Social loafing: Allocating effort or taking it easy?

When asked to work both alone and in groups, people exert less effort in groups, a phenomenon we call “social loafing.” Either of two possible strategies could explain this outcome: an allocational strategy where people work as hard as they can overall but conserve their strength for individual trials where work is personally beneficial and a minimizing strategy where the primary motive is to “get by” with the least effort possible. However, an allocational strategy would lead participants who always work in groups to put out as much effort as participants who always work alone, since there is no need to husband strength. Two studies using a sound production task found social loafing even under these conditions, suggesting that allocational strategies are not prevalent. Social loafing seems to occur when people perform together in groups, regardless of whether or not they must also perform alone.     

How big is big? Relative and absolute properties in memory

Previous studies of semantic memory have overlooked an important distinction among so-called “property statements”. Statements with relative adjectives (e.g., Flamingos are big) imply a comparison to a standard or reference point associated with an immediate superordinate category (a flamingo is big for a bird), while the truth of statements with absolute adjectives (e.g., Flamingos are pink) is generally independent of such a standard. To examine the psychological consequences of this distinction, we asked subjects in Experiment 1 to verify sentences containing either relative or absolute adjectives embedded in either predicate-adjective (PA) constructions (e.g., A flamingo is big (pink)) or predicate-noun (PN) constructions (e.g. A flamingo is a big (pink) bird), where the predicate noun was the immediate superordinate. Reaction times (RTs) and errors for relative sentences decreased when the superordinate was specified, but remained constant for absolute sentences. These data also suggest that the truth value of relative sentences depends, not just on the superordinate, but also on a more global standard for everyday, human-oriented objects. Experiment 2 extends these results in showing that ratings of the truth of relative sentences are a function of the difference in size between an instance and its superordinate standard (e.g., between the size of a flamingo and that of an average bird) and the difference between the instance and the standard for everyday objects. Experiment 3 replicated these findings using reaction time as the dependent measure.