Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A cost-benefit analysis of demand for food.

Laboratory studies of consumer demand theory require assumptions regarding the definition of price in the absence of a medium of exchange (money). In this study we test the proposition that the fundamental dimension of price is a cost-benefit ratio expressed as the effort expended per unit of food value consumed. Using rats as subjects, we tested the generality of this "unit price" concept by varying four dimensions of price: fixed-ratio schedule, number of food pellets per fixed-ratio completion, probability of reinforcement, and response lever weight or effort. Two levels of the last three factors were combined in a 2 x 2 x 2 design giving eight groups. Each group was studied under a series of six FR schedules. Using the nominal values of all factors to determine unit price, we found that grams of food consumed plotted as a function of unit price followed a single demand curve. Similarly, total work output (responses x effort) conformed to a single function when plotted in terms of unit price. These observations provided a template for interpreting the effects of biological factors, such as brain lesions or drugs, that might alter the cost-benefit ratio.     

Choice with delayed and probabilistic reinforcers: effects of variability, time between trials, and conditioned reinforcers.

In a discrete-trials procedure with pigeons, a response on a green key led to a 4-s delay (during which green houselights were lit) and then a reinforcer might or might not be delivered. A response on a red key led to a delay of adjustable duration (during which red houselights were lit) and then a certain reinforcer. The delay was adjusted so as to estimate an indifference point--a duration for which the two alternatives were equally preferred. Once the green key was chosen, a subject had to continue to respond on the green key until a reinforcer was delivered. Each response on the green key, plus the 4-s delay that followed every response, was called one "link" of the green-key schedule. Subjects showed much greater preference for the green key when the number of links before reinforcement was variable (averaging four) than when it was fixed (always exactly four). These findings are consistent with the view that probabilistic reinforcers are analogous to reinforcers delivered after variable delays. When successive links were separated by 4-s or 8-s "interlink intervals" with white houselights, preference for the probabilistic alternative decreased somewhat for 2 subjects but was unaffected for the other 2 subjects. When the interlink intervals had the same green houselights that were present during the 4-s delays, preference for the green key decreased substantially for all subjects. These results provided mixed support for the view that preference for a probabilistic reinforcer is inversely related to the duration of conditioned reinforcers that precede the delivery of food.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

Units of analysis and kinetic structure of behavioral repertoires

It is suggested that molar streams of behavior are constructed of various arrangements of three elementary constituents (elicited, evoked, and emitted response classes). An eight-cell taxonomy is elaborated as a framework for analyzing and synthesizing complex behavioral repertoires based on these functional units. It is proposed that the local force binding functional units into a smoothly articulated kinetic sequence arises from temporally arranged relative response probability relationships. Behavioral integration is thought to reflect the joint influence of the organism's hierarchy of relative response probabilities, fluctuating biological states, and the arrangement of environmental and behavioral events in time.     

An evaluation of the reliability of probability judgments across response modes and over time

Despite the importance of probability assessment methods in behavioral decision theory and decision analysis, little attention has been directed at evaluating their reliability and validity. In fact, no comprehensive study of reliability has been undertaken. Since reliability is a necessary condition for validity, this oversight is significant. The present study was motivated by that oversight. We investigated the reliability of probability measures derived from three response modes: numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. Unlike previous studies, the experiment was designed to distinguish systematic deviations in probability judgments, such as those due to experience or practice, from random deviations. It was found that subjects assessed probabilities reliably for all three assessment methods regardless of the reliability measures employed. However, a small but statistically significant decrease over time in the magnitudes of assessed probabilities was observed. This effect was linked to a decrease in subjects overconfidence during the course of the experiment.     

Upward versus Downward Anchoring in Frequency Judgments of Social Facts

Frequency estimation of social facts in two methods of judgment elicitation was investigated. In the “narrow-range” condition, subjects answered questions in the format: “Out of 100 incidents, how many belong to category X?” In the “wide-range” condition, the frequency for the same event was assessed with respect to “Out of 10,000”. Judged frequencies in the wide-range condition were divided by 100, and were compared with the corresponding judgments in the narrow-range condition. Such comparisons were made for low-frequency and high-frequency events. Previous research has shown that, for low-frequency events, judged frequencies are proportionally greater in the narrow-range than in the wide-range condition. These results reflect cognitive processes of implicit anchoring, whereby judged frequencies lie close to small numbers within the response ranges provided. I call this process “downward anchoring,” and predicted that this tendency would be replicated in the present study. Moreover, I predicted that assessments about high-frequency events would evoke similar cognitive processes operating in the opposite direction. By such “upward anchoring,” judged frequencies would lie close to relatively larger numbers within the given response ranges. Consequently, I predicted that judged frequencies for high-frequency events would be proportionally greater in the wide-range condition than in the narrow-range condition. These predictions were confirmed.     

Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: A single model for both

In a recent issue of this journal, Winman and Juslin (34 , 135–148, 1993) present a model of the calibration of subjective probability judgments for sensory discrimination tasks. They claim that the model predicts a pervasive underconfidence bias observed in such tasks, and present evidence from a training experiment that they interpret as supporting the notion that different models are needed to describe judgment of confidence in sensory and in cognitive tasks. The model is actually part of the more comprehensive decision variable partition model of subjective probability calibration that was originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 26 , 32–53, 1980). The characteristics of the model are described and it is demonstrated that the model does not predict underconfidence, that it is fully compatible with the overconfidence frequently found in calibration studies with cognitive tasks, and that it well represents experimental results from such studies. It is concluded that only a single model is needed for both types of task.     

Human Signal-detection Performance: Effects Of Signal Presentation Probabilities And Reinforcer Distributions

University students participated in one of four standard two-choice signal-detection experiments in which signal presentation probability was varied and the reinforcement distribution was held constant and equal. In Experiments 1, 3 and 4, subjects' performance showed a systematic response bias for reporting the stimulus presented least often. Experiments 1 and 4 showed that this effect was reliable with extended training and monetary, rather than point, reinforcement. In Experiment 2, all correct responses were signaled in some way, and this produced the opposite relationship between signal presentation probability and response bias. Experiments 1 and 3 found that explicitly deducting money (intended as punishment) for equal numbers of incorrect responses on each alternative, or varying the obtained overall rate of reinforcement, produced no clear change in response bias. The bias, shown by humans, for reporting the stimulus presented least often remains a challenge for theories of stimulus detection.     

Changeover behavior and preference in concurrent schedules

Pigeons were trained on a multiple schedule of reinforcement in which separate concurrent schedules occurred in each of two components. Key pecking was reinforced with milo. During one component, a variable-interval 40-s schedule was concurrent with a variable-interval 20-s schedule; during the other component, a variable-interval 40-s schedule was concurrent with a variable-interval 80-s schedule. During probe tests, the stimuli correlated with the two variable-interval 40-s schedules were presented simultaneously to assess preference, measured by the relative response rates to the two stimuli. In Experiment 1, the concurrently available variable-interval 20-s schedule operated normally; that is, reinforcer availability was not signaled. Following this baseline training, relative response rate during the probes favored the variable-interval 40-s alternative that had been paired with the lower valued schedule (i.e., with the variable-interval 80-s schedule). In Experiment 2, a signal for reinforcer availability was added to the high-value alternative (i.e., to the variable-interval 20-s schedule), thus reducing the rate of key pecking maintained by that schedule but leaving the reinforcement rate unchanged. Following that baseline training, relative response rates during probes favored the variable-interval 40-s alternative that had been paired with the higher valued schedule. The reversal in the pattern of preference implies that the pattern of changeover behavior established during training, and not reinforcement rate, determined the preference patterns obtained on the probe tests.