Integrating velocity,time, and distance information: A developmental study

The development of understanding the relationships between velocity, time, and distance was investigated in three tasks. In each task, values of two dimensions were given, and 5-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults had to infer values of the third dimension. These inferences were made in all age groups. The integration rules were found to depend upon age and task. In the distance = time × velocity task, all age groups obeyed the normative multiplication rule. In the time = distance ÷ velocity task, the two older age groups obeyed the normative division rule, but the 5-year-olds shifted to a simpler subtraction rule. In the velocity = distance ÷ time task, which was the most difficult, the two older age groups simplified to use of a subtraction rule, and the 5-year-olds simplified even further to use of a distance-only rule. The knowledge level revealed for young children contrasts sharply with results from previous studies using Piagetian choice tasks, which apparently investigate selective attention to one dimension rather than conceptual understanding of relations.     

Postdecisional preference for decision-relevant information as a function of the competence of its source and the degree of familiarity with this information

Three experiments are reported concerning the determinants of postdecisional preferences for decision-relevant information. Two factors were considered: the competence of the source of the information and the degree of prior familiarity with the contents of the information. The first two experiments showed that the competence of the source of decision-supporting information affected the desirability of reading both types of information, whereas the competence of the source of decision-opposing information had very little effect on the desirability of reading either type. In the third experiment, the effects of giving subjects access to prior information supporting or opposing their view on their preferences for further information were investigated under conditions in which the number of choices of this later information were either limited or unlimited. The effects of prior information on choices of decision-supporting information were identical regardless of whether the total amount of information available was limited or unlimited: Less decision-supporting information was chosen when subjects had previously been exposed to decision-supporting information than when they had not, and this difference was greater when they had not previously been exposed to decision-opposing information. However, the choices of decision-opposing information under unlimited choice conditions increased with the amount of decision-supporting information previously read, but decreased with the amount of decision-opposing information previously read. The processes that underlie the choices of information under conditions in which several types are available are discussed.     

Selective semantic-lexical impairment of language comprehension in right-brain-damaged patients

Fifty right-brain-damaged patients and thirty-nine normal controls were given two tests of semantic-lexical discrimination (auditory language comprehension and reading comprehension) and a test of phoneme discrimination. The aims of the research consisted in checking: (A) if right-brain-damaged patients are significantly more impaired than normal controls on the tasks of semantic discrimination even when the influence of associated variables (such as unilateral spatial neglect or general mental impairment) is ruled out; and (B) if semantic-lexical disorders of right-brain-damaged patients are selective or if they are associated with disorders of phoneme discrimination. Results have shown that right hemispheric lesions consistently impair semantic-lexical discrimination but do not hamper phoneme discrimination. Some implications of these results are discussed.     

Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception

Understanding of another person's wrong belief requires explicit representation of the wrongness of this person's belief in relation to one's own knowledge. Three to nine year old children's understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3–4-year old, 57% of 4–6-year old, and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches. Of the many cases where 4–6-year olds made an error they failed in only about 20% to remember the initial location correctly. As a test of the stability of children's representation of the protagonist's wrong belief the sketches continued with a statement about the protagonist's intention to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a friend about the object's location. Independent of age, of those children who correctly thought that the protagonist would search in x, 85% of the time they also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to location y and his friend to location x. This shows that once children can represent a person's beliefs they can constrain their interpretation of this person's stated intentions to the person's beliefs. In a more story-like situation another group of children had to infer a deceptive plan from the depiction of a goal conflict between two story characters and one character's expedient utterance. At the age of 4–5 years children correctly judged this utterance as a lie only 28% of the time while 5–6-year olds did so 94% of the time. These results suggest that around the ages of 4 to 6 years the ability to represent the relationship between two or more person's epistemic states emerges and becomes firmly established.     

A comparison between the development of the appearance-reality distinction in the People's Republic of China and the United States

A study of the appearance-reality distinction in American 3- to 5-year-olds was replicated with Chinese 3- to 5-year-olds. The error patterns, age changes, and absolute levels of performance were similar in the two samples. It was speculated that the acquisition of this distinction may be a universal, possibly age-linked development that is probably fueled by experiences with appearance-reality discrepancies that are available in all cultures.     

The development of discourse mapping processes: the on-line interpretation of anaphoric expressions

The present research focuses on how children integrate the antecedent of different kinds of anaphor into their on-going interpretation of an utterance, and on the kinds of cues they use to help them to do this. These issues were studied by examining the on-line processing of three types of anaphoric devices—repeated noun phrases, general terms and pronoun anaphors. The data showed that by the age of five, anaphoric mapping processes in general are well-mastered, although all age-groups (5, 7, 10 year olds and adults) found general term anaphors more difficult to interpret. The major developmental differences concerned the processing of anaphoric pronouns. For five year olds, pronouns were primarily interpreted as devices which maintained the thematic subject of the discourse, but when there was no thematic subject they relied primarily on pragmatic plausibility in their assignment of pronominal co-reference. As children get older, they are able to take advantage of the lexical properties of pronouns and all three sources of information—lexical, pragmatic inference and the thematic structure of the discourse—play contributory roles in the assignment of reference to a pronoun.     

Some theory and results for metrics for bounded response scales

In an earlier note, a new metric for bounded response scales (MBR) was introduced which resembles the city-block metric but is bounded above. It was suggested the MBR may be more appropriate than minkowski metrics for data obtained with bounded response scales. In this article, some formal properties of the MBR are investigated and it is shown that it is indeed a metric. Empirical predictions are then derived from the MBR and contrasted with those of a “monotonicity hypothesis,” which holds that dissimilarity judgements tend to be biased towards overestimation of larger distances, and with the predictions of the minkowski metrics, which imply additivity of collinear segments. Some empirical results are presented which contradict the monotonicity hypothesis and the minkowski metrics, and favor the MBR. Finally, the logic used to motivate the MBR is invoked to define a subadditive concatenation for bounded norms in the one-dimensional case, which may be useful in psychophysical work where the upper bounds are often real, rather than due to the response scale. This concatenation predicts understimation for doubling and overestimation for halving and middling tasks.     

A characterization of stochastic independence by association,with an application to random utility theory

A characterization of stochastic independence in terms of association of random variables is given. The result is applied to yield a simple proof of the Sattath-Tversky inequality without continuity assumptions.