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1.
Andreas Müller 《Philosophical explorations》2019,22(1):2-15
Does reasoning to a certain conclusion necessarily involve a normative belief in support of that conclusion? In many recent discussions of the nature of reasoning, such a normative belief condition is rejected. One main objection is that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thereby excludes certain reasoners, such as small children. I argue that this objection is mistaken. Its advocates overestimate what is necessary for grasping the normative concepts required by the condition, while seriously underestimating the importance of such concepts for our most fundamental agential capacities. Underlying the objection is the observation that normative thoughts do not necessarily cross our minds during reasoning. I show that proponents of the normative belief condition can accommodate this observation by taking the required normative belief to guide the reasoning process and offer a novel account of what such guidance consists in. 相似文献
2.
Ingmar Persson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):295-303
Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e.,
the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should
be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is
equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism,
and that (2), although this relational or egalitarian form of prioritarianism is hit by the levelling down objection, the
Parfitian form is also hit by it, or worse objections, if it is fully worked out.
相似文献
Ingmar PerssonEmail: |
3.
Objecting Morally 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
C.A.J. Coady 《The Journal of Ethics》1997,1(4):375-397
Just war theory entails that some wars may be morally unjustifiable, and hence citizens may be right to object morally to their government's waging of a war and to their being compelled to serve in it. Given the evils attendant upon even justified war, this fact sharply restricts any obligation to die for the state, and raises important questions about the appropriate state response to selective conscientious objectors. This paper argues that such people should be legally accommodated, and discusses objections to doing so, in particular, the possible erosion of the state's capacity to wage justified war, the unfairness of granting such exemptions from military service, and the impossibility of determining genuinely conscientious objection. 相似文献
4.
This essay considers some major questions raised by civil and other forms of conscientious disobedience. What distinguishes that form of dissent? Can we recognise the legitimacy of a political system yet defy its laws? Is disobeying a democratic decision especially or entirely unacceptable, or can disobedience be an instrument of democracy? If a regime recognises rights, how should we regard disobedience that appeals to those rights in challenging the regime’s laws? How should reasons for obedience figure in our thinking about justified disobedience? The essay locates the contributions that make up this special issue of Res Publica within these debates about disobedience. It questions whether any general theory of justified disobedience can command agreement: the conditions that give rise to conscientious disobedience -- conflicting values and judgements -- seem to preclude consensus on when its use is justified. 相似文献
5.
Lawrence B. Lombard 《Philosophia》2006,34(4):441-452
From time to time, the idea that enduring things can change has been challenged. The latest challenge has come in the form
of what David Lewis has called a “decisive objection”, which claims to deduce a contradiction from the idea that enduring
things change with respect to their temporary intrinsics, when that idea is combined with eternalism. It is my aim in this
paper to explain why I think that no argument has yet appeared that deduces a contradiction from a combination of eternalism
and the idea that enduring things change with respect to their temporary intrinsics, except ones that do so by committing
scope fallacies.
相似文献
Lawrence B. LombardEmail: |
6.
David Manley 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):321-334
I defend pretence hermeneutic fictionalism against the Autism Objection. The objection is this: since people with autism have no difficulty in engaging with mathematics even if they cannot pretend, it is not the case that engagement with mathematics involves pretence. I show that a previous response to the objection is inadequate as a defence of the kind of pretence hermeneutic fictionalism put forward as a semantic thesis about the discourse in question. I claim that a more general response to the Autism Objection is to deny the premise that people with autism cannot pretend. To motivate this response, I appeal to psychological studies suggesting that people with autism can understand pretence and they can pretend under certain conditions. Finally, I provide explanations for why it is the case that people with autism do not have a problem with engaging in mathematics whereas they have so much difficulty with other kinds of figurative language and pretence. 相似文献
7.
Brendan O’Sullivan 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):531-544
In “Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity,” Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments
that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property
dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist
is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that ‘thin’ side is granted, the property
dualist has won. I conclude that although Block is wrong to think that the property dualist must argue for so-called thin
mental properties, Block, and the physicalist, are able to resist property dualism. But any attempt to bolster this resistance
and do more than dogmatically assert the crucial identity runs a serious risk of undermining the physicalism it is meant to
save.
相似文献
Brendan O’SullivanEmail: |
8.
J. William Forgie 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(3):117-133
It is often said that the ontological argument fails because it wrongly treats existence as a first-level property or predicate.
This has proved a controversial claim, and efforts to evaluate it are complicated by the fact that the words ‘existence is
not a property/predicate’ have been used by philosophers to make at least three different negative claims: (a) one about a
first-level phenomenon possessed by objects like horses, stones, you and me; (b) another about the logical form of assertions of existence; and (c) still another about a second-level phenomenon possessed by concepts when they are instantiated. I argue that only the last of these claims, originally voiced
by Kant, is both plausible and relevant to the ontological argument. And I try to show that the relevance of the Kantian version
comes from its providing the underlying justification for a different, and far less controversial, criticism of the ontological
argument. 相似文献
9.
Guido Löhr 《Philosophical Psychology》2019,32(2):161-185
According to the embodied cognition hypothesis, the mental symbols used for higher cognitive reasoning, such as the making of deductive and inductive inferences, both originate and reside in our sensory-motor-introspective and emotional systems. The main objection to this view is that it cannot explain concepts that are, by definition, detached from perception and action, i.e., abstract concepts such as TRUTH or DEMOCRACY. This objection is usually merely taken for granted and has yet to be spelled out in detail. In this paper, I distinguish three different versions of this objection (one semantic and two epistemic versions). Once these distinctions are in place, we can begin to see the solutions offered in the literature in a new, more positive, light. 相似文献
10.
Christopher J. Eberle 《The Journal of religious ethics》2007,35(3):479-507
Many military officers believe that they morally ought to obey legal orders to fight even in unjust wars: they have a moral obligation to exercise indiscriminate obedience to legal orders to fight. I argue that officers should not be required to exercise indiscriminate obedience: certain theistic commitments to which many citizens and officers adhere prohibit indiscriminate obedience to legal orders to fight. This theistic argument constitutes adequate reason not to require officers to exercise indiscriminate obedience. However, this raises a further question: namely, whether it is appropriate to rely on such a theistic argument when shaping the moral requirements of military officership. I argue that citizens and officers have good reason to make public decisions solely on religious grounds and so are free to follow my theistic argument when shaping the requirements of military officership. 相似文献