Reason explanation a first-order rationalizing account

In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a concept of moral intuition as a seeming whose seemingness resides in special, phenomenological features such as a felt veridicality, appropriateness, familiarity, or confidence, and whose justificatory force is influenced by the reliability of the belief-producing procedures and by a subject's competence in applying moral concepts. I argue that subjects can come to realise that the beliefs expressed in their intuitive judgements evoke a sense of non-inferential credibility. In section 5, I first discuss the contribution of moral expertise to the non-inferential credibility of a person's intuitions. Subsequently, I discuss whether Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is right in saying that we can never claim non-inferential justification for our intuitions because they are subject to all kinds of distorting influences.     

Reasons for Randomness: A Solution to the Axiological Problem for Theists

Abstract

In this paper we bring to light several ways randomness—i.e., undetermined and unintended events—may contribute to our understanding of God's providence and personality. We begin by making clearer a certain problem that randomness has been thought to pose to theism. We then discuss recent criticisms of certain contemporary solutions to this problem that emphasize the value of an autonomous creation. From there, we propose a fresh way of understanding the value of a semi-autonomous creation that does not succumb to these recent critiques. Our end goal is to explore new reasons God might have to value randomness. In particular, we highlight two plausible, interrelated candidate values: (1) There are certain aesthetic properties that a partially random, self-forming creation enjoys; and (2) Such a creation grants God and creatures certain pleasures, such as wonder, anticipation, curiosity, surprise, and appreciation. In articulating our version of the autonomy defense, we position it within two opposing accounts of divine providence, specifically open theism and simple foreknowledge.     

The Universe as a Saturated Phenomenon: The Christian Concept of Creation in View of Modern Philosophical and Scientific Developments

Abstract

The article develops an argument that the Christian concept of creation of the world, being an issue of the modern dialogue between theology and science, must be rethought and reformulated along the lines of recent advancements in cosmology and philosophy. It is argued that the prevailing natural attitude to the issue of the creation of the universe (whether based on Biblical hermeneutics or scientific theories) is philosophically inadequate because it does not account for the facticity of the articulating consciousness, which itself is the modality of the created. Correspondingly, the issue of creation receives a different interpretation: it is the coming into existence of personal life in the Divine image, capable of recognizing its createdness, and articulating creation as hypostatically distant from the comprehending subjectivity. Creation as inseparable from the life of subjectivity thus acquires the status of a saturated phenomenon to which neither successive quantitative, nor qualitative synthesis, nor temporal synthesis can be applied; it also escapes a rubric of relation. The created world, or the universe as a whole, gives itself to us from its own “self” to such an extent that it affects us, changes us and almost constitutes us, and stages us out of its own giving itself to us. The universe is present in the background of our existence through relationship and communion in such a way that we can express this presence ecstatically—through music, painting, poetry etc.—that presence which cannot be formalized in definitions of physics and mathematics. It is the living humanity that is the only and ultimate manifestation of God through its creation.     

The Role of Dysphoria in Social Thinking and Behaviour

In response to Palermo (2016, Australian Psychologist, in press) comments, some aspects of the target paper are further elaborated here. In particular, given Palermo's timely emphasis on the potential social and cultural implications of research demonstrating the beneficial consequences of negative affect, the historical background, and practical implications of the experimental evidence are elaborated. Furthermore, the reviewer also comments on the applicability of alternative theoretical conceptualizations to the data reported here, and this issue also receives further attention. Overall, it is concluded that there is now strong and convergent evidence for the often beneficial consequences of mild negative affect, and these findings deserve serious consideration in practical applications of psychology, and in our conceptions of what represents a healthy and balanced emotional life. Embracing and accepting periods of negative affectivity should be recognised as a normal and healthy part of the human condition, and the cultural bias towards positive affect should be tempered by an appreciation of the adaptive benefits of dysphoria.     

The Function of Moods and Emotions: Comment on “Can Sadness Be Good for You? On the Cognitive,Motivational and Interpersonal Benefits of Mild Negative Affect” (Forgas, 2017)

Evolutionary theories suggest that all affective states have a function. The fascinating review “Can Sadness Be Good for You? On the Cognitive, Motivational and Interpersonal Benefits of Mild Negative Affect” by Joseph Forgas is a welcome reminder that happiness is not the be all and end all—sadness can also be beneficial. In this commentary, I summarise the studies conducted by Forgas et al. that demonstrate the benefit of mild negative affect for memory, judgement, motivation, and interpersonal behaviour (and those that do not), link them to current theories and models, and discuss avenues for future research.     

论审美文化与社会时尚

当审美文化与社会时尚相遇合时就形成审美时尚。审美时尚的背后往往有某种社会文化心理与之相伴随。审美时尚以社会时尚为背景,以社会文化思潮为情感动力。审美时尚的形成,有着深刻的社会原因和心理原因。审美时尚直接影响到个体审美观念的形成,影响到个体审美趣味的取向。不同年龄、性别的审美个体受审美时尚的影响各有差异。审美时尚还体现为审美欣赏与审美创造实践中的一种趋势、潮流。审美时尚,作为一种渠道或方式,有效地实现着社会心理对时代审美意识的影响。     

人类文明审美化道路之寓言 --以《神话研究》中普罗米修斯"神话创作"为例的述评

在布鲁门贝格看来,神话创作是推动文明发展的一个充分条件。它的充分性体现于它出于文化目的论的内在要求——征服现实绝对主义。这是神话创作性的合法性。惟其充分性而非必要性,对文明的书写只能是一种审美神话的寓言。这是神话创作的非法性。因此,审美神话的寓言式书写困境承诺斯替主义二元论而来,在西方审美思想史上绵延不绝的普罗米修斯神话创作中见出。在通盘重构西方审美思想史之后,布氏提出了令人不安的审美神话之后的解释学问题。     

在不同注意定向条件下是否出现返回抑制的知觉优先

返回控制中的知觉优先是指相对于非线索化位置,线索化位置的刺激被优先知觉到的现象。研究采用时序判断方法对不同注意定向下返回抑制的知觉优先现象进行了两个实验。实验１采用连续线索化的安排,发现当注意从线索化位置移开后知觉优先仍然存在;实验２采用同时呈现双线索的安排发现知觉优先也存在。     

Defensive emotions and evaluative judgements: Sensitivity to anger and fear predicts moral judgements,whereas sensitivity to disgust predicts aesthetic judgements

Aesthetic and moral evaluations engage appetitive and defensive emotions. While the role played by pleasure in positive aesthetic and moral judgements has been extensively researched, little is known about how defensive emotions influence negative aesthetic and moral judgements. Specifically, it is unknown which defensive emotions such judgements tap into, and whether both kinds of judgement share a common emotional root. Here, we investigated how participants' individual sensitivity to disgust, fear, anger and sadness predicted subjective judgements of aesthetic and moral stimuli. Bayesian modelling revealed that participants who were more sensitive to anger and fear found conventional and moral transgressions more wrong. In contrast, participants who were more sensitive to disgust disliked asymmetrical geometric patterns and untidy rooms more. These findings suggest that aesthetic and moral evaluations engage multiple defensive emotions, not just disgust, and that they may rely on different defensive emotions as part of their computational mechanism.