The influence of biased exposure to forgone outcomes

After making decisions, we often get feedback concerning forgone outcomes (what would have happened had we chosen differently). Yet, many times, our exposure to such feedback is systematically biased. For example, your friends are more likely to tell you about a party you missed if it was fun than if it was boring. Despite its prevalence, the effects of biased exposure to forgone outcomes on future choice have not been directly studied. In three studies (five experiments) using a simplified learning task, we study the basic influence of biased exposure to forgone outcomes in the extreme case in which decision makers can easily infer the missing information such that the biased exposure carries almost no informational value. The results in all studies suggest that nevertheless, the biased exposure to forgone outcomes affected choice. Exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were better than the obtained outcomes (Only-Better-Forgone) increased selections of the forgone option compared with exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were worse than the obtained outcome (Only-Worse-Forgone). Moreover, relative to an unbiased exposure to all forgone outcomes, the effect of exposure to Only-Worse-Forgone was larger than the effect of exposure to Only-Better-Forgone feedback. However, these effects were not universal: In environments that include rare negative events (“disasters”), biased exposure to forgone outcomes had very little effect. We raise potential explanations and further discuss implications for marketing and risk awareness.     

The effects of action,normality, and decision carefulness on anticipated regret: Evidence for a broad mediating role of decision justifiability

Two distinct theoretical views explain the effects of action/inaction and social normality on anticipated regret. Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) emphasises the role of decision mutability, the ease with which one can imagine having made a different choice. Decision justification theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) highlights the role of decision justifiability, the perception that the choice was made on a defensible basis, supported by convincing arguments or using a thoughtful, comprehensive decision process. The present paper tests several contrasting predictions from the two theoretical approaches in a series of four studies. Study 1 replicated earlier findings showing greater anticipated regret when the chosen option was abnormal than when it was normal, and perceived justifiability mediated the effect. Study 2 showed that anticipated regret was higher for careless than for careful decisions. Study 3 replicated this finding for a sample holding a different social norm towards the focal decision. Finally, Study 4 found that, when decision carefulness, normality and action/inaction were all specified, only the former showed a significant effect on anticipated regret, and the effect was again mediated by perceived justifiability. Decision justification theory thus appears to provide a better account of anticipated regret intensity in this context than does norm theory.     

Personal Value,Biographical Identity,and Retrospective Attitudes

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Anticipated Regret in Advice Taking

Across five studies, we demonstrate that anticipated future regret influences receptiveness to advice. While making a revision to one's own judgment based on advice, people can anticipate two kinds of future regret: (a) the regret of following non‐beneficial advice and (b) the regret of ignoring beneficial advice. In studies 1a (scenario task) and 1b (judgment task), we find that anticipated regret from erring after following advice is greater than anticipated regret from erring after ignoring advice. Furthermore, receptiveness decreases as the difference between anticipated regret from following and from ignoring advice increases. In study 2, we demonstrate that perceived justifiability of one's own initial decision is greater than that of advice. This difference in perceived justifiability influences anticipated regret and that, in turn, influences receptiveness. In study 3, we investigate the effect of advisor's expertise on perceived justifiability, anticipated regret, and receptiveness. In study 4, we propose and test an intervention to improve receptiveness based on self‐generation of advice justifications. Participants who were asked to self‐generate justifications for the advice were more receptive to it. This effect was mediated by perceived justifiability and anticipated regret. These findings shed further light on what prevents people from being receptive to advice and how this can be improved. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning and Affect Following Near‐Miss Outcomes in Simulated Gambling

Gambling near‐misses are non‐rewarded events that resemble a winning configuration. Past research using slot machines has shown that moderate rates of near‐misses increase gambling persistence, but the mechanisms supporting this persistence are unclear. One hypothesis is that near‐misses are mistakenly interpreted as signals of skill acquisition, supporting learning and fuelling the ‘illusion of control’. A slot machine simulation was administered to 60 volunteers, with ratings of the perceived chances of winning, pleasure and motivation to play following particular outcomes. Psychophysiological measures (electrodermal activity and heart rate) were taken, and gambling persistence was measured after 30 trials. Near‐misses were similar to full‐miss outcomes in that they were regarded as unpleasant. However, near‐misses were akin to win outcomes in that they increased motivations to play and electrodermal activity. Learning was evidenced by the expectancy of winning increasing following wins and decreasing after losses. Although there was no overall change in expectancy of winning after near‐misses across all participants, those subjects reporting a greater increase in the expectancy of winning following a near‐miss showed more persistent play, consistent with the learning hypothesis. Greater heart rate acceleration following near‐misses was also associated with persistence. We also observed differential effects of near‐misses where the reel stopped either side of the winning position (‘payline’): motivational effects were restricted to near‐misses stopping before the payline, whereas near‐misses that stopped after the payline were primarily aversive. The payline effects are not predicted by the learning hypothesis and may indicate an affective component to near‐misses, possibly linked to counterfactual processing. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conceptual overlap between moral norms and anticipated regret in the prediction of intention: Implications for theory of planned behaviour research

Moral norms and anticipated regret are widely used extensions to the theory of planned behaviour, yet there is some evidence to suggest that these constructs may conceptually overlap as predictors of intention. Two health-related behaviours with distinct moral implications (Study 1: organ donation registration, N?=?352 and Study 2: condom usage, N?=?1815) were therefore examined to ascertain whether moral norms and anticipated regret are indeed conceptually distinct. While evidence consistent with conceptual overlap was identified in Study 1, the evidence for such overlap in Study 2 was more ambiguous. In Study 3, a meta-analysis of existing literature revealed that the relationship between moral norms and anticipated regret was moderated by the extent of the moral implications arising from the behaviour under examination. Taken together, these findings suggest that conceptual overlap between moral norms and anticipated regret is more likely to occur among behaviours with obvious moral implications. Researchers wishing to examine the predictive utility of moral norms and anticipated regret among such behaviours would therefore be advised to aggregate these measures to form a composite variable (personal norms).     

Predictors of interest in direct-to-consumer genetic testing

Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing is an increasingly available option among individuals searching for information about their health risk factors and ancestry. This study is one of the first to examine predictors of interest in DTC genetic testing. Participants read one of the three types of information about DTC genetic testing (positive only, negative only or both) and reported perceptions of and intentions to pursue testing. The information which people read, their perceptions of the benefits of testing, their perceptions of the barriers to testing and anticipated regret predicted intentions to undergo testing. Interestingly, people who read both positive and negative information did not differ from people who read only negative information in their intentions to pursue testing. We discuss the implications of these findings for predicting interest in this relatively new type of genetic testing and for designing interventions to encourage (or discourage) testing.     

Functional magnetic resonance imaging activation in response to prompts of romantically disillusioning events

To differentiate romantic disillusionment from similar constructs of dissatisfaction and regret, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) data obtained when romantically involved individuals (N = 39) were reminded of relationship events representing these emotions were analyzed. Whole‐brain activations suggested disillusionment‐linked processes not observed for dissatisfaction or regret. Compared to dissatisfying events, disillusioning ones showed greater activity in regions pertaining to evaluation, reflection, and reconciling conflicting information (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex). No regions showed significantly more activation for dissatisfying than disillusioning events. Compared to regret‐inducing events, disillusioning events showed greater activation in areas thought pertinent to detail processing and decision making (occipital fusiform and lingual gyrus). Regret‐inducing events activated regions suggesting the planning and thoughts of how one could have acted differently (e.g., prefrontal cortex).     

先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性的调节机制

在以往涉及不作为惯性的研究中,个体通常只是错失了1个先前选项.本研究旨在考察当之前错失了多个选项后,不作为惯性是否仍会出现,并深入探讨估价和后悔因素在不作为惯性产生或消失中的作用.结果发现,先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性具有调节作用:当先前只错失了1个选项时,出现了不作为惯性,当先前已错失了两个选项时,不作为惯性消失了.中介分析发现,这一调节作用可被预期后悔所中介.结果表明,预期后悔是导致个体在错失多个选项后不作为惯性消失的主要原因.