An information - expectation framework for decisions under uncertainty

Despite being in existence for many decades, normative decision theory has not become a commonly used tool for real-world decisions. This paper considers the reasons for this situation and suggestions for circumventing them. The main suggestion involves a two-stage framework in terms of the information available to the decision maker and his/her expectations under the available acts. This framework is well suited for decisions with incomplete structure, which is typical of real decision situations. Within this framework a specific multiplicative model is also discussed.     

论构成的主体性与意动的主体性

先验主体性与客体性尽管在概念上相互对峙,但作为人类经验与实践的出发点,它们在运作上却从一开始就是浑然一体的。构成主体性是让在时空中对象化了的客体呈现在主体面前并获得意义的意向结构,意动主体性却是让主体获得目的性并将目的在与客体的相互作用中对象化的意向结构。在构成主体性和意动主体性之间的互动中协辩理性的介入,是使规范伦理学有可能在交互主体性的平台上展开的先决条件。     

A logic for deontic dilemmas

The possibility of deontic dilemmas poses a significant problem for deontic logic. Here I review some proposals to resolve this problem, and then offer a new account. This is a simple modification of standard deontic logic that enables the system to accommodate deontic dilemmas without inconsistency and without deontic explosion, while at the same time accounting for the range of genuinely valid inferences.     

Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom

There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.

Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy

The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers.     

Recognizing discrimination explicitly while denying it implicitly: Implicit social identity protection

Past research suggests that members of devalued groups recognize their groups are discriminated against. Do the implicit responses of members of these groups demonstrate the same pattern? We argue that they do not and that this is due to a motivated protection of members of devalued groups' social identity. Study 1 demonstrates that, at an explicit level African-Canadians recognize that their group is discriminated against, but at an implicit level African-Canadians think that most people like their group to a greater extent than do European-Canadians. Study 2 replicates this implicit finding with Muslim participants while demonstrating that, when affirmed, this group difference disappears. Study 3 demonstrates that implicit normative regard can predict collective action over and above implicit attitudes and explicit normative regard. The implications for changing the status quo are discussed.     

Observer judgmental accuracy of personality: Benefits related to being a good (normative) judge

The current study tested the hypothesis that accuracy of personality judgment would be positively related to beneficial life outcomes. 189 participants observed targets across 5 dyadic interactions and made judgments of the 10 targets on the Big Five traits. Self and acquaintance ratings were used as the accuracy criteria. Normative accuracy for all traits was related to agreeableness, and normative accuracy for some traits was positively related to interpersonal control, interpersonal support, positive affect, and life satisfaction. Distinctive accuracy was not related to beneficial outcomes. These results imply that normative accuracy based on observation is associated with beneficial outcomes, whereas distinctive accuracy is not.     

论传媒伦理的界定

要科学地界定传媒伦理,首先,不能偏离伦理“致至善”的本性;其次,须从元伦理学、规范伦理学及应用伦理学三个层面深入考察传媒伦理的理论进路。本文认为,传媒伦理首先是对人们媒介行为中善恶选择的系统性探究,它系统地研究道德善的媒体当如何履职、媒体是否符合它的应当以及媒介从业人员在其媒介行为中对善与恶,正当与不正当的认识与抉择等问题;其次,与人们实际生活相关的是,传媒伦理也试图界定那些构成价值与生活规范的,被作为个体、群体或文化共同体的人们所共同认可的原则性的内容。     

Prototypicality of responses of autistic,language disordered,and normal children in a word fluency task

This article describes an example of making pediatric neuropsychological assessments more time-efficient. Empirical support, including new data, for the utilization of an eight-subtest short form of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991) is reviewed. It is concluded that this short form of the WISC-III is a valid substitute for the complete version under most clinical circumstances, allowing the practitioner to expand on interview, history or more specific neuropsychological tests without adding financial or time burdens to the evaluation.     

A normative study of the Children’s Color Trails Test (CCTT) in the Cypriot population

Background: The Children’s Color Trails Test (CCTT) is a neuropsychological test that measures attention, divided attention, and speed of mental processing. It has been increasingly used in the assessment of children in cross-cultural environments for neurological and psychiatric disorders such as seizures and closed head injuries, learning and/or language disabilities, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, children with manganese exposure, and children diagnosed with HIV virus. However, there is a paucity of studies presenting normative data. The aim of the present study was to provide normative data for the CCTT in the Cypriot population. Methods: A total of 709 native Cypriot children aged 7–16 years, recruited from various public schools across the island, took part in the study. Exclusion criteria involved the existence of neurological, psychiatric, cardiological, and metabolic diseases, premature birth, history of maternal alcohol and drug abuse during pregnancy, low birth weight, hearing loss, visual problems, native language other than Greek, and abnormality in fine-motor movements. Results: Age and gender were found to be important factors for the interpretation of scores in all CCTT variables. Older children required less time and exhibited fewer errors, near misses, and prompts compared to younger children. There was a consistent pattern of a 3–4 seconds improvement (less time in seconds) in the CCTT completion time as age increased. Conclusions: CCTT is a promising tool for the measurement of attention in the native Cypriot population. Further research is needed in children diagnosed with various neurological and psychiatric diseases in order to estimate validity of the CCTT in clinical populations.