The Göteborg discothèque fire, 1998

Findings from a study of 563 adolescents’ reactions following a discotheque fire that killed 63 young people in Göteborg in October 1998 are presented. The group answered a questionnaire seven months following the disaster. The questionnaire included the Impact of Event Scale (IES) and the Birleson Depression Self‐Rating Scale (DSRS). The level of trauma was found to be very high, while depression scores were less elevated. A little under a third of the students scored above a clinical cut‐off point (> 35) on the IES, indicating high posttraumatic stress levels. Girls evidenced more depression and traumatic stress reactions than boys. Levels of reactions increased with more closeness (knowing victims personally) and if the adolescents were of non‐Swedish origin.     

Knowing in advance: the impact of prior event information on memory and event knowledge

We examined the influence of newly acquired information on children's memory and general representation of a personally experienced event. Thirty-five children between the ages of 5 and 7 years participated in the novel event (Visiting the Pirate). The day before participating, children were: (1) provided with new information specific to the up-coming event; (2) engaged in a discussion generally related to the event topic based on existing knowledge; or (3) discussed an unrelated topic. Advance information specific to the event led to better recall and, in particular, to better integration of the experience into a general event representation both soon after the event and at a follow-up interview 4 months later, whereas general discussion of the topic without the event specific information neither enhanced memory reports nor facilitated the integration of event information. Providing information in advance can have significant effects on memory and knowledge acquisition although many variables, including those relating to the specific content of the information, will affect this relation.     

Weak coherence,no theory of mind,or executive dysfunction? Solving the puzzle of pragmatic language disorders

Deficits in pragmatic language ability are common to a number of clinical populations, for example, right-hemisphere damage (RHD), Autism and traumatic brain injury (TBI). In these individuals the basic structural components of language may be intact, but the ability to use language to engage socially is impaired. Despite the nature of these difficulties being well documented, exactly what causes these difficulties is less clear. Furthermore, the current status of causal explanations for pragmatic difficulties across these populations is divergent and sometimes contradictory. This paper explores the empirical validity of three theories that attempt to explain pragmatic language impairment. It is recommended that a new, more convergent approach to investigating the causes of pragmatic language disability be adopted.     

A Capuchin monkey (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>) recognizes when people do and do not know the location of food

In a previous study, Kuroshima and colleagues demonstrated that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learned to discriminate between a "knower" who inspected a box for food, and a "guesser" who did not. The aim of the present study was to specify whether the subjects learned a simple conditional discrimination or a causal relationship that seeing leads to knowing. In experiment 1, we introduced five types of novel containers to two subjects. Each container was of different shape and color. The subjects gradually learned to reach toward the container the knower suggested. In experiment 2, we diversified the behavior of the knower and the guesser. In experiment 3, in order to eliminate the possibility of discrimination based on differences in the magnitude and the complexity of two trainers, we equated their behaviors. One subject adapted to the novel behaviors of the knower and the guesser, successfully discriminating the two trainers. Thus this monkey clearly learned to use the inspecting action of the knower and the non-inspecting action of the guesser as a discriminative cue to recognize the baited container. This result suggests that one capuchin monkey learned to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.     

The Pronoun Bias Effect Strikes Again: A Reply to Pynte and Colonna

The gender of an initial adjectival phase (AP) influences the analysis of a phrase which is a potential main clause subject in French. Pynte and Colonna (this issue) establish this generalization but analyze it without considering critical aspects of sentence structure, specifically, the fact that the AP has a null pronominal subject. If grammars contain a violable constraint requiring coreference between the pronominal subject of an initial subordinate phrase and the subject of the main clause, then in Pynte and Colonna's study perceivers must choose on-line between an analysis which satisfies the same subject constraint and one which doesn't. From this perspective, it is expected that the subject analysis of the ambiguous phrase predominates. Further, on this view, the preference fits with independent generalizations about language such as the existence of switch-reference languages which obligatorily mark the coreference relation between the initial subordinate subject and the main clause subject. It also fits with already established facts about language processing, such as Cowart and Cairns' (1987) Pronoun Bias Effect.     

Acquired ‘theory of mind'' impairments following stroke

The ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to self and others (‘theory of mind') has been hypothesised to have an innate neural basis and a dedicated cognitive mechanism. Evidence in favour of this proposal has come from autism; a brain-based developmental disorder which appears to be characterised by impaired theory of mind, despite sometimes good general reasoning skills/IQ. To date no case of specific acquired theory of mind impairment has been reported. The present study examined theory of mind in adults who had suffered right hemisphere stroke, a group known to show pragmatic and social difficulties. In one study using story materials and two using cartoons, patients' understanding of materials requiring attribution of mental states (e.g. ignorance, false belief) was significantly worse than their understanding of non-mental control materials. Data from healthy elderly subjects, and a small group of left hemisphere patients (who received the tasks in modified form), suggest that this impairment on mental state tasks is not a function of task difficulty. The findings support the notion of a dedicated cognitive system for theory of mind, and suggest a role for the healthy right hemisphere in the attribution of mental states.     

Found in Translation: Late Bilinguals Do Automatically Activate Their Native Language When They Are Not Using It

In their paper “Do Bilinguals Automatically Activate Their Native Language When They Are Not Using it?”, Costa, Pannunzi, Deco, and Pickering (Cognitive Science, 2017) proposed a reinterpretation of Thierry and Wu's (2004, 2007) finding of native language‐based (Chinese, L1) ERP effects when they tested Chinese–English late bilinguals exclusively in their second language (English, L2). Using simulations in a six‐node Hebbian learning model (three L1 nodes, three L2 nodes), Costa et al. suggested that form overlaps in L1 between otherwise unrelated words create a persistent relationship between their L2 translations. In this scenario, words in the nascent L2 lexicon overlapping in their L1 translations would become linked during learning because of the form overlap in L1; once the L2 words are learned, the direct link between them would be sufficient to generate robust, apparently “L1‐mediated” priming without requiring any activation of L1 translations. Costa et al. contend that links between L2 words remain beyond the learning phase, even after links to L1 representations have been severed, and thus that their model affords an alternative account to (but not a rebuttal of) Thierry and Wu's claim of language non‐selective activation—or automatic activation of translation equivalents—in late bilinguals. In this response, we build on Costa et al.'s original simulation code, showing that it can only reproduce L1‐independent priming when implementing the L1 disconnection in their particular way. By contrast, when severing inter‐language connections bidirectionally, their model fails to retain any sizeable influence of L1 form overlap on L2 activations. The model is not the theory, however, and we discuss several issues that would need to be addressed in further attempts to model language non‐selective activation in late bilinguals.     

Mental verb input for promoting children's theory of mind: A training study

An experimental study investigated the effect of the type of mental verb input (i.e., input with think, know, and remember) on preschoolers’ theory of mind development. Preschoolers (n = 72) heard 128 mental verb utterances presented in video format across four sessions over two weeks. The training conditions differed only in the way the mental verbs were presented: the form (statement or question), the referent (first person or other person), and the interaction style (overheard or interactive). Children who overheard the characters discussing the mental states of someone else, either in statement or question form, significantly improved in their false belief understanding. These experimental findings demonstrate mental verb utterances about other people, even when not directed to the child, scaffold children's attention to differing perspectives, thus more efficiently promoting some aspects of their ToM development.