Morality‐ and identity‐related antecedents of children's guilt and shame attributions in events involving physical illness

It is theorised that guilt‐ and shame‐related appraisals vary on two separate dimensions. Guilt implies an appraisal that one has either committed a moral transgression or that one has otherwise been involved in the creation of a morally wrong outcome. Shame implies one's appraisal that the current event or condition reflects negatively on one's identity. To test these claims, 206 7‐ to 16‐year‐old children gave shame and guilt ratings of three types of events that were drawn from the domain of physical illness and that were designed to elicit primarily guilt, primarily shame, or both emotions. The 12‐year‐olds and older children's ratings were fully consistent with our hypothesis. Younger children's greatest difficulty was in not attributing shame to protagonists who were involved in causing a moral wrong without there being the threat of an unwanted identity.     

Empathic forecasting: How do we predict other people's feelings?

When making affective forecasts, people commit the impact bias. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on their affective experience. In three studies we show that people also commit the impact bias when making empathic forecasts, affective forecasts for someone else. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on someone else's affective experience (Study 1), they do so for friends and strangers (Study 2), and they do so when other sources of information are available (Study 3). Empathic forecasting accuracy, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's actual affective experience, was lower than between-person forecasting correspondence, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's affective forecast. Empathic forecasts do not capture other people's actual experience very well but are similar to what other people forecast for themselves. This may enhance understanding between people.     

Automatic influence of arousal information on evaluative processing: Valence–arousal interactions in an affective Simon task

Previous research showed that evaluation speed is faster for negative stimuli that are high in arousal and for positive stimuli that are low in arousal. The present study investigated whether arousal and valence analogously interact in automatic stimulus evaluations, i.e., if stimulus valence is irrelevant for the task. One sample of participants switched randomly between an evaluation task and an affective Simon task that assessed stimulus evaluations indirectly. Another sample completed a pure Simon task. In all conditions, the influence of affective stimuli on task performance was enhanced when valence and arousal were congruent (i.e., high-arousing negative and low-arousing positive stimuli) than when both stimulus dimensions were incongruent (i.e., low-arousing negative and high-arousing positive stimuli). These findings suggest that evaluative implications of stimulus arousal and valence are automatically inferred even when stimulus evaluation is irrelevant for the task at hand.