another person knows to interpret what they say is relatively inefficient, giving rise to egocentric errors during communication.     

Belief attribution despite verbal interference

False-belief (FB) tasks have been widely used to study the ability of individuals to represent the content of their conspecifics' mental states (theory of mind). However, the cognitive processes involved are still poorly understood, and it remains particularly debated whether language and inner speech are necessary for the attribution of beliefs to other agents. We present a completely nonverbal paradigm consisting of silent animated cartoons in five closely related conditions, systematically teasing apart different aspects of scene analysis and allowing the assessment of the attribution of beliefs, goals, and physical causation. In order to test the role of language in belief attribution, we used verbal shadowing as a dual task to inhibit inner speech. Data on 58 healthy adults indicate that verbal interference decreases overall performance, but has no specific effect on belief attribution. Participants remained able to attribute beliefs despite heavy concurrent demands on their verbal abilities. Our results are most consistent with the hypothesis that belief attribution is independent from inner speech.     

What is “theory of mind”? Concepts,cognitive processes and individual differences

Research on “theory of mind” has traditionally focused on a narrow participant group (preschool children) using a narrow range of experimental tasks (most notably, false-belief tasks). Recent work has greatly expanded the age range of human participants tested to include human infants, older children, and adults, has devised new tasks, and has adopted methods from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, theoretical work has not kept pace with these changes, with the result that studies using one kind of method or participant group often inherit assumptions about the nature of theory of mind from other research, with little regard for whether these assumptions are appropriate. I argue that three distinct approaches to thinking about theory of mind are already implicit in research practice, and that future work, whether with infants, children, or adults, will benefit from articulating these approaches more clearly and following their different implications for what theory of mind is and how it should be studied.