弘扬孟子仁政思想精华促进建设和谐小康社会

孟子继承发挥孔子仁学德治思想,提出以民为本的仁政学说,经剔除其封建糟粕,具超时代超阶级的积极意义.孟子仁政说中保民而王、亲亲仁民、与民同乐及制民之产以安民富民的思想,其积极意义、历史贡献须充分肯定,它对我们今天加强党风政风建设,促进加强社会主义政治文明精神文明建设,促进全面建设和谐小康社会,有现实意义,须大力弘扬.     

RENAISSANCE HUMANISM AND PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE

A long-established view has deprecated Renaissance humanists as primarily literary figures with little serious interest in philosophy. More recently it has been proposed that the idea of philosophy as a way of life offers a useful framework with which to reassess their philosophical standing. This proposal has faced some criticism, however. By looking again at the work of three important figures from the period, this essay defends the claim that at least some thinkers during the Renaissance did see philosophy as a way of life, while also acknowledging the force of reservations made by recent critics.     

Fields and Theology: A Response to Wolfhart Pannenberg

In responding to Pannenberg's paper, "God as Spirit—and Natural Science," Polkinghorne challenges the paper's interpretation of the scientific concept of field. He insists on its physical, material nature, elaborated by quantum theory, and asserts that Pannenberg's concept of field is immaterial or even in some sense "spiritual." Polkinghorne also comments on how a physical theory may give rise to several differing, even contradictory, metaphysical interpretations.     

Beyond the molar-molecular distinction: we need multiscaled analyses.

Dinsmoor's (2001) adherence to molecular analyses may require him to assert that molar and molecular principles are mutually exclusive, but to instead analyze the phenomena of avoidance as inherently multiscaled is to follow a well-established practice in the natural sciences. Besides the issue of scale, two-factor theory, which Dinsmoor advocates, has little to say about some important and longstanding results in experiments that qualify as avoidance.     

Recognizing the infant as subject in infant-parent psychotherapy

Drawing on Winnicott's view of infants as subjects entitled to an intervention in their own right, infants as the referred patient have been seen in infant-parent psychotherapy for 20 years at the Royal Children's Hospital, Melbourne, Australia. This is a radically different view of infant symptomatology than viewing it as only expressing an aspect of the mother's unconscious. The clinical pathway differentiates the therapy from much parent-infant psychotherapy. The author describes the theoretical model of a twofold approach to understanding the infant's experience through interactive dialogue between therapist and infant, and sharing this understanding with the parents, and illustrates it with cases of failure-to-thrive infants. She discusses two criticisms: first, that infant-parent psychotherapy may undermine the parents and, second, that brief parent-infant psychotherapy does not alter parents' insecure attachment status. Videotaped sessions often show rapid improvement; parents generally feel relieved. This approach potentially shapes not only parents' and infants' representations, but also their implicit knowledge of relationships-partly, it is suggested, through activating the mirror neuron system to bring about implicit memory change. Change may therefore be longer lasting than psychoanalytic theory presently conceives. The approach is relevant in an outpatient setting: gains were maintained long term in 90% of out-patient cases.     

The eco-cognitive model of abduction: Ἀπαγωγή now: Naturalizing the logic of abduction

Abduction (ἀπαγωγή, in ancient Greek, often translated as “leading away” or “reduction”) is a procedure in which something that lacks classical explanatory epistemic virtue can be accepted because it has virtue of another kind: Gabbay and Woods [15] contend (GW-schema) that abduction presents an ignorance-preserving or (ignorance-mitigating) character. From this perspective abductive reasoning is a response to an ignorance-problem; through abduction the basic ignorance – that does not have to be considered a total “ignorance” – is neither solved nor left intact. Abductive reasoning is an ignorance-preserving accommodation of the problem at hand. Is abduction really ignorance-preserving? To better answer this question I will introduce (and take advantage of) an eco-cognitive model (EC-Model) of abduction. It will be illustrated that through abduction, knowledge can be enhanced, even when abduction is not considered an inference to the best explanation in the classical sense of the expression, that is an inference necessarily characterized by an empirical evaluation phase, or an inductive phase, as Peirce called it. To further deepen the eco-cognitive character of abduction a simple genealogy of logic is provided: Aristotle clearly states that in syllogistic theory local/environmental cognitive factors – external to that peculiar inferential process, for example regarding users/reasoners, are given up. Indeed, to define syllogism Aristotle first of all insists that all syllogisms are valid and contends that the necessity of this kind of reasoning is related to the circumstance that “no further term from outside (ἔξωθɛν) is needed”, in sum syllogism is the fruit of a kind of eco-cognitive immunization. At the same time Aristotle presents a seminal perspective on abduction: the second part of the article considers the famous passage in Chapter B25 of Prior Analytics concerning ἀπαγωγή (“leading away”), also studied by Peirce. I contend that some of the current well-known distinctive characters of abductive cognition are already expressed, which are in tune with the EC-Model. By providing an illustration of the role of the method of analysis and of the middle terms in Plato's dialectic argumentation, considered as related to the diorismic/poristic process in ancient geometry – also, later on, emphasized by Proclus – I maintain that it is just this intellectual heritage which informs Aristotle' Chapter B25 on ἀπαγωγή. Even if, in general, Aristotle seems to sterilize, thanks to the invention of syllogistic theory, every “dialectic” background of reasoning, nevertheless in Chapter B25 he is still pointing to the fundamental inferential role in reasoning of those externalities that substantiate the process of “leading away” (ἀπαγωγή). Hence, we can gain a new positive perspective about the “constitutive” eco-cognitive character of abduction, just thanks to Aristotle himself. Finally, the paper presents an excursus on Aristotle's enthymemes from signs, disregarded by Peirce, but extremely important to stress the Aristotelian treatment of what I have called selective abduction. A forthcoming companion paper [35] will further deepen the EC-Model of abduction stressing stricter logical aspects: the first result will be that, contrarily to the classical logical view, relevance and plausibility in abductive reasoning have to be relativized and so the epistemologically embarrassing concepts of irrelevance and implausibility exculpated: they are not always offensive to reason.     

冯特心理学遗产的历史重估

以从近代哲学向现代哲学转换的哲学史背景为基础,揭示冯特心理学体系的理论性质并探明其历史命运,以澄清关于冯特的各种历史的及现代的误解。指出冯特心理学体系作为哲学是一个在现代哲学氛围中建立起来的、以近代哲学精神为基础的理论体系,因而难逃被哲学自身的历史所否定的命运;这是理解冯特心理学体系并澄清关于冯特的种种误解的根本之所在。     

模糊容忍性与发散性思维的关系：不同认识兴趣的作用

有理论认为,模糊容忍性有助于个体发散性思维的发展,但部分实证研究却呈现出不一致的结论。本文考察了不同认识兴趣在模糊容忍性与发散性思维关系之间的中介和调节作用。结果发现：（1）I型认识兴趣在模糊容忍性和独创性、灵活性、流畅性间起完全中介作用;（2）模糊容忍性与独创性、灵活性的关系受到D型认识兴趣的调节,模糊容忍性与流畅性的关系不受D型认识兴趣的调节。