Critique of an epistemic account of fallacies

An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (Fallacies,Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would be permitted by traditional accounts. I also question thenecessity of fallacies leading to unwarranted beliefs. Some fallacies are fallacious due to their expected harm to argument practices. This position touches on a theme in the work of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, though I criticize their notion of rules of argument as too broad.     

AGAINST METAETHICAL IMPERIALISM: Several Arguments for Equal Partnerships between the Deontic and Aretaic

Virtue and deontological ethics are now commonly contrasted as rival approaches to moral inquiry. However, I argue that neither metaethical party should seek complete, solitary domination of the ethical domain. Reductive treatments of the right or the virtuous, as well as projects that abandon the former or latter, are bound to leave us with a sadly diminished map of the moral territories crucial to our lives. Thus, it is better for the two parties to seek a more cordial and equal relationship, one that permits metaethical pluralism, and acknowledges mutual dependence. I do not seek to prescribe how that relationship should look: this essay offers less a positive metaethical position than a prolegomenon to such a position, one that attempts to head off harmful attempts to reduce the territory of the aretaic to that of the deontic, or that of the deontic to the aretaic.     

Are Parental Rules regarding Screen Behaviors Associated with Youth’ Sedentary Behavior? The UP&DOWN Study

Abstract

This study aims to examine the associations of parental rules with sedentary behavior (SB) in youth. Leisure-time SB was assessed by accelerometry and questionnaire. In boys, parental rules regarding TV were negatively associated with objectively-measured leisure-time SB and time spent in all screen behaviors, but positively associated with educational SB. Among girls, the total number of parental rules was negatively associated with the time spent surfing the Internet, but positively related with educational SB, on weekends. The imposition of rules by parents may be a simple and effective strategy to improve sedentary patterns in youth, especially among boys.     

The contribution of self‐deceptive enhancement to display rules in the United States and Japan

Socially desirable responding was tested as a mediator of American and Japanese college student differences in display rules. Americans endorsed the expression of anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, and surprise more than the Japanese. Americans also exhibited more self‐deceptive enhancement than the Japanese, and self‐deceptive enhancement partially mediated country differences on the endorsement of anger, disgust, happiness, and surprise, but not contempt and fear. These findings highlight the role of self‐deceptive enhancement in contributing to expressive display rules and support the point of view that socially desirable responding is a reflection of one's personality and culture rather than a statistical nuisance.     

Parents teaching young children home safety rules: Implications for childhood injury risk

Teaching safety rules is a common practice but little is known about this. Fifty-eight parents of children 2 to 2.5 or 3 to 3.5 years of age reported on the safety rules they have, the factors that prompted these rules, the strategies used to teach these rules, and how they react to noncompliance with these rules. Results revealed more safety rules for children in the older group than the younger group, and greater emphasis on teaching the rule than teaching the basis for the rule at younger than older ages. Only about half the rules restricted the child from doing the risk behavior completely, whereas the remaining rules allowed for the behavior under certain circumstances. Parents assumed safety rules would prevent injuries and mostly implemented rules in reaction to evidence of injury risk. Parents equated noncompliance with not understanding, assuming that if children understood they would comply. Implications for childhood injury risk are discussed.     

Calling the beautiful game ugly: A response to Davis

In a previous article (Kretchmar 2005 Kretchmar, S. 2005. Game flaws. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXXII(1): 36–48.  [Google Scholar]), I identified problems in a certain species of games and traced these harms to something I called a ‘game flaw’. Unfortunately, ‘the beautiful game’ is a member of that species. I say it is unfortunate because Paul Davis (2006 Davis, P. 2006. Game strengths. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXXIII(1): 50–66.  [Google Scholar]), when taking me to task for providing an argument that, in his terms, was ‘not especially compelling’, focused on the game of soccer (hereafter, football). The issue over which we contended is one of ‘time management’– that is, how game initiation, duration and closure are structured. I suggest that two basic methods for managing such requirements are available. Games take place during a stipulated amount of time or for a specified number of events. In my original article, I identified four fundamental problems that may accompany time-regulated games. In this essay, I attempt to fortify those claims against Davis's criticisms.     

Familiar Words in Unfamiliar Surroundings: Davidson’s Malapropisms,Cavell’s Projections

Abstract

In their discussions and criticisms of the idea that language use is essentially a matter of following rules, Davidson and Cavell both invoke as counterexamples instances of intelligible linguistic innovation. Davidson’s favorite examples are malapropisms. Cavell focuses instead on what he calls projections. This paper clarifies some important differences between malapropisms and projections, conceived as paradigmatic forms of linguistic innovation. If malapropisms are treated as exemplary it will be natural to conclude, with Davidson, that a shared practice, be it rule-governed or not, matters only instrumentally – as something that may enhance but is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful communication. By contrast, if Cavellian projections are seen as exemplary, a shared practice will be conceived not only as essential to the possibility of meaningful linguistic innovation, but as already permeated by the sort of creativity of which projections are only particularly striking examples. It is also argued that malapropisms are not particularly convincing as counterexamples to the sort of view Davidson wants to reject. Cavellian projections, on the other hand, are powerful as counterexamples, and reflecting on the nature of their inventiveness is crucial to understanding and seeing the plausibility of Cavell’s own conception of language.     

Mood-as-input and depressive rumination

This article describes a test of mood-as-input theory predictions as applied to a rumination task in a nonclinical population. An experimenter-controlled interview was used to allow participants to reflect on a personal period of depression while in an experimentally-induced mood state (either negative or positive) or while deploying a specific stop rule for the task (either an “as many as can” or “feel like continuing” stop rule). As predicted by mood-as-input theory, persistence at the rumination task was greatest in the group experiencing negative mood while deploying an “as many as can” stop rule, and this suggests a mechanism that may contribute to perseverative depressive rumination. It is argued that the variables that contributed to perseveration in this study are already known to be characteristic of ruminative thinkers (e.g. negative mood and positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination that will command the deployment of “as many as can” stop rules for rumination). It is also argued that mood-as-input processes may provide a common mechanism for perseverative rumination and perseverative worry, and this common mechanism may account for many of the similarities between these two functionally-distinct activities.     

Psychophysiological effects of emotional dissonance in a face-to-face service interaction

Abstract

Current research demonstrates that requirements to express emotions which are not genuinely felt in the particular situation (emotional dissonance) are associated with negative long and short-term effects. The aim of the present study was to investigate: (a) the psychophysiological short-term effects of emotional dissonance in a face-to-face service interaction and (b) the moderating role of gender and neuroticism. In total, 32 women and 27 men were instructed to play the role of a service employee, who had to interact with an angry and rude customer. Half of the sample was given information that the organization expected them to be friendly (emotional dissonance), the other half was told they were expected to act naturally and show their genuine feelings (no emotional dissonance). Subjective and behavioral responses revealed that participants in the “friendly” condition modulated their emotional expressions to a greater extent than those in the “naturally” condition. Participants in the “friendly” condition showed stronger systolic and diastolic blood pressure responses. Furthermore, hierarchical regression analyses yielded that gender and neuroticism partly moderated the association between emotional dissonance and participants' psychophysiological response.     

The Limit of Mental Structures

The development of consistent health behaviors is important for chronic illness prevention and management. The current study experimentally compared two strategies—a personal-rule and a deliberation strategy—designed to help participants consistently perform their intended behaviors over a 7-week period in a real-world setting. Although the personal-rule strategy had theoretical support from behavioral economics and empirical support from both animal and human lab experiments, the deliberation strategy group was significantly more successful than the personal-rule strategy group, both initially (time to first violation, p < .01, Cohen's d = .51) and over the entire 7-week period (overall success, p < .05, Cohen's d = .18). These effects were significant even after controlling for known predictors of behavioral success, including individual-difference variables, person-behavior factors, and resolution-related factors.