ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

This essay presents an analysis of different processes of machine learning: supervised, unsupervised, and semisupervised, through the prism of the epistemologies of several prominent Islamic philosophical schools. I discuss the way each school conceptualizes the ontological absolute (immortality, death, afterlife) and the way this shapes their respective epistemologies. I present an analysis of the different machine learning processes through the prism of the epistemological constructs of each of these philosophic traditions. I conclude with the argument that more scholars from the Islamic philosophical tradition should engage in the debates about the development of artificial intelligence and its implications, given that many Muslim countries are among the leaders in this development and its application in everyday life.     

Radikaler Konstruktivismus und Konstruktionismus

Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself.     

The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals

Some epistemologists think that the Bayesian ideals matter because we can approximate them. That is, our attitudes can be more or less close to the ones of our ideal Bayesian counterpart. In this paper, I raise a worry for this justification of epistemic ideals. The worry is this: In order to correctly compare agents to their ideal counterparts, we need to imagine idealized agents who have the same relevant information, knowledge, or evidence. However, there are cases in which one's ideal counterpart cannot have one's information, knowledge, or evidence. In these situations, agents cannot compare themselves to their ideal counterpart.     

Reviews

Russell,Robert John, Murphy, Nancey and Peacocke, Arthur R. (eds) Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action
Tigue, John W. The Transformation of Consciousness in Myth: Integrating the Thought of Jung and Campbell     

Are Science and Religion in Conflict?

The widely held legend of historical conflict between science and religion cannot be sustained on the basis of research. Different sciences show different relationships to religion; the physical sciences show rapprochement, whereas the human sciences often are antagonistic to religion. Reconciling science and religion by regarding each as applicable to a different domain is rejected in favor of seeing them as complementary perspectives on the same phenomena. The science and theology of human nature represents a fruitful arena for the development of this approach. A key general requirement is the epistemological reconciliation of science and religion.     

Postmodernism: What One Needs to Know

This essay is an introduction to postmodernism and deconstruction as they relate to the special challenges of scholarship and teaching in the science and religion multidiscipline.     

Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies

In Biro and Siegel (1992) we argued that a theory of argumentation mustfully engage the normativity of judgments about arguments, and we developedsuch a theory. In this paper we further develop and defend our theory.     

THE JOHN TEMPLETON FOUNDATION MODEL COURSES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Abstract. In 1994 the John Templeton Foundation Humility Theology Information Center launched a major initiative, the Science-Religion Course Program, to encourage the teaching of high-quality academic courses focusing on the relationship between science and religion. In the first phase of the program, six courses were selected—four from the United States, one from Canada, and one from New Zealand—to serve as models for other academics wishing to initiate their own classes on the science-religion interface. In particular these six model courses will serve as examples for the second phase of the Templeton Foundation program, which will provide financial support for up to 100 courses at universities, colleges, and seminaries around the world. This paper is a report on the pedagogical strategies and methodologies employed in each of the six selected model courses.     

Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.