The disputation — a special type of cooperative argumentative dialogue

This article consists of three parts, two introductory, in which the limits and the methods of analysis of dialogues are expounded, and the major part, in which the main features of a philosophical theory of disputation are outlined.

Peering into the opaque mind

Abstract

Carolyn Saarni’s pioneering research showed that young children learn how to hide their feelings—to conceal disappointment with a smile or to conceal amusement with a neutral expression. By 6 years of age, children understand the implications of such concealment. They can distinguish between: (i) an individual’s true but hidden emotion; (ii) the emotion that the individual overtly expresses; and (iii) the emotion that other people might mistakenly attribute to the individual. Effectively, young children grasp that the mind is opaque. Its contents can remain hidden from others. We examine two issues raised by this important conceptual insight. First, we ask how it emerges in young children—what experiences lead them to acknowledge the mind’s opacity? Second, in light of Saarni’s emphasis on the impact of cultural beliefs and practices, we discuss anthropological evidence that in certain cultures the mind’s opacity is regarded as a social desideratum so that enquiries into, or speculations about, a person’s private mental states are regarded as inappropriate. We consider the understanding of hidden emotion that children will acquire if they grow up in such a culture. We propose—paradoxically—that they will readily differentiate between what is actually felt and what is overtly expressed. We conclude by reviewing recent cross-cultural evidence lending initial support to that prediction.     

Biased judgments of the effects of speed change on travel time,fuel consumption and braking: Individual differences in the use of simplifying rules producing the same biases

The main purpose of this study was to identify different cognitive rules that lead to a particular judgment bias. To fulfill this purpose, a new method Spectral analysis was introduced and applied. Participants judged time saved by driving faster, fuel saved by replacing a car and braking capacity at different speeds. These problems invite the time saving bias (e.g., time saved from speed increases at higher speeds overestimated), the miles per gallon, MPG illusion (misjudgment of fuel saved by replacing a car) and the braking capacity bias (overestimation of braking capacity after speed increase). The average results replicated the biases. Spectral analysis of individual participants and problems showed that a speed difference rule explained about half of the time saving judgments and about three fourth of the MPG judgments. A difference between speeds rule described about one third of the biased braking judgments and a ratio/proportion rule about one fifth of the time saving and MPG judgments. All rules give biased judgments in all three domains. The paper ends with a discussion of hierarchies of cognitive rules, applications of the results, and how to mitigate or avoid the biases and the risks associated with the biases.     

The Revival of Rejective Negation

Whether assent (acceptance) and dissent (rejection) are thought of as speech acts or as propositional attitudes, the leading idea of rejectivism is that a grasp of the distinction between them is prior to our understanding of negation as a sentence operator, this operator then being explicable as applying to A to yield something assent to which is tantamount to dissent from A. Widely thought to have been refuted by an argument of Frege"s, rejectivism has undergone something of a revival in recent years, especially in writings by Huw Price and Timothy Smiley. While agreeing that Frege"s argument does not refute the position, we shall air some philosophical qualms about it in Section 5, after a thorough examination of the formal issues in Sections 1–4. This discussion draws on – and seeks to draw attention to – some pertinent work of Kent Bendall in the 1970s.     

我国教育伦理学研究综述

在我国,教育伦理学在20世纪80年代后期一门独立的学科,在20多年的研究发展中,教育伦理学的研究视域得到了空前的拓展,形成了教育伦理学研究的价值目标体系和伦理规范体系,全面挖掘了教育伦理学的精神内涵,展开了教育伦理学实践机制的研究,呈现出繁荣发展的良好势头。     

平辈亲属词语义加工中长幼概念的空间隐喻和重量隐喻——来自中国朝鲜族和汉族的证据

采用具身认知范式考察平辈亲属词语义加工中长幼概念的空间和重量隐喻,比较中国朝鲜族和汉族的长幼观念。实验1表明,中国朝鲜族人在平辈亲属词语义加工中对平辈年长亲属词的加工快于对平辈年幼亲属词的加工,并且存在着部分的上下隐喻一致性效应,平辈年幼亲属词呈现在屏幕的下方加工得快。汉族人在平辈亲属词语义加工中存在着完整的上下隐喻一致性效应:平辈年长亲属词呈现在屏幕上方加工得快,平辈年幼亲属词呈现在屏幕下方加工得快。实验2表明,"左大右小"的亲属词对促进了中国朝鲜族人对"左重右轻"天平倾斜方向的判断,表明亲属词对蕴含的长幼概念激活了重量概念,但对汉族人的天平倾斜方向判断却无显著的影响。实验3表明,"左重右轻"的天平倾斜方向促进了中国朝鲜族人对"左大右小"的朝鲜语亲属词对的年龄比较,表明重量加工激活了长幼概念,但不影响汉族人对汉语亲属词对的年龄比较。朝、汉两个民族对平辈亲属词的不同隐喻方式源于不同的文化图式,反映了两个民族的长幼文化的差异:与汉族人相比,中国朝鲜族人更重视长幼秩序,对长幼规范的要求更加严格。     

通过样例和问题求解学习物理──加强对条件的认知

这项研究支持了我们先前的研究结果,即知识可以表征为一组产生式规则,产生式规则的学习可以通过考察样例和通过问题求解的方式进行。这项研究特别探讨了加强对于产生式的条件认知加工活动的效果。结果表明了我们这一构思的有效性。此外,还讨论了这一学习模式的学习过程。     

An example of discovery research involving the transfer of stimulus control

The initial purpose of the present study was to replicate procedures for teaching preschool children to recruit attention at appropriate times by having an experimenter signal the availability and unavailability of attention (i.e., arrange a multiple schedule involving reinforcement and extinction; Tiger & Hanley, 2004). Following the development of discriminated social responding, the schedule-correlated stimuli were removed (i.e., a mixed schedule of reinforcement was arranged). However, discriminated responding continued during these conditions. Further evaluation suggested that stimulus control over children's social responding had transferred from the schedule-correlated stimuli to the delivery of reinforcement. The effect of a history of reinforcement under multiple-schedule conditions on performance under mixed schedules was then replicated with 2 participants in a reversal design. These findings suggest that following experience with schedule-correlated stimuli, these stimuli may be removed with only modest disruption to discriminated responding.