Interpreting President Barack Obama's Facial Displays of Emotion: Revisiting the Dartmouth Group

Charismatic presidents like John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and now Barack Obama have been able to overcome stereotype‐based barriers to political power by connecting emotionally with viewers, particularly through their nonverbal skills. In this study we focus on the facial displays of emotion by President Obama and how participants interpret them. This study builds upon the pioneering research of the Dartmouth Group concerning response to displays of happiness‐reassurance by political leaders. It will first replicate and extend upon existing research by using Ekman and Friesen's Facial Action Coding System (FACS) to characterize facial displays by President Obama, specifically three neutral displays and three different types of smiles. Second, this study replicates research carried out over two decades ago concerning individual differences in sex, ethnicity, and age cohort on response to political candidates culturally defined as Black. Video focusing on the head and torso were FACS coded and presented in a web‐based experiment to 79 participants working at a southern institution of higher education. The participants identified the emotions felt by President Obama on a scale ranging from “not at all” to “extremely” focusing on the basic emotion terms of: “Happy” and “Playful” (happiness‐reassurance) and “Angry” and “Disgusted” (anger‐threat). Findings suggest participants differentiate between subtle facial‐display differences and that there are differences based upon ethnicity and support for President Obama when they interpret his facial displays of emotion.     

Do infants bind mental states to agents?

Recent findings suggest that infants understand others’ preferential choice and can use the perspectives and beliefs of others to interpret their actions. The standard interpretation in the field is that infants understand preferential choice as a dispositional state of the agent. It is possible, however, that these social situations trigger the acquisition of more general, not person-specific knowledge. In a looking-time study we showed an Agent A demonstrating a choice, that only could have been interpreted as preferential based on the perspective (and thus the belief) of the agent, not the observer. Then we introduced a new agent (Agent B), who chose consistently or inconsistently with Agent A; also varying whether Agent B was an adult or a child. Results show that infants expected Agent B (both the adult and the child) to choose as Agent A, but only in the condition where according to Agent A’s knowledge two objects were present in familiarization(confirming previous evidence on the importance of contrastive choice). We interpret these results in the following way: (1) infants do not encode the perspectives of other agents as person-specific sources of knowledge and (2) they learn about the object, rather than the agent’s disposition towards that object. We propose that early theory of mind processes lack the binding of belief content to the belief holder. However, such limitation may in fact serve an important function, allowing infants to acquire information through the perspectives of others in the form of universal access to general information.     

Interaction in planning vocalizations and grasping

Previous studies have shown a congruency effect between manual grasping and syllable articulation. For instance, a power grip is associated with syllables whose articulation involves the tongue body and/or large mouth aperture ([kɑ]) whereas a precision grip is associated with articulations that involve the tongue tip and/or small mouth aperture ([ti]). Previously, this effect has been observed in manual reaction times. The primary aim of the current study was to investigate whether this congruency effect also takes place in vocal responses and to investigate involvement of action selection processes in the effect. The congruency effect was found in vocal and manual responses regardless of whether or not the syllable or grip was known a priori, suggesting that the effect operates with minimal or absent action selection processes. In addition, the effect was observed in vocal responses even when the grip was only prepared but not performed, suggesting that merely planning a grip response primes the corresponding articulatory response. These results support the view that articulation and grasping are processed in a partially overlapping network.     

The mediating and moderating role of planning on mothers’ decisions for early childhood dietary behaviours

Objective: Examine the roles of action and coping planning on the intention–behaviour relationship for mothers’ decisions for their young children’s dietary behaviours.

Design: Prospective design with two waves of data collection, one week apart.

Main outcome measures: Mothers (N = 197, M_age = 34.39, SD = 5.65) of children aged 2–3 years completed a main questionnaire assessing planning constructs and intentions, and a one-week follow-up of the target behaviours – ‘healthy eating’ and ‘discretionary choices’.

Results: Intention was the strongest predictor of behaviour for both dietary behaviours. For healthy eating, intention moderated the indirect relationship between intention–behaviour via planning; coping planning was less important when intention was strong. Further, intention was not a direct predictor of behaviour when intention was relatively low. Action planning was not a direct predictor of either behaviour after accounting for intention and coping planning; action planning on behaviour was mediated by coping planning (only for healthy eating). Intention was not a direct predictor of coping planning; intention on coping planning was mediated by action planning. Neither type of planning predicted discretionary choices.

Conclusion: Current findings contribute novel information on the mechanisms underpinning the effect of action and coping planning on the intention–behaviour relationship.     

"Let's work together": what do infants understand about collaborative goals?

Collaboration is fundamental to our daily lives, yet little is known about how humans come to understand these activities. The present research was conducted to fill this void by using a novel visual habituation paradigm to investigate infants’ understanding of the collaborative-goal structure of collaborative action. The findings of the three experiments reported here suggest that 14-month-old infants understand that the actions of collaborative partners are complementary and critical to the attainment of a common collaborative goal. Importantly, 14-month-olds do not interpret the actions of two individuals in terms of a collaborative goal when their actions are not causally related. The implications of our findings for theories of collaboration and folk psychology are discussed.     

Infants' understanding of actions performed by mechanical devices

Recent research suggests that 9-month-old infants tested in a modified version of the A-not-B search task covertly imitate actions performed by the experimenter. The current study examines whether infants also simulate actions performed by mechanical devices, and whether this varies with whether or not they have been familiarized with the devices and their function. In Experiment 1, infants observed hiding and retrieving actions performed by a pair of mechanical claws on the A-trials, and then searched for the hidden toy on the B-trial. In Experiment 2, infants were first familiarized with the experimenter and the claws but not their function. In Experiment 3, infants were familiarized with the function of the claws. The results revealed that search errors were at chance levels in Experiments 1 and 2, but a significant proportion of the infants showed the A-not-B error in Experiment 3. These results suggest that 9-month-old infants are less likely to simulate observed actions performed by mechanical devices than by human agents, unless they are familiarized with the function of the devices so that their actions are perceived as goal-directed.     

Interactive context integration in children? Evidence from an action memory study

Action–object phrases (e.g., “lift the bottle”) are remembered better if they have been enacted rather than learned verbally. This enactment effect is largest in free recall for phrases with objects (e.g., “bottle”) present because these phrases can be interactively encoded with those context objects (interactive context integration) that serve as retrieval cues. The current study investigated whether 6- and 8-year-olds are already capable of interactive context integration. Experiment 1 demonstrated interactive context integration with 8-year-olds. This was hindered in a condition where attention was directed away from context objects. Experiment 2 demonstrated interactive context integration with 6-year-old kindergartners. Taken together, our findings show that even 6-year-olds are capable of incidental context integration through enactment and that this process is attention based.     

Experience matters: 11-month-old infants can learn to use material information to predict the weight of novel objects

In contrast to previous findings, this study demonstrates that 11-month-old infants are able to learn the relationship between object material and object weight when exploring different objects that provided a systematic covariation of both object features. This guides their action in a subsequent preferential-reaching task.     

Are People Successful at Learning Sequences of Actions on a Perceptual Matching Task?

We report the results of an experiment in which human subjects were trained to perform a perceptual matching task. Subjects were asked to manipulate comparison objects until they matched target objects using the fewest manipulations possible. An unusual feature of the experimental task is that efficient performance requires an understanding of the hidden or latent causal structure governing the relationships between actions and perceptual outcomes. We use two benchmarks to evaluate the quality of subjects' learning. One benchmark is based on optimal performance as calculated by a dynamic programming procedure. The other is based on an adaptive computational agent that uses a reinforcement-learning method known as Q-learning to learn to perform the task. Our analyses suggest that subjects were successful learners. In particular, they learned to perform the perceptual matching task in a near-optimal manner (i.e., using a small number of manipulations) at the end of training. Subjects were able to achieve near-optimal performance because they learned, at least partially, the causal structure underlying the task. In addition, subjects' performances were broadly consistent with those of model-based reinforcement-learning agents that built and used internal models of how their actions influenced the external environment. We hypothesize that people will achieve near-optimal performances on tasks requiring sequences of action-especially sensorimotor tasks with underlying latent causal structures-when they can detect the effects of their actions on the environment, and when they can represent and reason about these effects using an internal mental model.     

From intention to action: The role of presence

Recent research in neuroscience has tried to understand human action from two different but converging perspectives: the cognitive and the volitional. On one side, cognitive studies analyze how action is planned and controlled in response to environmental conditions. On the other side, volitional studies analyze how action is planned and controlled by a subject's needs, motives and goals. In this paper we suggest that the notion of presence may be the missing link between these two approaches, explaining how can we differentiate between perception, action and concepts.In particular, a consideration of presence can explain how can we distinguish between a perceived action, a planned or an executed one. We argue that the evolutionary role of presence is the control of agency through the unconscious separation of “internal” and “external” and the enaction/reenaction of intentions.The model makes sense in terms of evolutionary psychology and is beginning to be supported by evidence of the neural and other physical correlates of action, imitation and self-monitoring. Another strength of this model is that it provides testable predictions about how to improve the experience of presence in media: maximal presence in a mediated experience arises from an optimal combination of form and content, able to support the intentions of the user.