THE DIVINE SPIRIT AS CAUSAL AND PERSONAL

Theists in general and Christians in particular have good grounds for affirming divine action in relation to twenty‐first‐century science. Although humans cannot perceive with their five senses the causation—both divine and creaturely—at work in our world, they have reasons to believe God acts as an efficient, but never sufficient, cause in creation. The essential kenosis option I offer overcomes liabilities in other kenosis proposals, while accounting for a God who acts personally, consistently, persuasively, and yet in diversely efficacious ways. We can reasonably infer that the love, beauty, and truth expressed in creation derive from divine and creaturely causation.     

A Schutzian Perspective on the Phenomenology of Law in the Context of Positivistic Practices

The paper outlines Schutz’s phenomenology of law in the context of the transformation of positivistic practices in a post-totalitarian society. His major contribution is seen in the disentanglement of social phenomena from any form of naturalness by incorporating the dimension of meaning and interpretation into them. This philosophical gesture is made possible by renouncing any theory of transcendent ground(s) of a pre-formed order (Section 1) and leads to an interpretive concept of law, in which the reciprocity of perspectives play the major role. The conclusions are pointing toward a phenomenological concept of law able to take our freedom seriously. Presented as the Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture at the meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (SPHS), Chicago, 2007, and co-sponsored by the American Philosophical Association (APA) and the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology (CARP). I am grateful to Lester Embree and Nicoleta Szabo for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.     

Scientific Naturalism, the Mind-Body Relation, and Religious Experience

Although attempts to explain religious experience in terms of brain processes usually presuppose the identification of scientific naturalism with the s ensationist, a theistic, m aterialist version of naturalism (naturalism_sam), this version is inadequate for science, and human experience more generally, for numerous reasons. An alternative version, based on p anexperientialism, p anentheism, and a p rehensive doctrine of perception (naturalism_ppp), not only avoids those problems but also allows for religious experience understood as the soul's direct experience of a Holy Reality.     

A Minimalist Theory of Truth

This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what “true” does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation for opting for such a position. In addition, it provides some reasons for thinking that such a theory of truth is “minimal” or “deflationary” in the way that contemporary truth theorists have claimed it to be.     

Syntactical Constraints on Definitions

This essay considers arguments for and against syntactical constraints on the proper formalization of definitions, originally owing to Alfred Tarski. It discusses and refutes an application of the constraints generalized to include a prohibition against not only object‐place but also predicate‐place variables in higher‐order logic in a criticism of a recent effort to define the concept of heterologicality in a strengthened derivation of Grelling's paradox within type theory requirements. If the objections were correct, they would offer a more general moral for the proper formal definition of terms in philosophical logic. The criticism nevertheless seems mistaken both in the substance and specific application with respect to legitimate synctactical constraints on definitions of key concepts in the case of Grelling's paradox. As such, the critique provides no justification for overturning previous conclusions concerning the possibility of resurrecting a type‐observant version of Grelling's heterologicality paradox.     

Gregersen's Vision of a Theonomous Universe

In his article, "The Idea of Creation and the Theory of Autopoietic Processes," Niels H. Gregersen has proposed an important thesis: God supports and sustains autopoietic processes in nature. This contribution underscores what Paul Tillich called theonomy , a conception of the divine presence or action as one which under-girds, makes possible, and brings to perfection the creature's autonomy and creativity. The concept of theonomy is represented not only in contemporary Christian theology, but also in the work of Alfred North Whitehead and the Japanese Buddhist thinker, Tanabe Hajime. Gregersen shows that this concept extends not only to existential realities, but also to science and the processes of nature. There are connections, as well as differences, to be noted between Gregersen and Whitehead. This train of thought would be further enhanced if it included a discussion of the concept of God as the power to be—a connection that certainly is implied in Gregersen's argument.     

A Richer or a Poorer Naturalism?

Willem Drees endorses not only minimal naturalism, understood as the rejection of supernatural interruptions of the world's normal causal processes, but also maximal naturalism, with its reductionistic materialism. Besides arguing that this reductionistic naturalism provides the best framework for interpreting science, he believes that it is compatible with religion (albeit of a minimalist sort). The "richer" naturalism advocated by Whiteheadians is, accordingly, unnecessary. Drees's position, however, cannot do justice to a number of "hard-core commonsense notions," which we inevitably presuppose in practice and thereby in science as well as religion. His naturalism is too poor, in particular, to account for subjectivity, freedom, and mathematical, religious, and moral experience.     

The developmental relationship between identity and equivalence conservation

Hooper's (1969a) finding that identity conservation develops prior to equivalence conservation was investigated using a more stringent within-subject design. Seventy-two kindergarten, first, and second graders were given three conservation tasks: (1) Identity, (2) Equivalence 1, in which the perceptual cues were comparable to those in Identity, and (3) Equivalence 2, the traditional Piagetian conservation task. Each task was administered under two levels of transformation. No significant differences in performance as a function of level of transformation, type of equivalence task, or sex of S were found, but first and second grade Ss performed better than kindergarten Ss. Eighty-six percent of the sample conserved in an all-or-none fashion, and 7 Ss (10%) passed equivalence while failing identity, thus contradicting the developmental priority of identity conservation.     

Philosophical Criteria in Whitehead and Rorty

Rorty's aversion to metaphysics is well known, so the extent of his early work on Whitehead might come as a surprise. This article examines the young Rorty's critical assessment of Whitehead to show how it demonstrates the consequences of diverging metaphilosophical orientations. It argues that Rorty's insistence on judging Whitehead's work through an exclusively epistemological frame causes him to miss its more radical existential and epistemic implications. After examining how Rorty and Whitehead operate with different cost‐benefit analyses as to the risks and benefits of speculative philosophy, it suggests that closer attention to the fuller stakes of Whitehead's project shows that his metaphysics are not opposed to the “poeticized” culture that Rorty calls for, one where the distinction between making and finding is no longer metaphysically foundational.