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1.
Three methods for estimating reliability are studied within the context of nonparametric item response theory. Two were proposed originally by Mokken (1971) and a third is developed in this paper. Using a Monte Carlo strategy, these three estimation methods are compared with four classical lower bounds to reliability. Finally, recommendations are given concerning the use of these estimation methods.The authors are grateful for constructive comments from the reviewers and from Charles Lewis.  相似文献   
2.
Drawing on Gollwitzer's deliberative–implemental mindset distinction (P. M. Gollwitzer, 1990), it was predicted that people who are deliberating on different actions or goals would be more cautious or more realistic in their expectation of success in subsequent tasks than people who are going to implement a chosen action or goal. Participants were given a choice between different test-materials. They were interrupted before (deliberative) or immediately after decision-making (implemental). They then either had to choose between various levels of difficulty within one type of task (Experiment 1) or they had to predict their own future performance (Experiment 2). The results showed that deliberative participants preferred less difficult tasks and overestimated their probability of success less than implemental participants. In addition, deliberative participants referred more than implemental participants to their past performance when selecting levels of difficulty or predicting future performance; however, the two groups did not differ in actual performance. Taken together, the findings suggest that people are more realistic in a deliberative than in an implemental state of mind. The present studies extend prior research because for the first time they document mindset effects on peoples' estimates concerning their future performance in the achievement domain.  相似文献   
3.
In this study, 158 parents (79 fathers and 79 mothers) with a mean age of 38.3 yrs (SD = 8.2), estimated their own, and their children's, overall intelligence as well as their children's score on the 12 intelligence scales from the Wechsler's Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III). The sample included English (n = 122) and Icelandic parents (n = 36), and a comparison between them showed few differences except that Icelandic parents' estimates were lower than English parents' estimates. The results showed fathers estimated their own overall intelligence higher than mothers estimated theirs and sons were estimated higher than daughters on overall intelligence. Two factors (verbal, performance) of intelligence were identified through factor analysis of the ratings of the 12 WISC subscale score estimates. A hierarchical regression showed that these two factors explained most of the variance in the estimation of the child's overall intelligence; however, gender of child and parents' self-estimated own overall intelligence added incremental variance.  相似文献   
4.
Nonparametric tests for testing the validity of polytomous ISOP-models (unidimensional ordinal probabilistic polytomous IRT-models) are presented. Since the ISOP-model is a very general nonparametric unidimensional rating scale model the test statistics apply to a great multitude of latent trait models. A test for the comonotonicity of item sets of two or more items is suggested. Procedures for testing the comonotonicity of two item sets and for item selection are developed. The tests are based on Goodman-Kruskal's gamma index of ordinal association and are generalizations thereof. It is an essential advantage of polytomous ISOP-models within probabilistic IRT-models that the tests of validity of the model can be performed before and without the model being fitted to the data. The new test statistics have the further advantage that no prior order of items or subjects needs to be known.  相似文献   
5.
The paper suggests new methods for comparing the medians corresponding to independent treatment groups. The procedures are based on the Harrell-Davis estimator in conjunction with a slight modification and extension of the bootstrap calibration technique suggested by Loh. Alternatives to the Harrell-Davis estimator are briefly discussed. For the special case of two treatment groups, the proposed procedure always had more power than the Fligner-Rust solution, as well as the procedure examined by Wilcox and Charlin. Included is an illustration, using real data, that comparing medians, rather than means, can yield a substantially different conclusion as to whether two distributions differ in terms of some measure of central location.  相似文献   
6.
    
People vary dramatically in their calorie estimates of food depending on the information available to them. Prior research has focused on information that is normatively relevant to the number of calories a food contains (e.g., fat content, serving size). The current research examines whether information that is normatively irrelevant to the number of calories a food contains—such as its availability—might also shape people's calorie estimates. Three studies found that a food perceived as limited in availability leads people to estimate the food to contain more calories. Serial mediation analyses revealed that this effect occurs because scarce food is seen as more valuable and expensive, which subsequently induces feelings of resource deprivation. This sense of resource deprivation, in turn, leads to motivated perception, whereby higher calorie estimates are the result of people wanting to acquire more resources. The findings provide insight into the psychology of scarcity and underscore the importance of understanding how contextual factors shape people's calorie estimates and the psychological mechanisms that drive them.  相似文献   
7.
    
Adults' face processing may be specialized for the dimensions of young adult faces. For example, young and older adults exhibit increased accuracy in normality judgments and greater agreement in attractiveness ratings for young versus older adult faces. The present study was designed to examine whether there is a similar young adult face bias in facial age estimates. In Experiment 1, we created a face age continuum by morphing an averaged young adult face with an averaged older adult face in 5% increments, for a total of 21 faces ranging from 0 to 100% old. Young and older adults estimated facial age for three stimulus age categories [young (morphs 0–30%), middle‐aged (morphs 35–65%), and older adult (morphs 70–100%)]. Both age groups showed the least differentiation in age estimates for young adult faces, despite showing greater consensus across participants in estimates for young faces. In Experiment 2, young and older adults made age estimates for individual young and older adult identities. Both age groups were more accurate and showed greater consensus in age estimates for young faces. Collectively, these results provide evidence for a bias in processing young adult faces beyond that which is often observed in recognition and normality/attractiveness judgment tasks.  相似文献   
8.
    
Researchers have spent considerable effort examining unrealistic absolute optimism and unrealistic comparative optimism, yet there is a lack of research exploring them concurrently. This longitudinal study repeatedly assessed unrealistic absolute and comparative optimism within a performance context over several months to identify the degree to which they shift as a function of proximity to performance and performance feedback, their associations with global individual difference and event‐specific factors, and their link to subsequent behavioural outcomes. Results showed similar shifts in unrealistic absolute and comparative optimism based on proximity to performance and performance feedback. Moreover, increases in both types of unrealistic optimism were associated with better subsequent performance beyond the effect of prior performance. However, several differences were found between the two forms of unrealistic optimism in their associations with global individual difference factors and event‐specific factors, highlighting the distinctiveness of the two constructs.  相似文献   
9.
    
A standard approach to distinguishing people’s risk preferences is to estimate a random utility model using a power utility function to characterize the preferences and a logit function to capture choice consistency. We demonstrate that with often-used choice situations, this model suffers from empirical underidentification, meaning that parameters cannot be estimated precisely. With simulations of estimation accuracy and Kullback–Leibler divergence measures we examined factors that potentially mitigate this problem. First, using a choice set that guarantees a switch in the utility order between two risky gambles in the range of plausible values leads to higher estimation accuracy than randomly created choice sets or the purpose-built choice sets common in the literature. Second, parameter estimates are regularly correlated, which contributes to empirical underidentification. Examining standardizations of the utility scale, we show that they mitigate this correlation and additionally improve the estimation accuracy for choice consistency. Yet, they can have detrimental effects on the estimation accuracy of risk preference. Finally, we also show how repeated versus distinct choice sets and an increase in observations affect estimation accuracy. Together, these results should help researchers make informed design choices to estimate parameters in the random utility model more precisely.  相似文献   
10.
    
When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar], 62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]88 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]. doi:10 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar].1037 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]/0033 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]-295X Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar].106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar].1 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar].62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 6288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.  相似文献   
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