The Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility (and Other Useful Facts about Epistemic Betterness)

Measures of epistemic utility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations of epistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice (by far) among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis (and the probabilities assigned to the other hypotheses stay in the same ratios), but where the Brier rule says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this ‘elimination experiment’ counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure of epistemic utility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles for epistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example.     

Accounting for Parcel-Allocation Variability in Practice: Combining Sources of Uncertainty and Choosing the Number of Allocations

Item parceling remains widely used under conditions that can lead to parcel-allocation variability in results. Hence, researchers may be interested in quantifying and accounting for parcel-allocation variability within sample. To do so in practice, three key issues need to be addressed. First, how can we combine sources of uncertainty arising from sampling variability and parcel-allocation variability when drawing inferences about parameters in structural equation models? Second, on what basis can we choose the number of repeated item-to-parcel allocations within sample? Third, how can we diagnose and report proportions of total variability per estimate arising due to parcel-allocation variability versus sampling variability? This article addresses these three methodological issues. Developments are illustrated using simulated and empirical examples, and software for implementing them is provided.     

Pabiku and Ga Ti Ga: Two Mechanisms Infants Use to Learn About the World

Some of the things that adults learn about language, and about the world, are very specific, whereas others are more abstract or rulelike. This article reviews evidence showing that infants, too, can very rapidly acquire both specific and abstract information, and considers the mechanisms that infants might use in doing so.     

Intelligent digital image firewall system for filtering privacy or sensitive images

As the commonest part of social networks, sharing images in social network not only provides more information, but also gives more intuitive view than text. However, images also can leak out information more easily than text, so the audit of image content is particularly essential. The disclosure of a tiny image, which involves sensitive information about individual, society even the state, may trigger a series of serious problems. In this paper, we design a kind of intelligent image firewall to detect and filter sensitive or privacy images. Two different approaches of the firewall are proposed. In the first approach, we propose an image firewall based on joint sparse representation, which can provide accurate and robust privacy prediction, and also can provide rich spatial relationship information. In the second approach, we propose a method based on the deep learning (Faster RCNN), which can predict the privacy relationships or actions (like kiss, hug and hand in hand) among the persons of an image. Experimental results show the effectiveness of the two kinds of approaches.     

Children’s understanding of depreciation in scenarios of envy and modesty

The aim of this study was to explore children’s understanding of depreciation when being presented with scenarios of envious or modest behavior. 123 Spanish children, six to eight years of age, decided how a character should respond when faced with a situation of envy or modesty. These situations were described in vignettes. The children chose between a response of either depreciation or admiration in the case of envy and between a response of either modesty or immodesty when faced with modest behavior. They were then asked to explain the reasons for their choices. Generally speaking, the results indicated that children rated self-depreciation in scenarios of modesty more highly than they did depreciation of another in situations of envy. An interaction effect showed that eight-year-old chose modest responses more than immodest ones, in contrast to the six-year-old. Conversely, age differences were not observed for the scenarios of envy. We discuss these results in light of the children’s explanations. Furthermore, the acquisition of emotional display rules is discussed, as well as the ability to manage emotions. Also, we discuss the truths and falsehoods of expression within the framework of social pragmatism in the selection of responses in both scenarios.     

Stopping rule use during information search in design problems

Information search is critical in most decision-making tasks. An important aspect of information search is the stopping rule used by the decision maker to terminate information acquisition. Decision-making problems may be usefully decomposed into design problems and choice problems. The distinction is critical because the goals of stopping behavior in the two types of problems are quite different. In design problems, the focus is on the sufficiency of information obtained for problem structuring and generating alternatives, while choice problems focus on convergence toward a solution. While previous research has studied stopping behavior in choice problems, the present research is concerned with stopping rule use during information search in design problems. To build theory in this area, we conducted two experiments. In the first, we presented professional systems analysts with an information search problem in a systems development context and asked them to gather information for a proposed system. Protocols of the search sessions were analyzed, and stopping rules used and information gathered by the analysts were identified. Results indicated that the use of certain stopping rules resulted in greater quantity and quality of information gathered. Additionally, stopping rule use, rather than analyst experience, accounted for the quantity and quality of information elicited. Finally, stopping rule use differed between more experienced and less experienced analysts. To apply our findings about stopping rules from the first experiment, we performed a second experiment in which we investigated stopping rule use in a consumer information search task on the world wide web. Results indicated the use of the same stopping rules as in the first experiment, although in different proportions. Implications for information search theory and practice are discussed.     

Contrasting rule-based and similarity-based category learning: The effects of mood and prior knowledge on ambiguous categorization

This study adopts a dual-system view of category learning. The findings suggest that consumers who learn a dominant feature as a verbal rule for a product category will classify a new ambiguous product according to that feature even if it more closely resembles a different product category. The findings also demonstrate that dominant features can bias categorization toward a less prototypical category in the event that the new product breaks the rule. We refer to this phenomenon as criterial inferencing. Lastly, we offer unique empirical evidence to suggest that mood influences category learning and thus attenuates the criterial inferencing bias.     

The mismeasure of morals: antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas

Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral.     

Toward a Gongfu Reconstruction of Confucianism —Responses to Comments by Huang Yong,Fan Ruiping,and Wang Qingjie

Responding to comments of my recent book, Understanding the Analects of Confucius, by Huang Yong, Fan Ruiping, and Wang Qingjie, this paper looks to highlight one of its major features—that it is a contemporary continuation of the Chinese tradition of doing commentary both as a way of allowing classic texts to unfold their rich meanings in the context of different times, and as a way for the commentator to express his or her own views. It strives to explain how a gongfu reconstruction of Confucianism can explain the apparent inconsistency between advocating rule-like instructions next to its encouragement of the art of flexibility, and to reveal what is more fundamental about Confucianism—rather than a system of rigid moral rules, it is an art of life. This gongfu interpretation would lead to the view that Confucianism does not depend on metaphysical truths as its justification, although it does need to hold metaphysical views as a way of affirming its values, which are justified through the excellence of life to which they lead. While the gongfu approach more accurately reflects Confucius’ own philosophical orientation, and it is therefore used to determine technical details such as what interpretations to put into translation of a text and what interpretations to list in the annotations as alternatives, it is, in the author’s humble view, also a unique contribution that the Chinese tradition can offer to world philosophy.     

Principlism,Pragmatism, or Reconstructionist Confucianism? —Some Comments on Ni Peimin’s English Translation of the Analects

This essay provides a few critical points of view on Ni Peimin’s recent English translation of the Analects. It shows that his translations of ren into “human-heartedness” and of li into “ritual propriety” may indicate a willingness to recast these Confucian concepts in the modern ideology of western subjectivism or individualism, whereas Confucianism is not in the direction of such ideologies. Moreover, while Ni seems to offer a “no-rule” view of Confucian virtue ethics, he cannot deny the existence of moral rules and principles in the Confucian system. It is insufficient for him to emphasize the importance of Confucian “instructions” or “methods” as he does without explicating their relations to Confucian rules. Additionally, Ni’s gongfu Confucianism provides a necessary and healthy step back from the contemporary principlism that has been dominant and popular in contemporary politics, ethics, and applied ethics, but Ni goes too far in denying the importance of the moral rules and principles that are implicit or explicit in the Confucian ritual practices and upheld in Confucius’s Analects.