The influence of action on episodic memory: A virtual reality study

A range of empirical findings suggest that active learning is important for memory. However, few studies have focused on the mechanisms underlying this enactment effect in episodic memory using complex environments. Research using virtual reality has yielded inconsistent results. We postulated that the effect of action depends on the degree of interaction with the environment and freedom in the planning of an itinerary. To test these hypotheses, we disentangled the interaction and planning components of action to investigate whether each enhances factual and spatial memory. Seventy-two participants (36 male and 36 female) explored a virtual town in one of three experimental conditions: (a) a passive condition where participants were immersed as passenger of the car (no interaction, no planning); (b) a planning-only condition (the subject chose the itinerary but did not drive the car); (c) an interaction-only condition (the subject drove the car but the itinerary was fixed). We found that itinerary choice and motor control both enhanced spatial memory, while factual memory was impaired by online motor control. The role of action in memory is discussed.     

Systems Thinking for Knowledge

The capacity to engage in systems thinking is often viewed as being a product of being able to understand complex systems due to one's facility in mastering systems theories, methods, and being able to adeptly reason. Relatively little attention is paid in the systems literature to the processes of learning from experience and creating knowledge as a direct consequence of individuals engaging systems thinking itself over time. In fact, the potential efficacy of systems thinking to improve performance normally seen as only contingent on a priori knowledge, rather than knowledge created via learning from experience. Such newly create knowledge often results from engaging in modeling efforts and systemic forms of inquiry. This article proposes a model for creating new knowledge by coupling systems modeling with a pragmatic approach to knowledge-creation. This approach is based on a foundation of the pragmatic concepts first proposed by the American philosopher/scientist Charles Sanders Peirce over a century ago. This model offers systems practitioners a framework to engage in knowledge-intensive systems thinking (KIST) for addressing complex problematic issues.     

Cultural grounding of regret: Regret in self and interpersonal contexts

The purpose of this study was to explore cultural similarities and differences in regret, focusing on distinctions between interpersonal and self-situations, and between action and inaction regrets. Japanese and American undergraduates were asked to describe regrets experienced in interpersonal and self-situations. We found that both situational and cultural contexts influenced the likelihood of regretting inactions over actions. Participants were more likely to recall inaction regrets in self-situations than in interpersonal situations, and that the likelihood of recalling inaction regrets was more pronounced for Americans than for Japanese. Furthermore, we examined the intensity of the regret. Whereas American students experienced regret as intense as that of Japanese students in self-situations, Japanese students experienced regret more strongly than American students in interpersonal situations. Detailed content analysis also showed that individuals experienced regret in ways consistent with cultural values. The situational and cultural grounding of regret is discussed.     

How equivalent are the action execution,imagery, and observation of intransitive movements? Revisiting the concept of somatotopy during action simulation

Jeannerod (2001) hypothesized that action execution, imagery, and observation are functionally equivalent. This led to the major prediction that these motor states are based on the same action-specific and even effector-specific motor representations. The present study examined whether hand and foot movements are represented in a somatotopic manner during action execution, imagery, and action observation.     

Sensorimotor intentionality: The origins of intentionality in prospective agent action

Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of future effects, even from before birth. This implies that these movements, even if they are simple and discrete, are the actions of an intentional agent. We develop this notion to present a theory of the developing organisation of a core feature of cognition as embodied agent action, from early single actions with proximal prospectivity to the complex serial ordering of actions into projects to reach distal goals. We claim the prospective structural continuity from early and simple actions to later complex projects of serially-ordered actions confirms the existence of an ontogenetically primary form of content–directedness that is a driver for learning and development. Its implications for understanding autism are discussed.     

Action simulation in the human brain: Twelve questions

Although the idea of action simulation is nowadays popular in cognitive science, neuroscience and robotics, many aspects of the simulative processes remain unclear from empirical, computational, and neural perspectives. In the first part of the article, we provide a critical review and assessment of action simulation theories advanced so far in the wider literature of embodied and motor cognition. We focus our analysis on twelve key questions, and discuss them in the context of human and (occasionally) primate studies. In the second part of the article, we describe an integrative neuro-computational account of action simulation, which links the neural substrate (as revealed in neuroimaging studies of action simulation) to the components of a computational architecture that includes internal modeling, action monitoring and inhibition mechanisms.     

Parent-adolescent health conversations as action: Theoretical and methodological issues

Abstract

A qualitative research method based on action theory is proposed and illustrated for use in health psychology and health promotion research. Action refers to the goal-directed and intentional behaviors of individual and groups. Action theory has the advantage of using the perspectives provided by manifest behavior, internal processes, and social meaning in the analysis of action. In this article, the actions under consideration are the health-related conversations of parents and their adolescent children. The approach is premised on an understanding of health promotion as a family task constructed through actions such as conversations between family members. Health conversations in two parent-adolescent dyads are used to illustrate the method. The analysis includes the identification of goals, functional steps, and elements and their relation to the family health promotion project. Specific attention is paid to data gathering and analysis issues and their implications for health promotion research.     

Semantic embodiment,disembodiment or misembodiment? In search of meaning in modules and neuron circuits

“Embodied” proposals claim that the meaning of at least some words, concepts and constructions is grounded in knowledge about actions and objects. An alternative “disembodied” position locates semantics in a symbolic system functionally detached from sensorimotor modules. This latter view is not tenable theoretically and has been empirically falsified by neuroscience research. A minimally-embodied approach now claims that action–perception systems may “color”, but not represent, meaning; however, such minimal embodiment (misembodiment?) still fails to explain why action and perception systems exert causal effects on the processing of symbols from specific semantic classes. Action perception theory (APT) offers neurobiological mechanisms for “embodied” referential, affective and action semantics along with “disembodied” mechanisms of semantic abstraction, generalization and symbol combination, which draw upon multimodal brain systems. In this sense, APT suggests integrative-neuromechanistic explanations of why both sensorimotor and multimodal areas of the human brain differentially contribute to specific facets of meaning and concepts.     

Overcoming action crises in personal goals – Longitudinal evidence on a mediating mechanism between action orientation and well-being

An action crisis is defined as an intra-psychic conflict between further goal pursuit and disengagement from the goal and frequently signifies the beginning of disengagement processes. By analyzing dispositional predictors of the development of goal-related action crises over time, we applied a process-based approach to goal disengagement. In two longitudinal studies, we evaluated the effect of action (vs. state) orientation on the development of action crises. Using change-regression models, the hypothesis could be confirmed that action orientation enables individuals to overcome action crises in personal goals. Furthermore, in two cross-sectional studies, previously reported effects of action orientation on health and well-being could be replicated and shown to be partially mediated by a decreased overall prevalence of action crises.     

Beyond the information given: Infants’ transfer of actions learned through imitation

Five experiments were conducted to investigate infants’ ability to transfer actions learned via imitation to new objects and to examine what components of the original context are critical to such transfer. Infants of 15 months observed an experimenter perform an action with one or two toys and then were offered a novel toy that was not demonstrated for them. In all experiments, infants performed target actions with the novel toy more frequently than infants who were offered the same toy but had seen no prior demonstrations. Infants exhibited transfer even when the specific part to be manipulated looked different across the toys, even when they had not performed the actions with the demonstration toys themselves, even when the actions produced no effects on the demonstrations, and even when the actions were demonstrated with only a single exemplar toy. Transfer was especially robust when infants not only observed but also practiced the target actions on the demonstration trials. Learning action affordances (“means”) seems to be a central aspect of human imitation, and the propensity to apply these learned action affordances in new object contexts may be an important basis for technological innovation and invention.