Memory for action events in the bottlenosed dolphin

We investigated whether a bottlenosed dolphin’s ability to recall and repeat actions on command would immediately generalize to actions performed with specified objects. The dolphin was tested on her ability to repeat 18 novel behaviors performed with potentially interchangeable objects specified using an artificial gestural language. Such “action events” were correctly repeated at above chance levels, indicating that the dolphin had access to memories of those events. Performance levels were, however, lower than in previous tests. The dolphin appeared to have difficulty recalling which object an action was performed with. Previous research has demonstrated that animals can recall features of their environment and features of their actions independently of one another. The results of this study demonstrate (1) that the dolphin’s concept of repeating extends beyond simply accessing memories of movement patterns, and (2) that dolphins’ memories of past events incorporate representations of both self-performed acts and objects, locations, or gestural instructions. Received:10 October 1998 / Accepted after revision: 22 December 1998     

The role of action effects in 12-month-olds' action control: a comparison of televised model and live model

The present study investigated differences in infant imitation after watching a televised model and a live model and addressed the issue of whether action effects influence infants’ action control in both cases. In a 2 × 2 design, 12-month-old infants observed a live or a televised model performing a three-step action sequence, in which either the 2nd or the 3rd action step was combined with an acoustical action effect. We assumed that infants would use the observed action-effect relations for their own action control in the test phase afterwards. Even though results exhibited differences in the absolute amount of imitation between the two demonstration groups, both groups showed similar result patterns regarding the action effect manipulation: infants imitated the action step that was followed by a salient action effect more often and mostly as the first target action, emphasizing the important role of action effects in infants’ action control.     

Building Interdisciplinary/Intersectoral Research Partnerships for Community-Based Mental Health Research with Older Minority Adults

Community-based research often brings investigators from different disciplinary backgrounds together with community representatives to conduct research on topics of mutual concern. This paper describes a case example that illustrates an interdisciplinary/intersectoral study of depression and barriers to mental health care among older adults and illustrate the factors central to implementing a successful research partnership. It will address the following conditions that facilitate and challenge interdisciplinary/intersectoral research: (1) achieving commonality of purpose in study design and research and referral approaches; (2) ensuring the ability to develop, field-test and implement psychometrically rigorous and culturally and qualitatively appropriate instruments; (3) building effective management structures for interdisciplinary/intersectoral research partnerships; and (4) identifying, training and supporting qualified researchers to carry out a mental health study with older ethnically diverse adults. The paper concludes with strengths and limitations of the approach.     

Pulling out the intentional structure of action: the relation between action processing and action production in infancy

Adults and children readily construct action representations organized with respect to an ultimate goal. These representations allow one to predict the consequences of action, interpret and describe actions, and categorize action sequences. In this paper, we explore the ontogeny of hierarchically organized action representations, and its relation to infants' ability to produce similar sequences. To do so, we examine infants' perception and performance of a means-end sequence: pulling a cloth to retrieve a toy. Using a visual habituation paradigm, we demonstrate that 12-month-old infants understand that the initial step of the cloth-pulling sequence is directed toward the ultimate goal of attaining the toy, and use their knowledge of the causal constraints of the sequence to make this goal attribution. Ten-month-olds, however, appear transitional with respect to this understanding: their ability to identify the goal of the cloth-pulling sequence is related to their own ability to planfully solve a similar sequence. These findings are consistent with a burgeoning body of literature suggesting an intimate link between action production and perception, and suggest that this link is in place by at least 10 months of age.     

Being a self: considerations from functional imaging

Having a self is associated with important advantages for an organism.These advantages have been suggested to include mechanisms supporting elaborate capacities for planning, decision-making, and behavioral control. Acknowledging such functionality offers possibilities for obtaining traction on investigation of neural correlates of self-hood. A method that has potential for investigating some of the brain-based properties of self arising in behavioral contexts varying in requirements for such behavioral guidance and control is functional brain imaging. Data obtained with this method are beginning to converge on a set of brain areas that appear to play a significant role in permitting conscious access to representational content having reference to self as an embodied and independent experiencer and agent. These areas have been identified in a variety of imaging contexts ranging from passive state conditions in which they appear to manifest ongoing activity associated with spontaneous and typically 'self-related' cognition, to tasks targeting explicitly experienced properties of self, to demanding task conditions where activity within them is attenuated in apparent redirection of cognitive resources in the service of task guidance and control. In this paper, these data will be reviewed and a hypothesis presented regarding a significant role for these areas in enabling degrees of self-awareness and participating in the management of such behavioral control.     

Not only encoding and retrieval: The enactment effect as a function of task preparation

Three experiments examined the implications of adding a fourth preparation stage to the encoding-retention-retrieval stage analysis of memory. Action memory was selected as the research domain. The results demonstrated that systematic variation of the preparation stage yields new insights about enactment effects in memory. Together with effects of enactment in the preparatory stage, enactment was also shown to give differential effects in encoding and retrieval, with interactions between these three factors. The experimental results were discussed in relation to a strategy processing interpretation of action memory.     

A neuro-cognitive defense of the unified self

The topic of the self remains one of considerable controversy, and many arguments have been put forth suggesting the intuitive concept of self must be in some way mistaken – in part based on results in the cognitive and neural sciences. In this article I offer the alternative positive proposal that “the self” may indeed refer to a physical/computational system within the brain. To do this, I draw on empirical work regarding the neural basis of consciousness and decision-making, and on philosophical work regarding ecological control, unified group perspectives, and functional/mechanistic explanation. The work I review jointly supports the conclusion that a “core-circuit” of interacting cortical regions – the global workspace network – can be understood as a unified system for consciously perceiving and deciding, and thus fulfills many of the roles intuitively assigned to the self. I conclude that this self-concept need not be mistaken given current empirical knowledge.     

Expertise and injury experience in professional skiers modulate the ability to predict the outcome of observed ski-related actions

Professional athletes, compared to beginners, can better predict the outcome of sport-related observed movements, via mirror motor-system modulations (motor resonance). Furthermore, motor-system inhibition occurs when observing other people experiencing pain (pain resonance). Here we investigated whether observing sport-related actions, whose outcome can lead or not to a painful experience, results into different prediction performances depending on expertise and history of injury. Experiment 1 revealed that professional skiers, relative to beginners, show greater prediction accuracy but slower reaction times. Experiment 2 revealed that, among professional skiers, those previously injured, compared to uninjured ones, are slower in predicting the outcome of the observed action when it actually leads to an injury. We hypothesize that such results could be explained by an automatic activation of both motor and pain resonance mechanisms in the onlooker, inducing a sort of experience-dependant freezing response while observing actions likely leading to an injury.     

Inferring the intentional states of autonomous virtual agents

Inferring the mental states of other agents, including their goals and intentions, is a central problem in cognition. A critical aspect of this problem is that one cannot observe mental states directly, but must infer them from observable actions. To study the computational mechanisms underlying this inference, we created a two-dimensional virtual environment populated by autonomous agents with independent cognitive architectures. These agents navigate the environment, collecting “food” and interacting with one another. The agents’ behavior is modulated by a small number of distinct goal states: attacking, exploring, fleeing, and gathering food. We studied subjects’ ability to detect and classify the agents’ continually changing goal states on the basis of their motions and interactions. Although the programmed ground truth goal state is not directly observable, subjects’ responses showed both high validity (correlation with this ground truth) and high reliability (correlation with one another). We present a Bayesian model of the inference of goal states, and find that it accounts for subjects’ responses better than alternative models. Although the model is fit to the actual programmed states of the agents, and not to subjects’ responses, its output actually conforms better to subjects’ responses than to the ground truth goal state of the agents.