Executive functioning and prospective memory in young children

The current study examined the role of executive functioning (EF) in children's prospective memory (PM) by assessing the effect of delay and number of intentions to-be-remembered on PM, as well as relations between PM and EF. Ninety-six 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds completed a PM task and two executive function tasks. The PM task required children to interrupt an ongoing card game to perform one action (single intention) or two actions (dual intention) with target cards after a short delay (1 min) or a long delay (5 min). There was no main effect of number of intentions or delay on the PM task. However, performance improved with age, and age and delay interacted such that 4-year-olds’ performance remained the same after a long delay whereas 5-year-olds’ performance improved after a long delay. We suggest that the age by delay interaction is a product of age differences in cognitive monitoring. Working memory but not inhibitory control predicted PM with age controlled. We argue that an executive function framework permits an integrative understanding of many processes involved in young children's prospective memory.     

Prospective and retrospective time perception are related to mental time travel: Evidence from Alzheimer’s disease

Unlike prospective time perception paradigms, in which participants are aware that they have to estimate forthcoming time, little is known about retrospective time perception in normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Our paper addresses this shortcoming by comparing prospective and retrospective time estimation in younger adults, older adults, and AD patients. In four prospective tasks (lasting 30 s, 60 s, 90 s, or 120 s) participants were asked to read a series of numbers and to provide a verbal estimation of the reading time. In four other retrospective tasks, they were not informed about time judgment until they were asked to provide a verbal estimation of four elapsed time intervals (lasting 30 s, 60 s, 90 s, or 120 s). AD participants gave shorter verbal time estimations than older adults and younger participants did, suggesting that time is perceived to pass quickly in these patients. For all participants, the duration of the retrospective tasks was underestimated as compared to the prospective tasks and both estimations were shorter than the real time interval. Prospective time estimation was further correlated with mental time travel, as measured with the Remember/Know paradigm. Mental time travel was even higher correlated with retrospective time estimation. Our findings shed light on the relationship between time perception and the ability to mentally project oneself into time, two skills contributing to human memory functioning. Finally, time perception deficits, as observed in AD patients, can be interpreted in terms of dramatic changes occurring in frontal lobes and hippocampus.     

Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.     

Is the devil in the detail? Evidence for S-S learning after unconditional stimulus revaluation in human evaluative conditioning under a broader set of experimental conditions

Whether valence change during evaluative conditioning is mediated by a link between the conditional stimulus (CS) and the unconditional stimulus (US; S-S learning) or between the CS and the unconditional response (S-R learning) is a matter of continued debate. Changing the valence of the US after conditioning, known as US revaluation, can be used to dissociate these accounts. Changes in CS valence after US revaluation provide evidence for S-S learning but if CS valence does not change, evidence for S-R learning is found. Support for S-S learning has been provided by most past revaluation studies, but typically the CS and US have been from the same stimulus category, the task instructions have suggested that judgements of the CS should be based on the US, and USs have been mildly valenced stimuli. These factors may bias the results in favour of S-S learning. We examined whether S-R learning would be evident when CSs and USs were taken from different categories, the task instructions were removed, and more salient USs were used. US revaluation was found to influence explicit US evaluations and explicit and implicit CS evaluations, supporting an S-S learning account and suggesting that past results are stable across procedural changes.     

Do patients suffering from chronic diseases retrospectively overestimate how healthy they were before they fell ill?

Background/Objective: To examine the impact of a disease on a person's subjective health state, patients are often asked to assess their current health state and to retrospectively assess how healthy they were before they fell ill. The objective of this study was to test whether patients generally overestimated the quality of their pre-disease health. Method: Six samples of patients with chronic diseases (cancer patients, cardiovascular patients, and patients diagnosed with sarcoidosis, N between 197 and 1,197) were analyzed. The patients assessed their current health states and their health states at the time before diagnosis. The retrospective scores were compared with matched data from general population studies. Results: In three of the six studies, the retrospective health ratings of the patients were significantly higher than the general population norms (effect sizes between 0.24 and 0.46), two studies yielded nonsignificant effects, and in one study there was an opposite trend. The general overestimation of pre-disease health was more pronounced in older patients as compared with younger ones, and it was more pronounced when global health/quality of life was to be assessed. Conclusions: Retrospective assessments of pre-disease health states are not appropriate for assessing disease-related changes in a person's health state.     

Accuracy of retrospective memory and covariation estimation in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder

Assessment methods relying on biased or inaccurate retrospective recall may distort knowledge about the nature of disorders and lead to faulty clinical inferences. Despite concerns about the accuracy of retrospective recall in general and in particular with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, the accuracy of retrospective recall for one's own symptoms assessed in vivo is unknown in this population. This study used a prospective ecological momentary assessment (EMA) methodology to create a criterion against which to assess recall accuracy in OCD patients. Although results indicated that patients’ retrospective recall of OCD symptoms was fairly accurate, they consistently overestimated the magnitude of OCD symptom covariation with non-OCD facets (e.g., sleep duration, contemporaneous stress level, etc.). Findings suggest that even when recall of OCD symptoms is accurate, patients may be inaccurate in estimating symptom covariation. The findings have implications for the research, case conceptualization, and assessment of OCD, and may extend to other disorders.