Character-Principlism and the Particularity Objection

This paper is a response to particularist critics of the normative force of moral principles. The particularist critique, as I understand it, is a rejection not only of principle-based accounts of moral deliberation and justification, but also of accounts of character in which principles play a central role. I focus on the latter challenge and counter it with a view I call character-principlism .
I begin by discussing in a general way what motivates the particularity objection to principles and then contrast two views – both of which insist on the importance of attentiveness to particularity – about the relative normative status of principles and particular cases. I present some reasons for believing that we need a more normatively robust conception of the role of moral principles than the particularists provide. In the main portion of the paper, I discuss how character-principlism sees principles functioning in our lives and the lives we lead with others. I contrast this with some other accounts of desirable character that particularists can embrace, and argue that these are seriously flawed because, unlike character-principlism, they cannot satisfactorily explain how a person could possess the constancy of character that moral integrity requires.     

Mood-congruent thoughts and personality disorder pathology

The primary aim of this research was to investigate associations that depression severity and trait anxiety have with reactions to specific, identifiable thoughts experienced by persons with varying levels of personality disorder (PD) pathology as they went about their day-to-day lives. Ninety-eight psychotropic medication-free persons participated in an experience sampling assessment procedure over four consecutive days, during which participants recorded specific thoughts experienced moments before a page signal was received and corresponding ratings of thought discomfort. Thought discomfort, regarded as an emotional reaction to thoughts or their evaluation, was moderately associated with several forms of PD pathology, particularly Cluster C pathology. Once depression severity and trait anxiety were controlled, however, associations between PD pathology and thought discomfort were eliminated. Findings from this research generally support the mood-congruence of negatively valenced thoughts in relation to PD pathology.     

Psychometric qualities of the White Bear Suppression Inventory in a Dutch sample of children and adolescents

The White Bear Suppression Inventory [WBSI; Wegner and Zanakos (1994)] was developed to assess the tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts. Most psychometric studies of the WBSI have included healthy students and adults with obsessive-compulsive disorder. There has been increasing interest in thought suppression in children and adolescents, especially after a traumatic event, but little is known about the psychometric properties of the WBSI for children. The aim of this research was to examine the psychometric qualities of the WBSI in a Dutch sample of children and adolescents. Two studies were conducted. First, the WBSI’s factor structure, internal consistency and test-retest stability were examined in a sample of 203 primary school children (9-13 years). Second, the factor structure and content validity were assessed in 89 children and adolescents (8-18 years) who attended the emergency room after a road traffic accident. Results demonstrated that the WBSI items contribute to a single factor measuring the suppression of unwanted thoughts and that the reliability is satisfactory. Associations between the WBSI and PTSD-symptoms demonstrated sufficient content validity. The findings suggest that the WBSI can appropriately be used in child and adolescent samples.     

Four empirical tests of Unconscious Thought Theory

According to Unconscious Thought Theory, people make better decisions after unconscious than after conscious thought (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006a). Unconscious Thought Theory yields four specific predictions. First, an exact replication of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006a) study should indicate that unconscious decisions are superior to conscious decisions. Second, decisions should improve with duration of conscious thought. Third, unconscious decisions should be superior to conscious decisions, even if unconscious decisions are deliberated while having access to information. Fourth, unconscious decisions should be based on a weighting strategy. We report results of four studies, featuring 480 participants, that yield no evidence in favor of these predictions. Therefore our findings cast doubt on Unconscious Thought Theory and its advice to base decisions on unconscious thought. The results of our studies suggest that it is better to base decisions on conscious thought while having access to information.     

Effects of suppressing neutral and obsession-like thoughts in normal subjects: beyond frequency

Recent cognitive-behavioral theories on obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) show that deliberate attempts to suppress intrusive and undesirable thoughts lie at the genesis of clinical obsessions. In this paper the results of an experimental study on the suppression of neutral and obsession-like thoughts in normal subjects are presented. Eighty-seven university students performed in three experimental periods: (1) base-line monitoring, (2) experimental instruction, and (3) monitoring. For each of these periods, the frequency of the occurrence of a "white bear" thought or a personally relevant intrusive thought was registered. Half of the subjects received instructions to suppress the target-thought in period 2, and the other half were instructed to only monitor the target-thought in each of the experimental periods. Several measures were also obtained before and after the experiment: annoyance caused by the intrusion, suppression effort, subjective success, and evaluative appraisals of the target-thought. The results showed neither immediate nor delayed frequency increases of the target thought. However, evidence was found that deliberate thought suppression efforts, regardless of their content, had greater negative consequences than did non suppression. These results are discussed in relation to the recent cognitive proposals about OCD.     

Suppressing unwanted memories: where there is a will,there is a way?

Research suggests that suppressing unwanted thoughts, generally, is an ineffective thought control strategy, because suppression attempts oftentimes fail, and, furthermore, result in a paradoxical increase of unwanted thoughts, later on. The present study sought to investigate whether manipulated expectations about suppression efficacy determine actual effects of suppression attempts. To test this hypothesis, participants listened to an audiotaped story, and were subsequently appointed to one of four conditions: a no-instruction-control (n = 20), suppression (n = 20), suppression-works (n = 20; participants were told that suppression generally is a fruitful strategy), or suppression-does-not-work (n = 25; participants were told that suppression primarily has paradoxical effects) condition. Two hours later, participants' memories of the story were tested, and several metamemory questions were answered. Induced expectations actually determined the perceived efficacy of suppression attempts, as well as thought frequency, although perceived or actual accuracy of recollections was not affected by the instructions.     

Differentiating the effects of self-control and self-esteem on reactions to mortality salience

Whereas many previous studies suggest that self-esteem may buffer against the psychological threat of death, recent research has begun to suggest that self-control also may serve as a buffer. Two studies examined the possibility that dispositional self-control uniquely predicts responses to mortality salience, above and beyond self-esteem. In Study 1, an initial exercise in emotion regulation increased subsequent accessibility of death thoughts. In Study 2, mortality salience increased worldview defense. Both of these effects were moderated by dispositional self-control, such that the effects occurred among participants with low but not high self-control. More importantly, these moderating effects were observed over and above the moderating effects of self-esteem. Findings suggest that self-control may serve as an important and unique buffer against thoughts of death.