排序方式: 共有2条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1
1.
Stephen Maitzen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(2):93-103
Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such
a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical
theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus
our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics object that skeptical theism
implies a degree of moral skepticism that even skeptical theists will find objectionable and that it undermines moral obligations
that even skeptical theists will want to preserve. I discuss a version of the first objection and defend a version of the
second. 相似文献
2.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):229-246
Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional
fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on
a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be
abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed
in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof
invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.
相似文献
Luca MorettiEmail: |
1