Attribution and reconstructive memory

Two experiments were conducted to test the effects of making an attribution on later memory for the event that gave rise to the attribution. Subjects in Experiment 1 observed a scenario in which an actor's behavior was associated with high or low variance (distinctiveness) across situations, and high or low congruence (consensus) to the actions of others. Subjects either made attributions for the actor's behavior immediately following the scenario or not. One week later, subjects were asked to recall consensus and distinctiveness for the actor's original behavior. Subjects who made attributions were significantly better at estimating the high-high and low-low combinations of consensus and distinctiveness than were their no-attribution counterparts. It was suggested that making an attribution may allow for a reconstructed memory for the original event, but not enhance direct access to the original event information. A second experiment tested this concept further by having subjects view an edited version of the scenario in which either the distinctiveness or the consensus information was deleted and having subjects make attributions or not. One week later, subjects were asked to indicate their certainty that consensus and distinctiveness information was a part of the original scenario and to estimate the levels of consensus and distinctiveness. Subjects who made attributions were more confident and accurate in estimating the level of consensus or distinctiveness that was given in the original scenario than were no-attribution subjects. However, attribution subjects were also more confident that consensus information or distinctiveness information was contained in the scenario (when it was not) than were the noattributio subjects. Results of the two experiments suggest that eliciting attributions can distort subsequent memory for the event on which the attributions were based.     

Attribution bias: On the inconclusiveness of the cognition-motivation debate

Social psychologists have given considerable theoretical and research attention to whether motivational variables bias the attributions people make for behavior. Some theorists maintain that motivational constructs must be invoked to explain certain attributional phenomena; other theorists maintain that information-processing variables can adequately explain these phenomena. The present article critically examines existing cognitive and motivational approaches to attribution and analyzes the assumptions underlying the cognition-motivation debate. We argue that cognitive and motivational theories are currently empirically indistinguishable. In particular, its is possible to construct information-processing explanations for virtually all evidence for motivated bias. We conclude by examining the implications of this indeterminacy of cognitive and motivational explanations. Future research in the area can most profitably be addressed to improving the specificity of cognitive and motivational theories rather than to resolving the between-theory confrontation.     

Latent inhibition and learned helplessness in children: Similarities and differences

Four experiments used a common set of procedures to investigate the occurrence and the generalization of learned helplessness (LH) and latent inhibition (LI) in 10- to 11-year-old children. In Experiment 1, preexposure to response-outcome independence impaired performance (i.e., LH) on two subsequent tests: The first was similar to the preexposure situation, the second was not. Moreover, LH occurred whether preexposure involved positive or negative feedback. On the other hand, noncontingent stimulus preexposure did not impair subsequent performance, i.e., LI was not obtained in the first experiment. Experiment 2 replicated the LH findings of Experiment 1: LH occurred following preexposure to response-independent feedback, regardless of whether that feedback was positive or negative, and LH generalized to a situation that was different from the preexposure situation. In addition, the stimulus preexposure procedures of Experiment 2 were embedded in a “masking” task and, under these conditions, LI was obtained. Nevertheless, LI did not generalize to a testing situation that was different from the preexposure situation. Experiment 3 demonstrated that noncontingent stimulus preexposure impairs performance relative to a nonpreexposed control group, that the effect is dependent upon masking, that masking alone produces no performance decrement, and that LI is, indeed, stimulus specific. In Experiment 4, preexposure to response-outcome independence impaired subsequent performance on similar and dissimilar tests whether feedback was consistently positive, consistently negative, or randomly positive and negative over trials. In addition, stimulus preexposure produced LI only under conditions of masking and even then, LI was not evident in novel test situations. The results are discussed in terms of common and different mechanisms underlying the LI and LH phenomena.     

Semantic processing in aphasia: Evidence from an auditory lexical decision task

W. Milberg and S. E. Blumstein (1981, Brain and Language 14, 371–385) demonstrated semantic facilitation effects in a visual lexical decision task administered to Wernicke and other aphasics with severe comprehension deficits. In an attempt to explore the generalizability of these findings in a task where the acoustic-phonetic system could not be bypassed to access meaning, Wernicke's, Global, Broca's, and Conduction aphasics were administered a lexical decision task in the auditory modality. The patients were also given a simple semantic judgment task using the word pairs from the lexical decision task. The aphasic patients showed evidence of semantic facilitation whether they were categorized by diagnostic group or comprehension level. Performance of the semantic judgment task correlated with the severity of auditory comprehension deficits, whereas the consistency of the semantic facilitation effect did not. Even patients with severe comprehension deficits showed semantic facilitation. These results decrease the likelihood that auditory comprehension deficits are due to semantic organization per se and increase the likelihood that the deficits lie in one of the many processes involved in access to that information.     

Visual memory for colour

Two colours were either simultaneously or successively presented. In both cases the time taken to determine whether the colours differed increased as the visual similarity of the colours increased. In another experiment, colours or names of colours were presented successively in different blocks of trials. Here colour similarity affected the discrimination reaction times whenever the second stimulus was a colour. This was taken to suggest that visual mnemonic representations can be generated from the first stimulus.     

Gaze and emotional expression: The effects of message positivity-negativity and emotional intensity

The effects of emotional positivity-negativity and emotional intensity on actor's gaze were examined by simulating emotional situations to a camera. Female subjects were first asked to act out a neutral message as if they were speaking to a person to obtain a baseline for direct gaze. Subjects were then asked to perform a positive or a negative message to the camera. Half the subjects attempted to express the message with strong emotion; half expressed it with weak, ambivalent emotion. As expected, it was found that more direct gaze was maintained when expressing strong emotion. Whether the message was positive or negative did not affect gaze direction. The results were discussed in relation to the dimensions of nonverbal communication.     

How school-aged students define stuttering and stammering

Fifty students from each of the grades 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 were asked to complete a questionnaire containing the following three questions: 1) What is stuttering? 2) What is stammering? 3) How did you know that? Analysis of their responses indicated students were more familiar with stuttering as opposed to the term stammering. From grade 6 onward, we can expect at least three-fourths of the students to define stuttering as a disruption of speech consisting chiefly of sound or syllable repetitions. Only about one-fourth of students in grade 6 and above defined stammering as a speech disruption. This disruption was characterized chiefly by repetitions, injections, and pauses. Most of the students were unable to specify how they learned the definitions. The few who did identified family and friends as their chief source of knowledge.     

Individual differences in speed of retrieval from semantic memory

In the first of two experiments, the stimulus items consisted of category names followed by a single letter (e.g., fruit-P). The subjects (half introverted, half extraverted) were required to respond as quickly as possible with a member of the specified category starting with the letter. Extraverts responded significantly faster than introverts, and more so when the most likely response was of low frequency than when it was of high frequency. In the second experiment, subjects were assigned to one of four groups representing the four combinations of high and low Extraversion and high and low General Activation. The speed-of-recall task from the first experiment was used on some trials; on the remaining trials, a speed-of-recognition task was used. Extraverts had greater response speed than introverts for recall, but not for recognition. That finding, plus interactions between Extraversion and General Activation, suggested an interpretation of the results in terms of the Yerkes-Dodson Law.