Pour une poétique des jeux de langage

Malgré le refus que Wittgenstein semble avoir toujours opposé à l'idée d'une esthétique philosophique, son oeuvre et les nombreuses suggestions que contiennent ses divers propos se révélent riches d'enseignements, en particulier pour ce qui concerne les voies dans lesquelles certaines formes de discours sur l'art se sot engagées. La notion wittgensteinienne dejeu de langage est, sous ce rapport, éclairante. Elle permet de mettre au jour, ou du moins d'entrevoir, deux catégories de faits. Tout d'abord, elle offre une perspective critique intéressante sur le programme de ce que l'on s'est plu à nommer une poétique, dans le prolongement d'Aristote, de Jakobson et de Valéry. La poétique structuraliste, en particulier, se révéle solidaire d'une philosophie que ses ambitions théoriques ne suffisent pas à occulter. En second lieu, la notion de jeu de langage, chez Wittgenstein lui-même, est associée à une pratique d'écriture originale qui obscurcit les frontiéres que la philosophie, depuis Platon, s'est toujours souciée de tracer. Pour une poétique des jeux de langage, il existe, entre la poétique et la philosophie une double symétrie. La premiére — celle des structuralistes ou des néo-structuralistes —obéit à un programme plus philosophique qu'on ne croit; la second, en revanche, comme on le voit avec Wittgenstein, intégr une démarche poétique qui nous invite à penser à nouveaux frais ce que nous faisons.     

See the devil and tame him

Born in 1921, professor of philosophy at the University of Warsaw and art theory in the Polish Academy of Sciences; has published twelve books and more than three hundred articles (bibliography in volume 14 of A. Mercier (ed.).Philosophers on Their Own Work. Bern: 1990) ranging over the history of aesthetics, Marxist and Soviet aesthetics, and issues related to the status of the arts in contemporary Western culture.     

The impact of defibrillator discharges on psychological functioning of implantable cardioverter defibrillator recipients

A lag exists with respect to our understanding of the psychological demands and rehabilitation needs of individuals who have undergone implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) implantation. The ICD is designed to transmit an electric shock to the heart to treat a potentially life-threatening arrhythmia. This study specifically examined the impact of defibrillator discharges on the psychological functioning of ICD recipients. A questionnaire was self-administered to 33 individuals who have been living with the ICD for at least 6 months. Results revealed that levels of anger and depression were significantly higher in those subjects who reported a lower discharge rate, while sense of well-being was significantly higher in those subjects who reported a greater discharge rate. Possible explanations for our findings were proposed as well as implications for clinical intervention were discussed.     

Accountability in a computerized society

This essay warns of eroding accountability in computerized societies. It argues that assumptions about computing and features of situations in which computers are produced create barriers to accountability. Drawing on philosophical analyses of moral blame and responsibility, four barriers are identified: 1) the problem of many hands, 2) the problem of bugs, 3) blaming the computer, and 4) software ownership without liability. The paper concludes with ideas on how to reverse this trend. Several people have contributed generously to this work. Michael Davis, Deborah G. Johnson, Arthur Kuflik, Pamela Samuelson, Debra Satz, Richard De George, Larry May, and Dennis Thompson read drafts and made invaluable suggestions. Reviewers forScience and Engineering Ethics offered thorough and challenging commentary. An earlier version of the paper was presented at The American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division Meeting, December 1993, where audience comments and questions led to clarification of several key issues.     

Two approaches to the formalisation of defeasible deontic reasoning

This paper compares two ways of formalising defeasible deontic reasoning, both based on the view that the issues of conflicting obligations and moral dilemmas should be dealt with from the perspective of nonmonotonic reasoning. The first way is developing a special nonmonotonic logic for deontic statements. This method turns out to have some limitations, for which reason another approach is recommended, viz. combining an already existing nonmonotonic logic with a deontic logic. As an example of this method the language of Reiter's default logic is extended to include modal expressions, after which the argumentation framework in default logic of [20, 22] is used to give a plausible logical analysis of moral dilemmas and prima facie obligations.An earlier version of this article was written while the author was working at the Department of Computing, Imperial College London, supported by ESRC/MRC/SERC Joint Council Initiative Project G9212036. Work on the present version was supported by a research fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, and by Esprit WG 8319 Modelage. I thank one of the referees for his interesting comments. Also, many thanks are due to Marek Sergot for valuable discussions on the topic of this paper.     

Responsibility, Control, and Omissions

Previously, I have argued that moral responsibility for actions is associated with guidance control. This sort of control does not necessarily involve the freedom to do otherwise. In this paper I extend the view to apply to omissions. That is, moral responsibility for an omission is associated with guidance control of that omission. This helps to provide a systematic, unified account of moral responsibility.