Defensive patterns in reflective group supervisions at Child Health Centres

Reflective group supervision with infant healthcare workers has been described in several publications. It aims to enhance their ability to help distressed families, and to comprehend and relieve themselves of the distress that they encounter in such work. The ultimate aim has been formulated as an effort at increasing the professional's reflective function. The present article adds to the literature by applying an ego-psychological perspective on the group process and investigating defensive patterns in such supervisions. This approach includes a critical discussion of the place of the reflective function concept in psychoanalytic metapsychology. The article also suggests a Bionian perspective to account for skewed communicative patterns in groups, so-called basic assumptions. Some technical recommendations are provided on the frame in group supervision. They aim to disarm such defenses and facilitate the group participants’ possibilities of understanding and thus helping their colleague's problematic relationship with the family. To illustrate the discussion, and to help readers form an image of the supervision process, brief detailed accounts of such work are submitted.     

Making sense of Smith on sympathy and approbation: other-oriented sympathy as a psychological and normative achievement

ABSTRACT

Two problems seem to plague Adam Smith’s account of sympathy and approbation in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). First, Smith’s account of sympathy at the beginning of TMS appears to be inconsistent with the account of sympathy at the end of TMS. In particular, it seems that Smith did not appreciate the distinction between ‘self-oriented sympathy’ and ‘other-oriented sympathy’, that is, between imagining being oneself in the actor’s situation and imagining being the actor in the actor’s situation. Second, Smith’s account of approbation, according to which a sentiment of approval arises when there is recognition of concordance between the spectator’s sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion, seems to face the following problem: since the spectator attains both his own sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion by sympathizing with the actor, the sympathetic passion of the spectator and the original passion of the actor will necessarily be identical. Therefore, Smith’s account of approbation requires that the spectator utilize both self-oriented and other-oriented sympathy (‘the double-sympathy model of approbation’). I offer a novel developmental account of sympathy in TMS that renders Smith’s account of sympathy consistent and allows for the utilization of the double-sympathy model of approbation.