Dressing “in code”: Clothing rules,propriety, and perceptions

Does dressing in line with societal clothing rules make a woman appear more professional and competent? We used a within-subjects design and tested if participants rated women dressed in compliance with school and workplace clothing rules more positively than women not dressed in compliance with rules. Participants (N = 89) at a mid-sized mid-western university rated 10 pictures of women captured from the internet on 11 attributes. Participants rated the five women dressed following clothing rules higher on a composite measure of positive attributes (intelligent, competent, powerful, organized, efficient, and professional), F(1, 86) = 68.92, p < .001 η_p² = .45. Participant’s ratings did not correlate with their own self-reported levels of sexism. Participants’ gender was not a significant correlate. Our findings indicate that how students perceive women significantly relates to dressing in code. Participants rated women in less revealing and less tight clothing more positively.     

Decomposition Proof Systems for Gödel-Dummett Logics

The main goal of the paper is to suggest some analytic proof systems for LC and its finite-valued counterparts which are suitable for proof-search. This goal is achieved through following the general Rasiowa-Sikorski methodology for constructing analytic proof systems for semantically-defined logics. All the systems presented here are terminating, contraction-free, and based on invertible rules, which have a local character and at most two premises.     

The Quantitative/Qualitative Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference

We chart the ways in which closure properties of consequence relations for uncertain inference take on different forms according to whether the relations are generated in a quantitative or a qualitative manner. Among the main themes are: the identification of watershed conditions between probabilistically and qualitatively sound rules; failsafe and classicality transforms of qualitatively sound rules; non-Horn conditions satisfied by probabilistic consequence; representation and completeness problems; and threshold-sensitive conditions such as ‘preface’ and ‘lottery’ rules. Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

Reasoning with conditionals

This paper reviews the psychological investigation of reasoning with conditionals, putting an emphasis on recent work. In the first part, a few methodological remarks are presented. In the second part, the main theories of deductive reasoning (mental rules, mental models, and the probabilistic approach) are considered in turn; their content is summarised and the semantics they assume for if and the way they explain formal conditional reasoning are discussed, in particular in the light of experimental work on the probability of conditionals. The last part presents the recent shift of interest towards the study of conditional reasoning in context, that is, with large knowledge bases and uncertain premises.     

医学职业潜规则的颠覆与“伦理生态”的营造——论医学职业精神重构的第一要务

我国的医学职业精神重构是一项庞大的系统工程,目前的第一要务是营造良好的医学伦理生态,而要达到上述近远期目标,则必须从颠覆医学职业潜规则起步。颠覆是破,营造是立,二者相辅相成,而且都需要从认识的困惑与误区中走出来,都需要政府、卫生行政管理部门及其官员、医院院长和一线医务人员的同心协力。其中,政府、卫生行政管理部门及其官员合乎医学职业精神的积极作为是最为关键的首要环节。     

5-6岁儿童多单位量比较能力的发展特点

通过计算机呈现任务和记录反应,对5岁、5岁半和6岁儿童解决多单位量比较问题的正确率和反应时进行了考察。研究结果表明:(1)6岁之前的儿童难以正确解决多单位量比较问题,从6岁开始,儿童开始逐渐掌握这种问题的解决方法;(2)在解决多单位量比较问题时,儿童采用了比较较高级单位的策略,而没有对每个单个物体进行计算;(3)进位规则没有对儿童解决多单位量比较问题的正确率和反应时产生显著影响。     

Compulsive perseveration: empirical criticism on the mood-as-input model

It has been proposed that the "Mood as Input" model provides an explanation of the perseverative nature of Obsessive Compulsive (OC) behaviour (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91). The model implies that task perseveration occurs when individuals (a) experience a bad mood and (b) ask themselves "did I do as much as I can?" In two earlier experiments with healthy participants (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91) it was found that when the allegedly critical conditions were met (negative mood and "did I as much as I can?" stop rule) perseveration occurred on a complex text-correction task. This finding was held to support a "mood as input" explanation of compulsive perseveration. It is important to note, however, that perseveration in clinical samples occurs for very simple "tasks" (e.g. closing a door or washing ones hands) and perseveration does not increase efficacy of performance. In the present study we compared the effects of the original task to effects of text correction tasks that were simpler and more OCD-like. The original effects were replicated: the combination of negative mood and the "did I do as much as I can" stop rule provoked perseveration. Meanwhile, "perseveration" was highly functional: the more "perseveration" the more text-errors were detected. Secondly, to the degree that tasks became simpler and more OCD-like, less checking occurred and the effects of the "did I do as much as I can?" stop rule on detection of errors became smaller. The findings raise questions about the validity of the paradigm as a model of OC perseveration.     

Sampling and decision rules used by honey bees in a foraging arena

Animals must continuously choose among various available options to exploit the most profitable resource. They also need to keep themselves updated about the values of all available options, since their relative values can change quickly due to depletion or exploitation by competitors. While the sampling and decision rules by which foragers profitably exploit a flower patch have attracted a great deal of attention in theory and experiments with bumble bees, similar rules for honey bee foragers, which face similar foraging challenges, are not as well studied. By presenting foragers of the honey bee Apis cerana with choice tests in a foraging arena and recording their behavior, we investigate possible sampling and decision rules that the foragers use to choose one option over another and to track other options. We show that a large part of the sampling and decision-making process of a foraging honey bee can be explained by decomposing the choice behavior into dichotomous decision points and incorporating the cost of sampling. The results suggest that a honey bee forager, by using a few simple rules as part of a Bayesian inference process, is able to effectively deal with the complex task of successfully exploiting foraging patches that consist of dynamic and multiple options.     

When constituencies speak in multiple tongues: The relative persuasiveness of hawkish minorities in representative negotiation

Although constituencies often consist of opposing factions, we know little about the way such opposing factions influence the representative’s negotiation strategy. This study addressed this issue: Representatives negotiated as sellers on behalf of a group consisting of hawkish (competitive) and dovish (cooperative) factions. Experiments 1–3 showed that a minority of hawks was sufficient to influence the representatives to acting in a competitive way; only when all constituents unanimously advocated a cooperative strategy were representatives more conciliatory towards their negotiation partner. These tendencies did not differ as a function of the representatives’ pro-social versus pro-self value orientation, or the unanimity versus majority rule putatively used in the constituency to accept of reject the representative’s negotiated agreement. We conclude that hawkish minorities are persuasive and influential because representatives accord more weight to hawkish than to dovish messages.     

A positive information logic for inferential information

Performing an inference involves irreducibly dynamic cognitive procedures. The article proposes that a non-associative information frame, corresponding to a residuated pogroupoid, underpins the information structure involved. The argument proceeds by expounding the informational turn in logic, before outlining the cognitive actions at work in deductive inference. The structural rules of Weakening, Contraction, Commutation, and Association are rejected on the grounds that they cause us to lose track of the information flow in inferential procedures. By taking the operation of information application as the primary operation, the fusion connective is retained, with commutative failure generating a double implication. The other connectives are rejected.