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In this paper, I argue for an Aristotelian way of accommodating supererogation within virtue ethics by retrieving an account of moral heroism and providing a picture of different degrees of virtue. This, I claim, is the most appropriate virtue-ethical background allowing us to talk about supererogation without falling prey to several dangers. After summarizing the main attempts to deny the compatibility of virtue and supererogation, I will present some recent proposals to accommodate supererogation within virtue ethics. Next, I will argue that these proposals raise substantial worries. I will then offer an analysis of heroism and the degrees of virtue to outline my own alternative definition of supererogation in terms of heroic virtue. 相似文献
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Douglas W. Portmore 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(4):369-388
In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must
accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can
prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others
from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that moral reasons morally override nonmoral
reasons, such that even the weakest moral reason trumps the strongest nonmoral reason in the determination of an act’s moral
status (e.g., morally permissible or impermissible). If this is right, then it seems that these theorists have their work
cut out for them. It will not be enough for them to provide a criterion of rightness that accommodates agent-centered options
and supererogatory acts, for, in doing so, they incur a debt. As I will show, in accommodating agent-centered options, they
commit themselves to the view that moral reasons are not morally overriding, and so they owe us an account of how both moral
reasons and nonmoral reasons come together to determine an act’s moral status.
相似文献
Douglas W. PortmoreEmail: |
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Jason Kawall 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):153-156
In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I present.
相似文献
Jason KawallEmail: |
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Jose-Miguel Fernandez-Dols Pilar Aguilar Robin R. Vallacher Hugo Rabbia Melvin J. Lerner 《Journal of experimental social psychology》2010,46(3):525-530
The failure to recognize the influence of two distinct forms of moral norms can lead to the misattribution of moral behavior to egoistic motives. This is illustrated in the research of Batson and his colleagues (e.g., Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). They reported the appearance of moral failure and hypocrisy motivation in several experiments employing essentially the same “zero-sum” experimental situation. They cited as evidence the discrepancy between participants’ apparently self-serving private acts and their subsequent public ratings of the morality of what they had done as well as their recognition of the “most” moral way to behave. The research reported here supported an alternative explanation that located the experimenter’s implicit and explicit instructions as the source of the discrepancy between the participants’ private acts and their public ratings. The findings confirmed the hypothesis that Batson and his colleagues had not merely made moral norms “salient”. They had actually presented their participants with contradictory “demands”: explicitly inviting them to meet the norm of justified self-interest in private but then give public lip-service to the experimenter’s instructions as to a supererogatory way to behave. When either of the demands was removed, the “hypocrisy” no longer occurred. 相似文献
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