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The Free will Revolution (Continued) 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
John Martin Fischer 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(3):315-345
I seek to reply to the thoughtful and penetrating comments by William Rowe, Alfred Mele, Carl Ginet, and Ishtiyaque Haji.
In the process, I hope that my overall approach to free will and moral responsibility is thrown into clearer relief. I make
some suggestions as to future directions of research in these areas.
I thank Michael McKenna for his thoughtful comments, his generous introduction, and all his hard work in putting this together.
Also, I wish to thank J. Angelo Corlett for his very pleasantly surprising decision to do this volume, and for his outstanding
work in editing this wonderful journal from its inception. 相似文献
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John J. Davenport 《The Journal of Ethics》2002,6(3):235-259
This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza'smature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of``moral sanity.' This theory, presented in Responsibility andControl, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weakreasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication thatagents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can beresponsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still facesseveral problems. It does not allow sufficiently for non-psychoticagents (who are largely reasons-responsive) with localized beliefsand desires incompatible with full responsibility. Nor does it take intoaccount that practical ``fragmentation of the self' over time may alsoreduce competence, since moral sanity requires some minimum level ofnarrative unity in our plans and projects. Finally, I argue that actual-sequenceaccounts cannot adequately explain sane but weak-willed agency. This isbecause without libertarian freedom, such accounts have no way to modelthe perverse agent's determination to be irrational or weak. 相似文献
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