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Lawrence J. Mykytiuk 《Journal of Religious & Theological Information》2013,12(3-4):114-155
This series of articles covers scholarly works in English which can, at least potentially, be associated with a generally positive view of biblical historicity regarding periods preceding the Israelites’ return from exile. Part 2 covers works that treat the methodological issues at the center of the maximalist–minimalist debate. Parts 3–5 will cover works on evidences. This article completes the coverage, begun in the preceding article, of works that are neither maximalist nor minimalist, by treating select publications of Anthony J. Frendo, Nadav Na’aman, Israel Finkelstein, Andrew G. Vaughn, Baruch Halpern, Robert D. Miller II, and H. G. M. Williamson. It then discusses works on methodology by authors who espouse biblical historicity unless it is proven wrong, who are often called maximalists. It introduces these through the comments of Craig G. Bartholomew, then treats select works by Kenneth A. Kitchen, Jens Bruun Kofoed, Richard E. Averbeck, Iain W. Provan, V. Philips Long, and James K. Hoffmeier. 相似文献
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Timothy Pawl 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):539-550
Call the thesis that, possibly, there are two times, t1 and t2, such that everything that exists at t2 also exists at t1, but some things that exist at t1 do not exist at t2 Temporal Change. Call the thesis that, possibly, there are two worlds, w and v, such that everything that exists at v also exists at w, but some things that exist at w do not exist at v Modal Difference. I argue that if either Temporal Change or Modal Difference is true, then Orthodox Truthmaker Theory—the theory that every truth requires a necessitating truthmaker—is false. 相似文献
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Justin Zylstra 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(8):859-876
In this paper, I develop a truthmaker semantics for essence and use the semantics to investigate the explanatory role of essence. 相似文献
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《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(4):460-474
According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. However, it will be argued here that these theories cannot be sustained, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong's invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I'll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist. 相似文献
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