Hierarchical structure in perceptual representation

A theoretical framework for perceptual representation is presented which proposes that information is coded in hierarchical networks of nonverbal propositions. The hierarchical structure of the representations implies selective organization: Some subsets of a figure will be encoded as integral, structural units of that figure, while others will not. A context-sensitive metric for the “goodness” of a part within a figure is developed, corresponding to the probability that the subset will be encoded as a structural unit. Converging evidence supporting this position is presented from four different tasks using simple, straight-line figures. The tasks studied are (a) dividing figures into “natural” parts, (b) rating the “goodness” of parts within figures, (c) timed verification of parts within figures, and (d) timed mental synthesis of spatially separated parts into unitary figures. The results are discussed in terms of the proposed theory of representation, the processes that operate on those representations, and the general implications of the data for perceptual theories.     

A stimulus-compounding assay of conditioned inhibition and excitation

Rats were trained in an operant discrimination involving two panel lights, A and B. Group CI (Conditioned Inhibition) was trained to lever press in the presence of A (S+), and not in the presence of the compound AB (S?). The opposite contingencies held in Group CE (Conditioned Excitation). Response rates were higher in Group CE than in Group CI, especially to the positive stimulus. However, the groups acquired the discrimination at comparable rates. In a separate phase of the experiment, a tone (C) was separately trained in the absence of the lights to control responding. All seven possible combinations of A, B, and C were then presented randomly during extinction. The inhibitory effect of B on C in Group CI was comparable in magnitude to the excitatory effect of B on C in Group CE. B's effect on C was not altered by the presence or absence of A, regardless of whether A was inhibitory or excitatory. The symmetry between CI and CE revealed by the stimulus-compounding test may be partly artifactual.     

Hemispheric asymmetries in human infants: Spectral analysis of flash and click evoked potentials

Evoked potentials of 16 human infants (mean age = 5.0 weeks, SD = 1.8 weeks) were recorded from the left and right, occipital and temporal areas. Spectral analysis showed a high amplitude, localized, coherent center of activity within the left temporal area for click stimuli, and a high amplitude, localized center of activity in the right occipital area for flash stimuli. It was proposed that the structured auditory information of the click and the unstructured visual information of the flash represented different degrees of familiarity to the subjects. With this hypothesis, left hemisphere involvement in stimulus processing would increase as the stimulus became more referrable to previous long- or short-term experience. Conversely, right hemisphere involvement would increase with unfamiliar stimuli which could not be readily associated with earlier data.     

Auditory perception of speech and speech sounds in recent and recovered cases of aphasia

Auditory perception of speech and speech sounds was examined in three groups of patients with cerebral damage in the dominant hemisphere. Two groups consisted of brain-injured war veterans, one group of patients with high-frequency hearing loss and the other, a group of patients with a flat hearing loss. The third group consisted of patients with recent cerebral infarcts due to vascular occlusion of the middle cerebral and internal carotid artery. Word and phoneme discrimination as well as phoneme confusions in incorrect responses were analyzed from conventional speech audiometry tests with bisyllabic Finnish words fed close to the speech reception threshold of the patient. The results were compared with those of a control group with no cerebral disorders and normal hearing. The speech discrimination scores of veterans with high-frequency hearing loss and patients with recent cerebral infarcts were some 15–20% lower than those of controls or veterans with flat hearing loss. Speech sound feature discrimination, analyzed in terms of place of articulation and distinctive features, was distorted especially in cases of recent cerebral infarcts, whereas general information transmission of phonemes was more impaired in patients with high-frequency hearing loss.     

A Retrospective on Sociobiology

Zygon has been discussing the implications of sociobiology for twenty-five years, ever since E. O. Wilson's book by that name first burst upon the stage. In the course of that discussion there have been many heated exchanges, but in this journal, at least, the heat has also generated light. Thus it is now timely and useful to review and consolidate Zygon 's approach to the sociobiology construct, not only as it was originally presented but as it has changed over time. The goal of this article is to recapitulate and summarize the dialogue that has taken place here. But my aim is not merely to rehash the discussion; it is more precisely to extend and continue it. Specific proposals are offered that are designed to ground future conversations on the solid foundation that has been established over the last quarter century.     

Understanding Religion: The Challenge of E. O. Wilson

E. O. Wilson's fundamental challenge is to bring knowledge and sensibility into an effective working relationship. Both ambivalence and opaqueness characterize his analysis of religion. Ambivalence refers to his conviction on the one hand that religion is essential for societal well-being and genetically resourced and his prediction, on the other hand, that religion will be superseded by scientific reason; the opaqueness refers to his strange insistence that religion be subjected to tests of literal facticity, whereas, in contrast, the arts are exempted from this test, because they constitute a delivery system that impacts the sensibilities directly, with no particular concern for literalness. Wilson's analysis of religion should be brought into consonance with his view of the arts, thereby recognizing the importance of myth, symbol, metaphor, and analogy in religious formulations and their status as direct delivery systems to the sensibilities. Wilson's distinction between empiricist/materialist and transcendentaliist worldviews is reshaped by distinguishing between metaphysical and methodological transcendentalism. This reshaping enables us to recognize how the action required by human existence depends both on scientific knowledge and symbolic formulations that extend to human action, even though certain knowledge is lacking.     

Evidence that stakes don’t matter for evidence

Some philosophers have recently defended anti-intellectualism with respect to knowledge and evidence. In this paper, I assess anti-intellectualism about evidence, which claims a relation between one's evidence and the practical benefits or costs of being right or wrong about the propositions supported by that evidence. Proponents of anti-intellectualism generally regard their view as not at all obvious, but nonetheless strongly supported by appeal to our intuitive judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases. Anti-Intellectualism is thus taken by its proponents to be a surprising truth. I show that, though peoples’ explicit judgments about the general issue of whether or not non-epistemic factors make an epistemic difference are often in line with anti-intellectualism, their judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases do not display a pattern that would clearly support anti-intellectualism about evidence. Thus, anti-intellectualism about evidence is not entirely surprising, and intuitive assessments of hypothetical cases do not clearly support its truth.     

Is empathizing in the E–S theory similar to agreeableness? The relationship between the EQ and SQ and major personality domains

This study investigated the relationship between the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and Systemizing Quotient (SQ) and major personality domains (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Honesty–Humility) using two personality questionnaires: the NEO-FFI and the HEXACO-PI. Participants who responded were 1382 university students for the NEO-FFI, and 842 for the HEXACO-PI, with the EQ and SQ. The results showed almost no relationship between the EQ and SQ and the five-factor personality domains of the NEO-FFI. The regression analysis showed that the NEO-FFI explained only 2–3% of the variance of the EQ/SQ, while in the domains of the HEXACO-PI extraversion moderately correlated with the EQ (r = 0.32) and openness showed the highest correlation with the SQ (r = 0.44). The regression analysis showed that the HEXACO-PI explained 22% of the variance of the EQ and 28% of the variance of the SQ. The strong relationship between the EQ and agreeableness, which was reported as r = 0.75 by Nettle (2007), was hardly found in the results of the NEO-FFI (r = 0.16) and HEXACO-PI (r = 0.17). These results suggest that that empathizing and systemizing, as one-dimensional constructs, are not substantially related to personality, although some weak relationship might be observed between the EQ/SQ and some personality domains.     

Why Brains Are Not Computers,Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism,and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.