On the processing of arguments

This paper is concerned with the processing of informal arguments, that is, arguments involving probable truth. A model of informal argument processing is presented that is based upon Hample's (1977) expansion of Toulmin's (1958) model of argument structure. The model postulates that a claim activates an attitude, the two components forming a complex that in turn activates reasons. Furthermore, the model holds occurrence of the reason, or possibly the claim and the reason, activates values. Three experiments are described that provide support for the model.This research was supported by the Mellon Foundation and by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement of the Department of Education via an award for the Center for the Study of Learning to the Learning Research and Development Center. The contents of the paper are not necessarily the position of any of these organizations.     

Ad hominem arguments in practical argumentation

This paper is ultimately about the nature of argumentation in general and about the nature of practical argumentation in particular. (Practical argumentation is the form of argumentation which aims at answering the question: ‘What is to be done?’) The approach adopted here is an indirect one. I analyze one traditional form of argumentive fallacyargumentum ad hominem and try to show that in some argumentative situations it is an intuitively legitimate move. These intuitions can be explained if we accept that practical argumentation is also governed by the general rules of practical rationality.     

TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE: ON DREAMING THE IMPOSSIBLE

Abstract. My comment on Ethics in an Age of Technology, volume 2 of Ian G. Barbour's Gifford Lectures, acknowledges the excellence of Barbour's depictions of the social-cum-technological problems facing humanity in the coming millennium. Barbour's proposed solutions, too, are reasonable—but usually presuppose fundamental reforms in social values, especially within the powerful industrialized societies. Without further analysis of technology and values, this seems to make such solutions “impossible dreams.” My thesis is that clear analysis of the ideal aspects of technology (as itself the embodiment of knowledge and values), plus clues from Alfred North Whitehead on the dynamics of social change, can reinforce hope even in “impossible” dreams. First, technology, though embodied in solid material machinery and powerful social institutions, is no more “solid” than constant reaffirmation of the values behind it (as was the case with the Berlin Wall). Second, great ideals, over time, have the power to help create the conditions of their own possibility. Social change is both “pushed” by coercive forces (e.g., climate changes) and “pulled” by great values (e.g., human dignity). Therefore there are practical benefits to be gained from attending to, and celebrating, even currently “impossible” dreams as they work to make themselves possible.     

环境公正:和谐社会的基本前提

人与人的和谐是和谐社会的“底线要求”,人与社会的和谐是和谐社会的核心所在,而人与自然的和谐是和谐社会的基本前提。人与自然和谐集中体现为环境公正。它首先是指人与自然物种之间的种际公正,具体体现为两个维度的公正：在空间维度上,要促进国际公正、族际公正、域际公正、群际公正;在时间维度上具有代际公正意识。     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

The moral obligations of trust

Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ‘all the way down’. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ‘all the way down’.     

Reasoning's relation to bodily action

Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non-mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out-loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions as constituents, where such bodily actions themselves amount to contentful mental events. Furthermore, the natural lines of resistance to this view trade on type-token errors, or on a questionable common-factor assumption.     

Reasons or rationalizations: The role of principles in the moral dumbfounding paradigm

Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide reasons for it. Recently, questions have been raised about whether dumbfounding is a real phenomenon. Two reasons have been proposed as guiding the judgments of dumbfounded participants: harm-based reasons (believing an action may cause harm) or norm-based reasons (breaking a moral norm is inherently wrong). Participants in that research (see Royzman, Kim, & Leeman, 2015), who endorsed either reason were excluded from analysis, and instances of moral dumbfounding seemingly reduced to non-significance. We argue that endorsing a reason is not sufficient evidence that a judgment is grounded in that reason. Stronger evidence should additionally account for (a) articulating a given reason and (b) consistently applying the reason in different situations. Building on this, we develop revised exclusion criteria across three studies. Study 1 included an open-ended response option immediately after the presentation of a moral scenario. Responses were coded for mention of harm-based or norm-based reasons. Participants were excluded from analysis if they both articulated and endorsed a given reason. Using these revised criteria for exclusion, we found evidence for dumbfounding, as measured by the selecting of an admission of not having reasons. Studies 2 and 3 included a further three questions relating to harm-based reasons specifically, assessing the consistency with which people apply harm-based reasons across differing contexts. As predicted, few participants consistently applied, articulated, and endorsed harm-based reasons, and evidence for dumbfounding was found.     

The Value of Sacrifices

ABSTRACT

Most authors who discuss the normative impact of sacrifices do so with regards to the impact that a sacrifice can have on the practical reasons of the agent who makes it. A different and underappreciated phenomenon of sacrifices is their other-regarding normative impact: the sacrifice of person A can have an impact on the practical reasons of person B, either by generating practical reasons for B to act in certain ways or by intensifying existing reasons of B for specific courses of action. This paper asks when and why sacrifices have such other-regarding normative impact and argues that sacrifices can have other-regarding normative impact because sacrifices can be intrinsically good. The intrinsic value of sacrifices is explained by the recursive account of value: sacrifices are intrinsically good if and because they are appropriate responses to intrinsic values, and appropriate responses to intrinsic values are themselves intrinsically good. Furthermore, sacrifices are difficult to make, and successful pursuit in difficult activities can also be intrinsically good.     

Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state

This paper constructs a theory according to which an intention is not a mental state but an action at a certain developmental stage. I model intention on organic life, and thus intention stands to action as (e.g.) tadpole stands to frog. I then argue for this theory by showing how it overcomes three problems: intending while (1) merely preparing, (2) not taking any steps, and (3) the action is impossible. The problems vanish when we see that not all actions are mature. Just as some frogs (such as tadpoles) are immature frogs, some actions (such as intentions) are immature actions.