从儿童道德发展初探人性本源的论题

关于人性善恶的问题一直有争议,本文从行为实验的角度对这一问题进行探讨。结果发现:3岁以前的儿童表现出人之初性本善的特征,对他人比较宽厚;3岁到4岁之间随着心理理论的增长,表现出道德水平下降,心理理论和道德水平两者之间出现交互作用。5岁以后的儿童由于心理理论的逐步完善,显现出越来越明确的“镜子行为”,即:谁对我好,我就对谁好;谁对我不好,我就对谁不好;原有的善性被外界恶性刺激掩蔽。     

War: Mentalization and Totalitarian State of Mind

For most residents of Europe, war is a new experience in which they find themselves both as witnesses and participants. In this paper the war in Ukraine serves as an illustration and case example. Like any unfamiliar experience, war elicits profound emotional responses which can be so overwhelming that an individual may be unable to fully process them and to create mental representations of the reality of war. When the psyche becomes entrapped in an unprocessed state, without the capacity to derive meaning from it, this results in the “fossilization” of the psyche akin to what McGinley and Segal describes as a totalitarian state of mind. Subjectivity and individual differences come under collective or personal attack, or both. This state of being prioritizes the needs of the collective psyche over the individual psyche. The image of Gorgon Medusa, who transformed living people into “fossilized” ones, is presented as a metaphor of total identification with the collective dimension. In contrast, the psyche can reveal a creative approach to resolving war-induced trauma. This is depicted in the concept of the Alchemical Stone and its creation, which symbolizes a harmonious connection between the external and internal realms, the subjective and objective experiences, and the real and the imaginal dimension.     

More than words: A reply to Malt and Sloman

In four experiments, Malt and Sloman [Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator’s intention in naming and what’s really what. Cognition, 105, 615-648] show that the naming of artifacts is affected by discourse context. They see this phenomenon as posing a problem for the intentional-history theory of artifact categorization (e.g., [Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, history, and artifact concepts. Cognition, 60, 1-29]), and as supporting instead their alternative theory that naming is determined by communicative goals. This response begins by distinguishing the problem of artifact categorization (determining the categories that artifacts belong to) from the problem of artifact naming (deciding how to talk about members of these categories). In light of this distinction, it turns out that Malt and Sloman’s findings are fully consistent with all theories of artifact categorization, including the intentional-historical one. Moreover, contrary to what they argue, there are actually many cases where the relative contributions of categorization and pragmatics can be clearly distinguished. Finally, it is argued that Malt and Sloman’s own account of artifact naming presupposes a capacity for artifact categorization; it cannot work without one.     

Second-order beliefs about intention and children's attributions of sociomoral judgment

Predicting how another person will evaluate the intention underlying an action involves consideration of second-order mental states. Children (ages 5-10 years) and college students (N=105) predicted an observer's belief about an actor's intention and evaluated the actor from both their own perspectives and the perspective of the observer. Younger children were more likely than older children and adults to attribute a belief to the observer that mismatched the actor's prior intention. Attributed beliefs about intention were more likely to match negative prior intentions than to match positive prior intentions and were also more likely to match prior intentions when the observer knew the actor's prior intention than when the observer did not know the actor's prior intention. The judgments attributed to the observer were based on the beliefs about intention attributed to the observer, showing use of second-order mental states to infer another's sociomoral judgments.     

Soames on Quine and Davidson

A discussion of Quine and Davidson, as interpreted and criticized in Scott Soames’ Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II.     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.     

探讨我国住院医师规范化培训的现况及对策

临床住院医师规范化培训是培养高水平专业人才的重要手段,是提高我国医疗水平的重要环节和措施,是一项有关卫生事业发展的重要工作.目前,我国住院医师培训还存在不少问题.在各方面的不断努力和探索下,一定能够使住院医师规范化培新工作做得更好.     

成人在错误信念任务上的表现

考察成人在错误信念(FB)任务上是否存在"知识偏差"效应。实验1重复Birch等的实验程序并未得到与之一致的结果,成人在FB任务上的表现不理想,且无"知识偏差"效应存在。实验2排除琴盒位置及颜色的突出性影响后,结果与实验1相似。成人在FB任务上的不佳表现与成人具有心理理论的事实相悖,说明把通过FB任务作为衡量心理理论的唯一评定标准有待商榷。     

Animal Mind: Science,Philosophy, and Ethics

Although 20^th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors – John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear. That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about animal thought and feeling.