A cognitive model of insomnia

Insomnia is one of the most prevalent psychological disorders, causing sufferers severe distress as well as social, interpersonal, and occupational impairment. Drawing on well-validated cognitive models of the anxiety disorders as well as on theoretical and empirical work highlighting the contribution of cognitive processes to insomnia, this paper presents a new cognitive model of the maintenance of insomnia. It is suggested that individuals who suffer from insomnia tend to be overly worried about their sleep and about the daytime consequences of not getting enough sleep. This excessive negatively toned cognitive activity triggers both autonomic arousal and emotional distress. It is proposed that this anxious state triggers selective attention towards and monitoring of internal and external sleep-related threat cues. Together, the anxious state and the attentional processes triggered by it tricks the individual into overestimating the extent of the perceived deficit in sleep and daytime performance. It is suggested that the excessive negatively toned cognitive activity will be fuelled if a sleep-related threat is detected or a deficit perceived. Counterproductive safety behaviours (including thought control, imagery control, emotional inhibition, and difficulty problem solving) and erroneous beliefs about sleep and the benefits of worry are highlighted as exacerbating factors. The unfortunate consequence of this sequence of events is that the excessive and escalating anxiety may culminate in a real deficit in sleep and daytime functioning. The literature providing preliminary support for the model is reviewed and the clinical implications and limitations discussed.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Transfer of newly acquired stimulus valence between identities in dissociative identity disorder (DID)

Patients with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) frequently report episodes of interidentity amnesia, that is amnesia for events experienced by other identities. The goal of the present experiment was to test the implicit transfer of trauma-related information between identities in DID. We hypothesized that whereas declarative information may transfer from one identity to another, the emotional connotation of the memory may be dissociated, especially in the case of negative, trauma-related emotional valence. An evaluative conditioning procedure was combined with an affective priming procedure, both performed by different identities. In the evaluative conditioning procedure, previously neutral stimuli come to refer to a negative or positive connotation. The affective priming procedure was used to test the transfer of this acquired valence to an identity reporting interidentity amnesia. Results indicated activation of stimulus valence in the affective priming task, that is transfer of emotional material between identities.     

Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition

Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion detection? Four alternative models are explored: a generate-and-test model, a reverse simulation model, a variant of the reverse simulation model that employs an "as if" loop, and an unmediated resonance model.     

Organizational expectations of the novice teacher

The study focuses on the teacher as an organization person, that is, a professional working in an organizational setting, and forms part of its administrative and human fabric. The purpose of the article is to describe the novice teachers expectations from teaching as a profession and from the school as a work organization. The novice teachers who participated in trainee programs at five large teacher training colleges in Israel, completed a self-report questionnaire. The questionnaire items expressed teachers expectations of their work at the outset of their professional career. Facet Theory was the methodological approach used for the study. It was found that novice teachers expectations focus on the following areas of interest and activity expectations of professional and social recognition; expectations of responsive conduct on the part of students; of involvement and support from parents, and of collegiality from other staff, parents and the principal; and expectations that teaching and those associated with it will contribute to strengthening the teachers professional sense of self. The findings were also examined based on self-psychology perspectives. The article discusses the implications of these expectations pertaining to teacher training.     

Disposition to recognize goals in infant chimpanzees

Do nonhuman primates attribute goals to others? Traditional studies with chimpanzees provide equivocal evidence for “mind reading” in nonhuman primates. Here we adopt looking time, a methodology commonly used with human infants to test infant chimpanzees. In this experiment, four infant chimpanzees saw computer-generated stimuli that mimicked a goal-directed behavior. The baby chimps performed as well as human infants, namely, they were sensitive to the trajectories of the objects, thus suggesting that chimpanzees may be endowed with a disposition to understand goal-directed behaviors. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Cognitive behaviour therapy for eating disorders: a "transdiagnostic" theory and treatment

This paper is concerned with the psychopathological processes that account for the persistence of severe eating disorders. Two separate but interrelated lines of argument are developed. One is that the leading evidence-based theory of the maintenance of eating disorders, the cognitive behavioural theory of bulimia nervosa, should be extended in its focus to embrace four additional maintaining mechanisms. Specifically, we propose that in certain patients one or more of four additional maintaining processes interact with the core eating disorder maintaining mechanisms and that when this occurs it is an obstacle to change. The additional maintaining processes concern the influence of clinical perfectionism, core low self-esteem, mood intolerance and interpersonal difficulties. The second line of argument is that in the case of eating disorders shared, but distinctive, clinical features tend to be maintained by similar psychopathological processes. Accordingly, we suggest that common mechanisms are involved in the persistence of bulimia nervosa, anorexia nervosa and the atypical eating disorders. Together, these two lines of argument lead us to propose a new transdiagnostic theory of the maintenance of the full range of eating disorders, a theory which embraces a broader range of maintaining mechanisms than the current theory concerning bulimia nervosa. In the final sections of the paper we describe a transdiagnostic treatment derived from the new theory, and we consider in principle the broader relevance of transdiagnostic theories of maintenance.     

Six-year-olds' difficulties handling intensional contexts

Previous research shows that children have difficulties handling intensional contexts even when they can pass a test of false belief (e.g. Cognition 67 (1998) 287; Cognition 25 (1987) 289). Some authors (Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Cognition 25 (1987) 289) place these difficulties in the linguistic and not the mental representational domain. The experiments reported here examined whether 6-year-old children could answer questions in an intensional context that did not require the explicit verbal characterization of a belief. We replicated previous findings and found that children answered according to their own knowledge in an intensional context. This occurred even though they responded by choosing a picture to insert into a protagonist's thought bubble rather than report the belief verbally. Children could correctly answer questions about the knowledge state of the protagonist and pass a test of false belief. Further experiments ruled out methodological explanations. Experiment 2 showed that the difference in answering according to own knowledge between the false belief and intensional stories is not accounted for by procedural factors in the two types of test. Experiment 3 revealed that children did not answer according to their own knowledge by default. Experiment 4 suggested that answering according to own knowledge was not a result of pictorial salience. Results are discussed in relation to the simulation-theory debate.