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In this article I concentrate on three issues. First, Graham Oppy’s treatment of the relationship between the concept of infinity
and Zeno’s paradoxes lay bare several porblems that must be dealt with if the concept of infinity is to do any intellectual
work in philosophy of religion. Here I will expand on some insightful remarks by Oppy in an effort ot adequately respond to
these problems. Second, I will do the same regarding Oppy’s treatment of Kant’s first antinomy in the first critique, which
deals in part with the question of whether the world had a beginning in time or if time extends infinitely into the past.
And third, my examination of these two issues will inform what I have to say regarding a key topic in philosophy of religion:
the question regarding the proper relationship between the infinite and the finite in the concept of God. 相似文献
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Stephen Maitzen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(2):93-103
Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such
a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical
theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus
our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics object that skeptical theism
implies a degree of moral skepticism that even skeptical theists will find objectionable and that it undermines moral obligations
that even skeptical theists will want to preserve. I discuss a version of the first objection and defend a version of the
second. 相似文献
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