Gibbard on meaning and normativity

The paper is a critique of Allan Gibbard’s impressively crafted monograph Meaning and Normativity. The book relies on a subtle form of logical empiricism, developing a normative verificationist semantics within a subjective Bayesian framework. I argue that the resulting account of synonymy is too fine-grained, since it counts clearly synonymous words in different languages as non-synonymous. For similar reasons, Gibbard’s account of analytic implication relies on postulating untenable connections between semantics and epistemology. I conclude that one of the main obstacles to robust realism about normativity and morality, the supposed conceptual connections between normative language and action, is a myth.     

Skookumchuck,Kiidk'yaas,Gibbard: normativity,meaning, and idealization (critical notice of Allan Gibbard Meaning and Normativity)

Gibbard argues that ‘meaning is normative’. He explains the claim with an account of the normative which bases it on the process of planning, taken in part as issuing instructions to oneself. It seems to entail that the right kind of plans make norms. One ought to continue adding with plus rather than quus in a Kripkenstein horror story. I focus on Gibbard's characterization of normativity: it is not what one might expect. The main purpose of this review article is to present the way of understanding normativity that makes most sense of what he says, and which makes some otherwise implausible assertions defensible and perhaps even true. I give reasons for thinking that Gibbard's understanding of normativity-through-plans cannot do the work he wants it to. I also argue that he is onto something right, and it opens interesting new questions.     

Self-attention,concept activation,and the causal self

Two experiments examined the relationship between the accessibility of selfreferent information and attributions of causal responsibility to the self. The first study introduced a priming technique, in which subjects used either first-person or third-person terms in a story construction task, to directly access self-referent or other-referent thought. It was found that self-attributions for hypothetical outcomes were greater for those subjects whose earlier stories were focused on the self. The second study, rather than activate self-referent cognition in a general fashion, sought to explicitly prime the notion of a “causal self.” In addition to self-referent or other-referent words, subjects were also given words that evoked notions of either causality or noncausality to be incorporated into their stories. Contingent activation of both “self” and “causal” notions subsequently resulted in greater self-attributions than any other experimental condition. Recall and recognition data from Experiment 2 were generally consistent with the contention that a specific and differentiated component of the self-schema had been accessed. The results of both studies, as well as the novel “self-priming” technique, are discussed in terms of self-awareness theory.     

On the relationship between the psychological environment and the development of individual differences in abilities

Some previous attempts at dimensionalizing human psychological environments are briefly considered. The problem is reformulated within the context of the development of dimensions of individual differences in abilities. The human psychological environment is viewed within the context of general systems theory. The latter permits an integrated view with respect to dimensions of the psychological environment and dimensions of individual differences within a developmental context. Critical in this formulation is the idea that, within the framework of the development of individual differences, it is of value to postulate the dimensions of the psychological environment as isomorphic to dimensions of individual differences.     

Perspectival representation and fallacies in metaethics

Abstract

The prevailing theoretical framework for theorising about representation construes all representation as involving objective representational contents. This classic framework has tended to drive philosophers either to claim that evaluative judgements are representations and therefore objective, or else to claim that evaluative judgements are not really representations, because they are not objective. However, a more general, already well-explored framework is available, which will allow theorists to treat evaluative judgements as full-fledged representations (thus doing justice to their representational aspects) while leaving open whether they are objective. Such a more general conception of representational content is exemplified, e.g. by Lewis’s ‘centred contents’ and Gibbard’s framework of ‘contents of judgement’, thus it is not new. I shall start in §1 by introducing the more general framework of perspectival contents and then illustrate in §2 how awareness of it can help expose the fallaciousness of certain widely used forms of argumentation in metaethics.     

Edgar Allan Poe: A psychological profile

Edgar Allan Poe is often regarded as one of the most well-known American poets of the 19th century. He is best known for his dark, gruesome depictions of emotionally haunted characters. His most famous poem, The Raven, exemplifies this style. To understand what motivated this writing style, we must learn about the man behind the pen. Not surprisingly, Poe had a difficult upbringing, fraught with illness, loss, and poverty. This review will examine Poe’s personal life and discuss how early experiences and possible genetic predispositions may have contributed to his affect and behaviours as an adult.