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1.
In Biro and Siegel (1992) we argued that a theory of argumentation mustfully engage the normativity of judgments about arguments, and we developedsuch a theory. In this paper we further develop and defend our theory. 相似文献
2.
Malcolm Ashmore 《Argumentation》1994,8(2):157-161
This essay argues that the really useful character of reflexivity is that it enables a radical critique of representation and its conventional material and rhetorical practices. It is uniquely able to produce paradox and thus disrupt discourses by undermining authorial privilege. Because Fuller's social epistemology is insensitive to its own reflexive implications, and limits itself to normative questions about knowledge policy, it is too limited — and limiting — to provide a context that can nurture reflexivity. 相似文献
3.
A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001; Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011; Stanley 2011a, 2011b] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart. 相似文献
4.
Paolo Valore; 《Metaphilosophy》2024,55(2):264-279
This article introduces a novel theoretical framework for addressing epistemic injustice—a phenomenon where certain groups or individuals are systematically excluded from knowledge creation and dissemination processes—by employing ontological relativity and conceptual analysis. “Ontological relativity” refers to a philosophical perspective that posits our understanding of reality as being shaped by our toolbox of concepts, categories, language, and social practices; “conceptual analysis” is a method of inquiry that involves the rigorous examination and deconstruction of a particular concept or set of concepts in order to uncover their constituent elements, relationships, and underlying assumptions. To exemplify the effectiveness of the ontology-based approach, two paradigmatic applications are explored: (a) educational practices and (b) clinical practice and access to health care. Through the presentation of these applications and the step-by-step illustration of the applied methodology, the aim of the article is to showcase the efficacy of ontology in tackling epistemic injustices, suggesting innovative paths for future research in this domain. 相似文献
5.
D. K. Levy 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2020,28(2):227-239
ABSTRACT I question whether the flourishing that McMullin presents as negotiating the demands of three distinct normative domains is itself normative. If it is, I argue it must be incremental in some way to McMullin’s three normative domains, because there is no single, plausible, structural inter-relation between the domains. This leads to regress. If flourishing is not normative, then it undermines the unity of reason that is a cornerstone of McMullin’s account. These difficulties lead to further consideration of flourishing conceived, as McMullin does, as a project of living well in the world. What is the content of this project and what role can it play? If it is merely formal, i.e. without content, then it can be shared, but is empty, therefore without a role. If it has content, and so plays a role in balancing or unifying one’s responses to the normative domains, then that content comes, McMullin claims, from answers to the question, “Who am I?” However, I claim that this question and the answers it is likely to elicit cannot supply the content required. Even if it could, it could not do so to produce a project that is plausibly normative, leaving it thus disconnected from the normative domains. I conclude that the normative character of McMullin’s notion of flourishing cannot be made good. My tentative suggestions are to jettison flourishing as a central part of conceiving a life well-lived; or to swap Aristotle for Plato to supplant flourishing with the idea of a good life. 相似文献
6.
Over the last 15 years, researchers have been increasingly interested in understanding the nature and development of children’s selective trust. Three meta‐analyses were conducted on a total of 51 unique studies (88 experiments) to provide a quantitative overview of 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children’s selective trust in an informant based on the informant’s epistemic or social characteristics, and to examine the relation between age and children’s selective trust decisions. The first and second meta‐analyses found that children displayed medium‐to‐large pooled effects in favor of trusting the informant who was knowledgeable or the informant with positive social characteristics. Moderator analyses revealed that 4‐year‐olds were more likely to endorse knowledgeable informants than 3‐year‐olds. The third meta‐analysis examined cases where two informants simultaneously differed in their epistemic and social characteristics. The results revealed that 3‐year‐old children did not selectively endorse informants who were more knowledgeable but had negative social characteristics over informants who were less knowledgeable but had positive social characteristics. However, 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds consistently prioritized epistemic cues over social characteristics when deciding who to trust. Together, these meta‐analyses suggest that epistemic and social characteristics are both valuable to children when they evaluate the reliability of informants. Moreover, with age, children place greater value on epistemic characteristics when deciding whether to endorse an informant’s testimony. Implications for the development of epistemic trust and the design of studies of children’s selective trust are discussed. 相似文献
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Ton van den Beld 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2001,4(4):383-399
What I set out to do is to cast some doubt on the thesis that, in Bernard Williams's words, any appeal to God in morality either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing. A first conclusion is that a morality of real, inescapable and (sometimes) for the agent costly obligations, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, does not sit easily with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project which is neutral towards theism and atheism fails in giving a satisfying account of such obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong divine command theory might succeed where non- and atheistic accounts seem to founder. 相似文献
10.
Nancy Frankenberry 《The Journal of religious ethics》1999,27(1):129-136
The philosophical question Nunez raises is whether we can have, as he thinks we need, a theoretical grounding for appeal to the intrinsic value of nature. This article examines the neopragmatist reasons for repudiating metaphysical realism's notions of intrinsicality and subject-independent reality. Following the holism of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty rather than the epistemological premises of Holmes Rolston and Bernard Lonergan, the author concludes that coping with the ecological crisis does not require conjuring an epistemic crisis. Environmental ethics in neopragmatist hands would seek procedures for bringing about agreement in improving our practices, not our epistemology. 相似文献