Endangering humanity: an international crime?

Abstract

In the Anthropocene, human beings are capable of bringing about globally catastrophic outcomes that could damage conditions for present and future human life on Earth in unprecedented ways. This paper argues that the scale and severity of these dangers justifies a new international criminal offence of ‘postericide’ that would protect present and future people against wrongfully created dangers of near extinction. Postericide is committed by intentional or reckless systematic conduct that is fit to bring about near human extinction. The paper argues that a proper understanding of the moral imperatives embodied in international criminal law shows that it ought to be expanded to incorporate a new law of postericide.     

The Social Causes and Political Consequences of Group Empathy

Recent scholarship has discovered significant racial/ethnic group variation in response to political threats such as immigration and terrorism. Surprisingly, minority groups often simultaneously perceive themselves to be at greater risk from such threats and yet still prefer more open immigration policies and civil liberties protections. We suggest a group‐level empathy process may explain this puzzle: Due to their higher levels of empathy for other disadvantaged groups, many minority group members support protections for others even when their own interests are threatened. Little is known, however, about the unique properties of group empathy or its role in policy opinion formation. In this study, we examine the reliability and validity of our new measure of group empathy, the Group Empathy Index (GEI), demonstrating that it is distinct from other social and political predispositions such as ethnocentrism, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, ideology, and partisanship. We then propose a theory about the development of group empathy in reaction to life experiences based on one's race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education. Finally, we examine the power of group empathy to predict policy attitudes and political behavior.     

Safety in Numbers: Why the Mere Physical Presence of Others Affects Risk‐taking Behaviors

As social mammals, being in a group signals a state of relative security. Risk‐taking behavior in other social mammals formed the basis for our prediction that the mere physical presence of others, absent any social interaction, would create a psychological state of security that, in turn, would promote greater risk‐taking behavior. We investigated whether, why, and when the mere physical presence of others affects risk‐taking behaviors in three contexts: acceptance of greater financial volatility, attitudes toward risky gambles, and actual gambling behaviors. Results indicate that people in the mere physical presence of others make riskier decisions than people making identical decisions alone, and that feelings of security were the psychological mechanism behind this effect. Our results also suggest that the effect is contingent on whether people are surrounded by others who belong to the same social group. A meta‐analysis across all studies presented in this research reveals a highly reliable mere‐presence effect. Together, these results demonstrate that the mere physical presence of others can have a potent impact on risk‐taking behaviors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

计算机自适应测验中测验安全控制方法评述

计算机自适应测验在实际应用中曾经受到了测验安全问题质疑。国内外学者主要从两种研究思路提出了测验安全控制的方法：一是控制项目的最大曝光率, 沿着这个思路发展出来的方法有SH法、项目合格方法、多重最大曝光率法等; 二是改进选题策略, 沿着这个思路发展的方法主要是 分层法及其变式。此外, 近年来出现了测验安全控制方法之间相结合的研究思路。本文从均方误差、项目曝光率、题库利用率等指标论述了测验安全控制方法的优缺点, 并概述了这些测验安全控制方法的研究发展历程与发展思路, 展望了今后的研究趋势。     

亲密伴侣暴力中儿童的社会适应及干预

亲密伴侣暴力是指现在或曾经处于亲密关系中的伴侣之间发生的攻击或控制行为。亲密伴侣暴力不仅对妇女的身心造成伤害,对家庭中儿童的社会适应也有不利影响。亲密伴侣暴力与儿童外化行为、内化行为有紧密联系。作为保护因素,年龄、情绪调节能力、社会支持等可以减少亲密伴侣暴力环境中儿童的适应问题。认知-背景理论、情绪安全理论、外溢理论和发展心理病理学理论对亲密伴侣暴力影响儿童社会适应的机制进行了解释。为了促进亲密伴侣暴力中儿童的社会适应,实践工作者提出了不同的干预方案。未来研究应在区分亲密伴侣暴力的不同评估、控制共生风险因素、重视神经生物学研究、改进干预研究等方面做出努力。     

Analytic Confidence and Political Decision‐Making: Theoretical Principles and Experimental Evidence From National Security Professionals

When making decisions under uncertainty, it is important to distinguish between the probability that a judgment is true and the confidence analysts possess in drawing their conclusions. Yet analysts and decision‐makers often struggle to define “confidence” in this context, and many ways that scholars use this term do not necessarily facilitate decision‐making under uncertainty. To help resolve this confusion, we argue for disaggregating analytic confidence along three dimensions: reliability of available evidence, range of reasonable opinion, and responsiveness to new information. After explaining how these attributes hold different implications for decision‐making in principle, we present survey experiments examining how analysts and decision‐makers employ these ideas in practice. Our first experiment found that each conception of confidence distinctively influenced national security professionals' evaluations of high‐stakes decisions. Our second experiment showed that inexperienced assessors of uncertainty could consistently discriminate among our conceptions of confidence when making political forecasts. We focus on national security, where debates about defining “confidence levels” have clear practical implications. But our theoretical framework generalizes to nearly any area of political decision‐making, and our empirical results provide encouraging evidence that analysts and decision‐makers can grasp these abstract elements of uncertainty.     

Islam,secularism and danger: a reconsideration of the link between religiosity,radicalism and rebellion in Central Asia

In equating political Islam with radicalism and rebellion against the state, security analysts make a number of assumptions about the religious, the secular and security. Within the Central Asian context, the discursive fusing of religiosity with radicalism produces a bogeyman in which national and foreign governments, although offering quite different countermeasures, have found a common enemy. This securitisation of Islam distorts our understanding of these movements whose approach is seldom ‘radical’ in form. We identify six claims which are axiomatic to both international and national secularist security discourses with respect to Islam in the region. We then demonstrate that popular Muslim discourse and political practice – in the findings of an original survey and ethnographic research in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – provide a more complex picture than that found in elite discourses. While the six propositions can be refuted in objective terms, they remain relevant to how the problem is subjectively produced and reproduced in elite discourse and practice. As particular secularist claims about Islam, they inform national and international policies towards religious freedom and Islamic movements across Central Asia. Many of these themes appear in weaker and ambiguous forms in popular discourse and continue to limit Muslim political participation.     

Cautious Defection: Group Representatives Cooperate and Risk Less than Individuals

Individuals often make decisions that affect groups, yet the propensities of group representatives are not as well understood than those of independent decision makers or deliberating groups. We ask how responsibility for group payoffs—in the absence of group deliberation—affects the choice. The experiment utilizes the Interdependent Security Dilemma paradigm. In its deterministic version, the game is identical to a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. In the stochastic version, potential losses are larger but uncertain, occurring with a predefined probability when one or both players choose to forgo investment in protection. Participants were assigned to play either as individuals, or as representatives of three‐person groups, with each member's choices equally likely to determine the group's payoffs. In the deterministic condition, individuals were more likely to invest (cooperate) than group representatives (80% vs. 62% of rounds). In the stochastic condition, the pattern was reversed as representatives were slightly, but not significantly, more likely to invest than individuals (46% vs. 40%). The significant interaction effect suggested that group representatives were not only less cooperative but also more risk averse than individuals. A follow‐up study supported this account by showing participants who construed the invest strategy as low‐risk than those who perceived this strategy to be high risk. Overall, group representatives exhibited a tendency to act more competitively and more cautiously than individuals acting alone. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.