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Sarah C ODowd 《Journal of experimental child psychology》1980,29(1):36-49
A semantic differential study of development of antonym meanings revealed methodological problems (e.g., concept-scale interaction and developmental changes in scale-checking style) not fully considered in previous semantic differential investigations of child language development. Twenty adjectives were rated on 10 scales by subjects from grades K to 5 (approximately 6 through 11 years old) and adults. Analyses by means, polarity ratings, and average sums of squared differences failed to yield consistent developmental trends. Subjects' choices of scale ratings did show clear age-related differences: Grades K and 1 chose extreme ratings almost exclusively; grades 2 through 4 showed an increase in neutral choices and decreases in extreme ratings; grades 4 and 5 and adults chose extreme ratings least often, neutral choices most often, and more intermediate ratings than any younger subjects. Results show that scale choice is a crucial factor in designing semantic differential studies with children, there is a low correlation between mean scores and ratings given by individual children, and shifts in scale-checking style should be considered when interpreting apparent developmental changes in children's semantic differential ratings. 相似文献
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by Gregory R. Peterson 《Zygon》2009,44(1):19-29
Owen Flanagan's The Really Hard Problem provides a rich source of reflection on the question of meaning and ethics within the context of philosophical naturalism. I affirm the title's claim that the quest to find meaning in a purely physical universe is indeed a hard problem by addressing three issues: Flanagan's claim that there can be a scientific/empirical theory of ethics (eudaimonics), that ethics requires moral glue, and whether, in the end, Flanagan solves the hard problem. I suggest that he does not, although he provides much that is of importance and useful for further reflection along the way. 相似文献
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Charles Goodman 《Zygon》2014,49(1):220-230
Owen Flanagan's important book The Bodhisattva's Brain presents a naturalized interpretation of Buddhist philosophy. Although the overall approach of the book is very promising, certain aspects of its presentation could benefit from further reflection. Traditional teachings about reincarnation do not contradict the doctrine of no self, as Flanagan seems to suggest; however, they are empirically rather implausible. Flanagan's proposed “tame” interpretation of karma is too thin; we can do better at fitting karma into a scientific worldview. The relationship between eudaimonist and utilitarian strands in Buddhist ethics is more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize incautious and imprecise claims that Buddhism will make practitioners happy. We can make progress by distinguishing between happiness in the sense of a Buddhist version of eudaimonia, and happiness in the sense of attitudinal pleasure. Doing so might result in an interpretation of Buddhist views about happiness that was simultaneously philosophically interesting, historically credible, and psychologically testable. 相似文献
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Mikael Leidenhag 《Zygon》2018,53(1):29-48
This article critically analyzes Owen Flanagan's physicalism and attempt at deriving ethical normativity from current neuroscience. It is argued that neurophysicalism, despite Flanagan's harsh critique of “the new mysterians,” entails a form of mysterianism and that it fails to appropriately ground human mentality within physicalism. Flanagan seeks to bring spirituality and a physicalist ontology together by showing how it is possible to derive an account of the good life from science. This attempt is critiqued and it is shown that Flanagan fails to establish the consistency between ethical normativity and physicalism. Hence, another form of mysterianism seems to emerge within this normative mind science. 相似文献
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J. L. A. Garcia 《Philosophia》2006,34(4):417-435
I first sketch an account of humility as a character trait in which we are unimpressed with our good, envied, or admired features,
achievements, etc., where these lack significant salience for our image of ourselves, because of the greater prominence of
our limitations and flaws. I situate this view among several other recent conceptions of humility (also called modesty), dividing
them between the inward-directed and outward-directed, distinguish mine from them, pose problems for each alternative account,
and show how my understanding of humility captures truths present but exaggerated in several of them. Responding to some problems
for my view, including what I call “Driver’s Paradox”(i.e., the strangeness of someone’s proclaiming ‘I’m humble!’), I suggest
that some over-ambitious claims about our moral responsibilities may indicate a lack of proper humility. I discuss the relationship
of the character trait of humility both to what humiliates and to what humbles, concluding with consideration of the background
assumptions against which, and the circumstances in which, humility may reasonably be classified as a moral virtue.
相似文献
J. L. A. GarciaEmail: |
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Christian Coseru 《Zygon》2014,49(1):208-219
Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain represents an ambitious foray into cross‐cultural neurophilosophy, making a compelling, though not entirely unproblematic, case for naturalizing Buddhist philosophy. While the naturalist account of mental causation challenges certain Buddhist views about the mind, the Buddhist analysis of mind and mental phenomena is far more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize the Buddhist claim that there could be mental states that are not reducible to their neural correlates; however, when the mental states in question reflect the embodied patterns of moral conduct that characterize the Buddhist way of being‐in‐the‐world, an account of their intentional and normative status becomes indispensable. It is precisely this synthesis of normativity and causal explanation that makes Buddhism special, and opens new avenues for enhancing, refining, and expanding the range of arguments and possibilities that comparative neurophilosophy can entertain. 相似文献
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Bronwyn Finnigan 《Zygon》2014,49(1):231-241
Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain aims to introduce secular‐minded thinkers to Buddhist thought and motivate its acceptance by analytic philosophers. I argue that Flanagan provides a compelling caution against the hasty generalizations of recent “science of happiness” literature, which correlates happiness with Buddhism on the basis of certain neurological studies. I contend, however, that his positive account of Buddhist ethics is less persuasive. I question the level of engagement with Buddhist philosophical literature and challenge Flanagan's central claim, that a Buddhist version of eudaimonia is a common core conception shared by all Buddhists. I argue that this view is not only a rational reconstruction in need of argumentation but is in tension with competing Buddhist metaphysical theories of self, including the one Flanagan himself endorses. 相似文献
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Don Garrett 《Synthese》2006,152(3):301-319
Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) Howdo perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, a significant part of the causal and/or functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular functional roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds. 相似文献
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