Conceiving of entities as objects and as stuff

What is the difference between conceiving of an entity as an object of some kind and conceiving of it as an amount of solid stuff? We propose that the difference lies in how one thinks about the entity's structure. Object construals require thinking of the structure as being nonarbitrary, whereas substance construals require thinking of the structure as being arbitrary. We report six experiments that provide empirical support for this proposal. Regularity of structure, repetition of structure, and the existence of structure-dependent functions, all of which provide reasons to consider the structure of an entity to be nonarbitrary, were shown to bias participants towards object construals. We also discuss how the proposed account of what it means to construe an entity as an object or as some stuff can account for a range of findings in the literature on lexical development. These include the relation between cohesiveness and ontological category, shape and ontological category, and complexity of shape and ontological category. Finally, we discuss the nature of construals and the relation of object and substance construals to the physical, design, and intentional stances.     

Patterns of 4-month-old infant responses to hidden silent and sounding people and objects

Responses of 4-month-old infants to hidden people and objects were investigated with equated task demands. Twenty-one 4-month-old infants were administered a combined task, in which they were shown a sounding stimulus that continued to sound after hiding, an auditory task, in which sound was the only source of information about the position of the object in space, and a vision task, in which a silent stimulus was shown to the infants prior to hiding. Five infant behaviours were coded: reaching, gazing, body movements, vocalizations and smiles. The infants reached significantly more for hidden objects than for people, to whom they vocalized instead. They further smiled, and moved their bodies more towards their invisible mother than to the other stimuli. Thus infants responded differentially to people and objects whether the stimuli were soundless (so that there was no cue to their presence) or not. This suggested that infants appreciated (a) that an object had been hidden; (b) this object was either animate or inanimate; and (c) different procedures were appropriate for the retrieval of, or for interacting with animate and inanimate objects. Discussion centres on the underlying representational system that allows for such appreciation.     

Too much anticipation? Large anticipatory adjustments of grasping movements to minimal object manipulations

When humans grasp objects, the grasps foreshadow the intended object manipulation. It has been suggested that grasps are selected that lead to medial arm postures, which facilitate movement speed and precision, during critical phases of the object manipulation. In Experiment 1, it has been tested whether grasp selections lead to medial postures during rotations of a dial. Participants twisted their arms considerably before grasping the dial, even when the upcoming dial rotation was minimal (5°). Participants neither assumed a medial posture at any point during a short rotation, nor did they assume any of the postures involved in short rotations in the opposite direction. Thus, grasp selections did not necessarily lead to specific postures at any point of the object manipulation. Experiment 2 examined the effect of various grasps on the speed of dial rotations. A medial initial grasp resulted in the fastest dial rotations for most rotation angles. Spontaneously selected grasps were more excursed than necessary to maximize dial rotation speed. This apparent overshot might be explained by participants’ sensitive to the variability of their grasps and is in line with the assumption that grasps facilitate control over the grasped object.     

Infants' formation and use of categories to segregate objects

Four- and-a-half-month-old infants' (N = 100) category formation and use was studied in a series of five experiments. For each experiment, the test events featured a display composed of a cylinder and a box. Previous research showed that this display is not clearly parsed as a single unit or as two separate units by infants of this age. Immediately prior to testing, infants were shown a set of category exemplars. Knowledge about this category could help infants disambiguate the test display, which contained a novel exemplar of this category. Clear interpretation of the test display as composed of two separate units (as indicated by infants' longer looking at the move-together than at the move-apart test event) was taken as evidence of category formation and use. In Experiments 1 and 5, infants' prior experience with a set of three different boxes that were similar to the test box facilitated their segregation of the test display. Experiment 2 showed that three different exemplars are necessary: prior experience with any two of the three boxes used in Experiment 1 did not facilitate infants' segregation of the test display. Experiment 3 showed that variability in the exemplar set is necessary: prior experience with three identical boxes did not facilitate infants' segregation of the test display. Experiment 4 showed that under these conditions of very brief prior exposure, similarity between the exemplar set and test box is necessary: prior experience with three different boxes that were not very similar to the test box did not facilitate infants' segregation of the test display. Together, these findings suggest that: (a) number of exemplars, variability, and similarity in the exemplar set are important for infants' category formation, and (b) infants use their category knowledge to determine the boundaries of the objects in a display.     

Young infants' expectations about hidden objects

Infants aged 3-5 months (mean of approximately 4 months) were given a novel anticipatory looking task to test object permanence understanding. They were trained to expect an experimenter to retrieve an object from behind a transparent screen upon hearing a cue ("Doors up, here comes the hand"). The experimenter then hid the object behind one of two opaque screens and after either 2 or 8s gave the "doors up" cue. Infants looked to the correct location after the two-second delay, but not after the eight-second delay. This indicates a brief memory that the object is present behind the occluder. The study provides converging evidence that infants grasp object permanence by a young age. The novel anticipatory looking paradigm helps rule out counter-explanations applied to violation-of-expectation tasks.     

Learning about life and death in early childhood

have argued that young children initially understand biological phenomena in terms of vitalism, a mode of construal in which "life" or "life-force" is the central causal-explanatory concept. This study investigated the development of vitalistic reasoning in young children's concepts of life, the human body and death. Sixty preschool children between the ages of 3 years, 7 months and 5 years, 11 months participated. All children were initially given structured interviews to assess their knowledge of (1) human body function and (2) death. From this sample 40 children in the Training group were taught about the human body and how it functions to maintain life. The Control group (n=20) received no training. All 60 children were subsequently reassessed on their knowledge of human body function and death. Results from the initial interviews indicated that young children who spontaneously appealed to vitalistic concepts in reasoning about human body functioning were also more sophisticated in their understanding of death. Results from the posttraining interviews showed that children readily learned to adopt a vitalistic approach to human body functioning, and that this learning coincided with significant development in their understanding of human body function, and of death. The overall pattern of results supports the claim that the acquisition of a vitalistic causal-explanatory framework serves to structure children's concepts and facilitates learning in the domain of biology.