Integrating velocity,time, and distance information: A developmental study

The development of understanding the relationships between velocity, time, and distance was investigated in three tasks. In each task, values of two dimensions were given, and 5-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults had to infer values of the third dimension. These inferences were made in all age groups. The integration rules were found to depend upon age and task. In the distance = time × velocity task, all age groups obeyed the normative multiplication rule. In the time = distance ÷ velocity task, the two older age groups obeyed the normative division rule, but the 5-year-olds shifted to a simpler subtraction rule. In the velocity = distance ÷ time task, which was the most difficult, the two older age groups simplified to use of a subtraction rule, and the 5-year-olds simplified even further to use of a distance-only rule. The knowledge level revealed for young children contrasts sharply with results from previous studies using Piagetian choice tasks, which apparently investigate selective attention to one dimension rather than conceptual understanding of relations.     

Postdecisional preference for decision-relevant information as a function of the competence of its source and the degree of familiarity with this information

Three experiments are reported concerning the determinants of postdecisional preferences for decision-relevant information. Two factors were considered: the competence of the source of the information and the degree of prior familiarity with the contents of the information. The first two experiments showed that the competence of the source of decision-supporting information affected the desirability of reading both types of information, whereas the competence of the source of decision-opposing information had very little effect on the desirability of reading either type. In the third experiment, the effects of giving subjects access to prior information supporting or opposing their view on their preferences for further information were investigated under conditions in which the number of choices of this later information were either limited or unlimited. The effects of prior information on choices of decision-supporting information were identical regardless of whether the total amount of information available was limited or unlimited: Less decision-supporting information was chosen when subjects had previously been exposed to decision-supporting information than when they had not, and this difference was greater when they had not previously been exposed to decision-opposing information. However, the choices of decision-opposing information under unlimited choice conditions increased with the amount of decision-supporting information previously read, but decreased with the amount of decision-opposing information previously read. The processes that underlie the choices of information under conditions in which several types are available are discussed.     

On the form and location of the Psychometric Bisection Function for time

The Psychometric Bisection Function for time relates the discriminability of intermediate duration stimuli to a short and long training duration. Bisection Functions for animals (R. M. Church & M. Z. Deluty, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 1977, 3, 216–228) confirm Weber's Law and also show indifference between short and long reports at the geometric mean of the training durations. Two discrimination processes are studied which, in combination with different constructions of the subjective time scale, result in Bisection Functions which differ in form and location. The two discrimination processes use a likelihood ratio rule or a similarity rule to compare intermediate durations to the training durations. These rules in combination with two different constructions of the subjective time scale result in four models which conform to Weber's Law. For one of the scales subjective time is a power function of real time with the scalar property on variance (Scalar Timing). For the other, subjective time is a logarithmic function of real time with constant variance (Log Timing). Both Log and Scalar Timing assume normality on the subjective scale. Only three of these models also entail the geometric mean at the indifference point. The exception is Scalar Timing with the likelihood ratio discrimination rule. This model entails indifference at approximately the harmonic mean of the training stimuli. Variants of the remaining three models differ theoretically but alternatives are difficult to discriminate empirically. A contrast is provided by a Poisson Timing subjective scale in which variance increases directly with the mean. This scale results in indifference at the geometric mean for both discrimination rules but violates Weber's Law in both cases.     

Atttudes and behavior: Implications of attitudes toward behavioral alternatives

The relationship between attitudes and behavior was considered. An attitudinal model of behavioral alternatives was presented and its applied and theoretical implications explicated. Three investigations were reported that tested the initial viability of the approach. Support for the model was observed in all three investigations.     

On the problems of being more or less the same

Sixty children aged 2–3 to 5-2 were given four quantity tasks which tested their understanding of more and same. Two tasks involved addition, two involved judgment of static quantities. One of each type of task required a manipulative response, and one of each required a yes/no judgment. The tasks involved judgments of equality and inequality. Tasks involving a manipulative response were significantly easier than those involving a yes/no judgment, indicating that the nature of the response required of the child is crucial. All other differences were negligible, indicating that the other task variables investigated do not affect the child's ability to respond correctly. The ability to make accurate responses was not strongly associated with counting ability. There was a significant difference in the children's counting responses depending on the method used to elicit it.     

The relationship of sex and sex role to trait and situationally specific anxiety types

While considerable research has investigated the relationship of sex and/or sex role to general or trait anxiety, little is known about their relationship to more specific anxiety types. Based on the postulate that sex and sex-role differences may depend on the extent to which an anxiety-producing situation represents a sex-stereotypic domain, the present study compared their relationships to four measures of anxiety: Math anxiety, test anxiety, and two measures of trait anxiety. Subjects were 180 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology courses. Although females reported higher levels of anxiety on all four scales than did males, a discriminant function analysis indicated that math anxiety was the strongest contributor to the separation of the sexes. Significant score differences as a function of sex role were found using the STAI A-Trait scale, and a significant sex × sex-role interaction was found for scores on the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness. Feminine-typed males and undifferentiated females reported highest anxiety levels in comparison to same-sex individuals. Implications for the understanding and treatment of both general and situationally specific anxiety are discussed.     

Attention to important versus trivial tasks and salience of fatigue-related symptoms for coronary prone individuals

The present study tested the hypothesis that individuals with the Type A coronary prone behavior pattern focus their attention more on important tasks, and less on trivial tasks than do Type B's. The study used a paradigm in which some subjects worked on math problems (important task) and rated intervening mood items (trivial task), whereas others rated mood items they were to memorize (important task) and worked on intervening math problems (trivial task). All subjects were later tested on recall of mood items. Results indicated that Type A's performed better on math problems and recalled more fatigue-related mood items when the task was important than when it was trivial; for Type B subjects, there was no difference in the number of math problems solved correctly or number of mood items recalled between important and trivial task conditions. Moreover, Type A's reported greater fatigue when mood recall was the important task than when math was the important task, whereas fatigue ratings of Type B's did not differ across these conditions. The findings suggest that Type A's suppress their attention to fatigue-related symptoms only when symptoms are not the objects of focus.     

Factors underlying the social readjustment rating scale

The Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS) was administered to 185 subjects whose age ranged from 21 to 61 yr. The responses were factor analyzed for a principal axis solution followed by isopromax oblique rotation. All the items were loaded and clustered under five factors labeled as follows: (1) personal growth, maturation, and renewal; (2) tension and uncertainty; transitions in personal or occupational situations; (3) changes in one's usual routine and relationship; (4) significant changes in family or mirriage; and (5) personal catastrophies. Males scored significantly higher than females on factors 4 and 5. There were no age differences in the obtained scores. The finding of the factorial structure was thought to add credence to the scale especially in view of past criticism. Implications for future research were also discussed.     

Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception

Understanding of another person's wrong belief requires explicit representation of the wrongness of this person's belief in relation to one's own knowledge. Three to nine year old children's understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3–4-year old, 57% of 4–6-year old, and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches. Of the many cases where 4–6-year olds made an error they failed in only about 20% to remember the initial location correctly. As a test of the stability of children's representation of the protagonist's wrong belief the sketches continued with a statement about the protagonist's intention to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a friend about the object's location. Independent of age, of those children who correctly thought that the protagonist would search in x, 85% of the time they also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to location y and his friend to location x. This shows that once children can represent a person's beliefs they can constrain their interpretation of this person's stated intentions to the person's beliefs. In a more story-like situation another group of children had to infer a deceptive plan from the depiction of a goal conflict between two story characters and one character's expedient utterance. At the age of 4–5 years children correctly judged this utterance as a lie only 28% of the time while 5–6-year olds did so 94% of the time. These results suggest that around the ages of 4 to 6 years the ability to represent the relationship between two or more person's epistemic states emerges and becomes firmly established.