Response of colony mice to intruders with different fighting experience

Six male mice placed in a large, moderately complex enclosure formed a stable dominance hierarchy in which two mice defended adjacent floor areas and the remaining four mice were subordinate and did not form territories. Intruder mice with winning or losing experience in prior paired encounters, or those with no fighting experience, were introduced individually into the colony for 30 minute periods. These intruders were attacked by the dominant members of the colony, and the fighting outcomes were strongly dependent upon the fighting experience of the intruder. Intruders with losing or no fighting experience engaged in little mutual fighting with residents, were easily defeated, and terminated attacks by engaging in subordinate behaviors. Intruders with winning experience fought vigorously with residents, attacked and, in many cases, defeated residents. These results suggest that relatively little winning experience gained in earlier paired encounters may be sufficient to overcome the various fighting advantages enjoyed by a dominant territorial holding member of a colony.     

Effects of isolation during development on reactivity and home-cage agonistic behavior in rats

This experiment was designed to determine whether isolation during two developmental periods would contribute to differences in home-cage agonistic behavior and whether altered reactivity was a mediating variable. While early isolation (16–41 days) was shown to have a significant and sustained impact on agonistic behavior, isolation during a later developmental period (41–68 days) did not result in altered occurrences of agonistic behavior. While isolation did result in increased reactivity to both footshock and dorsal tactile stimuli, the pattern of these data suggested that hyperreactivity to tactile stimulation was not a satisfactory account of the increased agonistic behavior of rats raised in isolation.     

Dynamics of the knowledge instinct: Effects of incoherence on the cognitive system

We successfully replicated a study about aesthetic emotions in a different socio-cultural environment. The present results suggest that incoherence is a strong inhibitor for aesthetic chills and verify a positive correlation between pleasure and meaning. These results allow for a scientific study of aesthetic emotions as it is now possible for the experimenter to have two groups of subjects, both exposed to the same stimulation, one group experiencing measurable aesthetic emotions whereas the other does not. We review the literature on the problem of both positive and negative psychogenic shivering and relate this phenomenon to the instinct of knowledge. We discuss the implications of our findings, stress the importance of studying the psychological and physiological effects of incoherence on the central nervous system, introduce a series of hypotheses to be tested in further research and conclude with a plausible explanation for the relation between temperature and cognition in humans.     

Domain generality and domain specificity in aesthetic appreciation

Aesthetic appreciation is looked at with respect to domain generality and domain specificity. Within the classic cognitive paradigm, modality- and domain-specific receptive processes are explored. These are then complemented with central processing structures. These reveal domain-specific as well as domain-general processing. Extending the classic cognitive science approach, the role of emotion in aesthetic appreciation is also explored. While domain-specific models of aesthetic appreciation are clearly called for, there are also numerous domain-general subprocesses and structures.     

Discouraging unethicality versus encouraging ethicality: Unraveling the differential effects of prevention‐ and promotion‐focused ethical leadership

Theory on the impact of ethical leadership has traditionally been based on a deontological approach to morality. Underlying this perspective is the assumption that all leader behaviors that encourage “normatively appropriate conduct” will influence followers in a similar fashion. Put differently, the current consensus seems to suggest that actions that focus on preventing unethical behavior—attending to “the wrong”—will have the same impact as actions that focus on promoting ethical behavior—attending to “the right.” Taking a within‐person approach, we draw upon social exchange theory to challenge this consensus and build theory that suggests a follower's felt trust from their leader will be differentially impacted by prevention‐ versus promotion‐focused ethical leadership. We also explore how these different types of ethical leadership may indirectly, through felt trust, impact citizenship behavior and counterproductive work behavior. Finally, we consider how the role of the “moral manager” may interact with the “moral person” by identifying leader moral hypocrisy as an important between‐person moderator of these effects. Given the importance of ethical decision‐making in organizations and the calls for increased ethical leadership, our findings have important implications for both theory and practice.     

A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception

In this paper, I offer a discussion concerning the conceptual connection between the notion of vision-for-action and the one of affordance perception. I first analyze the notion of vision-for-action. I then analyze a notion usually coupled with it: the notion of affordance perception, the main insights behind which are guiding several current neuroscientific enterprises and the related philosophical speculations. Then, I argue that we should not couple these two notions with a light heart: though these two processes can be, from a theoretical point of view, related, we should be careful in inferring the actual and effective occurrence of the latter in the presence of the former. This will be done by carrying out a conceptual analysis of the experimental evidence coming from the ‘Two Visual Systems Model’, which is the main reference in the literature on affordance perception and vision-for-action. My point has strong philosophical implications for our view concerning the best interpretation of how vision-for-action really works, and the specific relation it actually entertains with affordance perception.     

On modeling the creativity and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre

The problem of modeling the creativity is shown to be entirely connected with another mysterious challenge — the “Explanatory Gap” between the concepts of “Brain” and “Mind”. We use the Natural Constructive Cognitive Architecture, with its important feature being the combination of two subsystems, for generation of new information and for its conservation. “Brain” is considered as records of the raw images of real objects (individual objective information), while “Mind” refers to individual subjective information created inside the cognitive system (symbols). We argued that creativity can be treated as “an effort to bring a piece of personal “Brain” into the “Mind” and World”. Specific thinking mode (intellectual panic or throes of creativity) is shown to enhance the creative work resulting in over-mobilization and even enriching personal deep inside (“Brain”) experience. It is simulated by chaotic jumps of the noise amplitude around abnormally high value. The nature of Aesthetic Emotions and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre are analyzed. It is shown that they are caused by the “recognition paradox”: an object seems both, familiar but unusual. This occurs if the “Brain” does see its subtle features, while the “Mind” does not realize. Bright aesthetic emotions (goosebumps) are caused by irregular excitation of implicit associations provided by weak (“gray”) connections of the halo neurons (simulating the subconsciousness). General formula for Chef-D’oeuvre in science and art could be expressed as “condensed capacity to see the invisible, to combine the incompatible”.     

Exploring parent-athlete sport related communication outside of the sport environment with the Electronically Activated Recorder

ObjectivesThe purpose of the current study was to explore parent-athlete sport-related conversations as they naturally occurred in the private contexts that surround youth sport. A secondary aim was to understand whether male and female guardians communicate differently in sport, and whether these differences are shaped by the contexts in which they appear.DesignWe used the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR) to gather snippets of parents' and athletes' daily social interactions in the contexts that surround youth sport. A total of 220 audio files were gathered in the car ride to and from competition, the ice hockey arena, and at their home base (i.e., family residence of local teams and hotels for out-of-town teams) over the course of a 3-day competitive ice hockey tournament. Conversations were inductively coded using reflexive thematic analysis through a critical realist lens.ResultsHigher order themes included (a) performance-related dialogue; (b) the opportunity to discuss other social agents, and (c) parental social support. Frequency analysis revealed more instances of negative evaluations and technical instruction from fathers, whereas positive encouragement was more prominent from mothers.ConclusionThese findings present novel insight into the nature of parent-athlete interactions outside of the immediate sport-competition environment. We encourage scholars to consider the EAR for future investigation of the youth sport environment.     

感知运动经验在心理时间线形成中的作用—来自盲生的证据

本研究考察视觉和读写习惯有关的感知运动经验是如何影响心理时间形成的。实验1和实验2分别采用一天内和一生中的词语或短句,以小学三年级的普生和盲生为被试,结果发现不论是短的还是长的时间,普生对早的刺激按左键,晚的刺激按右键反应更快,而盲生未出现早左晚右的心理时间线。实验3和实验4分别以短时间和长时间范围的时间词为材料,以初一盲生和普生为被试,结果发现普生和盲生都是对过去的时间按左键,未来的时间按右键反应快;而且在长的时间范围内,盲生的反应时长于普生。结果表明视觉是心理时间线的基础,阅读经验在盲生心理时间线的形成中起着关键作用。     

Monothematic delusion: A case of innocence from experience

Empiricists about monothematic delusion formation agree that anomalous experience is a factor in the formation of these attitudes, but disagree markedly on which further factors (if any) need to be specified. I argue that epistemic innocence may be a unifying feature of monothematic delusions, insofar as a judgment of epistemic innocence to this class of attitudes is one that opposing empiricist accounts can make. The notion of epistemic innocence allows us to tell a richer story when investigating the epistemic status of monothematic delusions, one which resists the trade-off view of pragmatic benefits and epistemic costs. Though monothematic delusions are often characterized by appeal to their epistemic costs, they can play a positive epistemic role, and this is a surprising conclusion on which, so I argue, all empiricists can agree. Thus, I show that all empiricists have the notion of epistemic innocence at their disposal.