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Appreciation is expressed for the work of Golden's group in the selection of Luria's tests, the standardization of their administration, the collection of norms, and the evaluation of the reliability and validity of the Luria-Nebraska test battery. However, questions are raised concerning the ability of the test to efficiently handle topical diagnosis and to construct rehabilitation programs. Concern is expressed over the possible vulgarization of Luria's doctrine of functional systems and the loss of predictive power in Luria's tests through neglect of qualitative information and methodology. Suggestions are made as to how Luria's qualitative methodology might be incorporated in a standardized version of a neuropsychological examination. 相似文献
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Janet Levin 《Philosophical Studies》2005,121(3):193-224
Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In the first two sections of this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and also the counter-arguments of contemporary defenders of tradition. In the next two sections, I sketch an alternative account of the role of philosophical intuitions that incorporates elements of traditionalism and naturalism - and defend it against other such views. In the final section, however, I discuss intuitions about conscious experience, and acknowledge that my view may not extend comfortably to this case. This may seem unfortunate, since so much contemporary discussion of the epistemology of modality seems motivated by worries about the mind-body problem, and informed by the position one wishes to endorse. But, as I argue, if conscious experience is indeed an exception to the view I suggest in this paper, it is an exception that proves - and can illuminate - the rule. 相似文献
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